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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation extends theory and empirical research on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
to include the unique context faced by underwriters that have the flexibility to overprice 
cold offerings. First, it argues that underwriters have the incentive to deliberately 
overprice weakly-received offerings in order to avert potential withdrawal of the 
offerings and loss of underwriting commissions. It then empirically tests this argument 
and finds supporting evidence. Measuring underwriter pricing intention by the 
NASDAQ-adjusted percentage change from the offer price to the closing price three days 
prior to the end of the quiet period, it finds deliberate overpricing to be more pronounced 
for offerings that end up priced exactly at the lower boundary of the preliminary price 
range, especially when the ex ante withdrawal probability is high or when the lower 
boundary represents a smaller percent drop from the range’s midpoint. 
The dissertation then examines the effect of IPO overpricing on the long-term prospects 
of the underwriters. It empirically demonstrates that overpricing offerings to avert 
withdrawal not only increases the payoff to the underwriter from the respective deals but 
also enhances the underwriter’s share of future IPO business. In particular, it finds that 
banks which engage issuers with a higher ex ante propensity to withdraw, and then 
aggressively price the offerings to actually avert withdrawal, experience a pronounced 
increase in their future IPO market share. Such reward is not experienced by underwriters 
which at the outset avoid engaging issuers with high likelihood of withdrawal. The 
dissertation also finds that withdrawals have more of an adverse effect on future market 
share than does mere overpricing. Furthermore, when overpricing is accompanied by 
even a low level of price support during first-day of public trading, the effect on the 
 iv 
 
bank’s future market share is significantly less adverse than that associated with 
otherwise letting the offer be withdrawn. 
The dissertation extends the IPO bookbuilding theory by developing a model which 
encompasses the potential for IPO withdrawal, overpricing, and aftermarket price support 
altogether, and solving for the equilibrium offer-price-maximizing price/allocation 
schedule. The analysis shows that overpricing can be sustained in equilibrium in a 
manner that still ensures maximized proceeds to the issuer. The optimal price/allocation 
rule calls for allocation priority to be given to investors with strong indications of 
interest; underpricing to occur when premarket demand is strong; and overpricing to be 
resorted to only as needed to avert withdrawal by the issuer in lukewarmly-received 
offerings. Aftermarket price stabilization plays two roles in equilibrium: It bonds the 
underwriter against deliberate overpricing when premarket demand is either strong or too 
weak; and it adequately compensates investors when overpricing is utilized to avert issue 
withdrawal. 
Keywords: Initial Public Offerings, Withdrawals, Selective overpricing, Aftermarket 
price support, Bookbuilding, Underwriter market share, Firm valuation,  
Reservation price 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1   Introduction 
The market for initial public offerings (IPO) in the United States revived during 
the 1990s. Not only did the number of companies going public grow tremendously, but 
also the gross proceeds raised during the decade were almost four times that of the earlier 
three decades combined. After the year 2000, the number of IPOs decreased, as compared 
to that of the preceding decade, but the gross proceeds continued to increase. With the 
booming IPO market, the phenomenon of underpricing becomes more pronounced. The 
average percentage first-day returns of IPOs each year were routinely above two digits, 
and a rapid upsurge of initial returns coincided with the Internet bubble during 1999 and 
2000.1 As a result, researchers since Ibbotson (1975) have continued their attempt to 
explain the underpricing of IPOs.2  
However, the negative initial returns are less often studied. Not all uncertainty 
about the market valuation of the new shares will be resolved during the premarket, so 
inadvertent ‘errors’ in setting an offer price , which result in negative returns, are not 
improbable.  Normally, the commitment to support the price in the aftermarket reduces 
the underwriter’s incentive to deliberately overstate premarket interest and overprice the 
offering (Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm 1996). Furthermore, since investment banks 
are repeated players in the equity market, their reputation would suffer any time they 
inaccurately price an offering (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994). However, this thesis will 
                                                 
1 Data obtained from Jay Ritter’s Web site (http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm).  
2 For example, Baron (1982), Rock (1986), Tinic (1988), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989), Welch (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Spatt and Srivastava (1991), Welch (1992), 
Chemmanur (1993), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), etc. 
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demonstrate that it might be in the interest of the underwriter, both short term and long, to 
deliberately overprice some offerings.  
In chapter 2, we argue and provide evidence that, despite their commitment to 
aftermarket price support, underwriters might overprice weakly-received offerings for the 
purpose of averting the potential withdrawal of these offerings. Benveniste et al. (1996) 
demonstrate that the commitment to aftermarket price support effectively destroys 
underwriters’ incentive to overstate premarket interest and overprice offerings. While 
underwriters get to keep seven percent—the typical spread—of any inflation of the offer 
price, they bear the full cost of such inflation as they stand ready to buy back shares in the 
aftermarket at (or slightly below) the inflated offer price. However, Benveniste et al. 
(1996) do not consider the case when the issuer might withdraw the offering if premarket 
interest suggests a price below the issuer reservation price. In such a case, overpricing to 
meet the issuer’s minimum acceptable price not only raises the underwriting commission 
but rather, and more importantly, it averts the likely withdrawal and the loss of the entire 
commission. When the cost of overpricing needed to avert withdrawal is not too severe, 
the salvaged commission can outweigh the added cost of price support, and the 
underwriter, therefore, still have an incentive to overprice.   
The theoretical argument in the thesis is complementary to that of Benveniste et 
al. (1996). In the current framework, the commitment to price stabilization is required to 
sustain overpricing in equilibrium. It bonds the banks against overpricing when 
premarket demand is strong for the very reason explained in Benveniste et al. (1996). It 
also discourages overpricing when premarket demand is too weak as aftermarket support 
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would be too expensive. And when overpricing does occur to avert potential withdrawals 
with lukewarm reception, the stabilization commitment ensures that overpricing is 
minimized and IPO investors are adequately compensated.  
We test our hypothesis using the offerings completed or withdrawn in the U.S. 
market during the period of 1996-2007. We measure the underwriter’s pricing intention 
(to underprice or overprice) by the NASDAQ-adjusted percentage change from the offer 
price to the closing price three days prior to the end of the quiet period (hereafter, day-3 
PEQ excess return). Consistent with our prediction, a negative price drift, proxying for an 
intention to overprice, is more pronounced among the offerings priced at the lower 
boundary of the preliminary price range, especially when the ex ante withdrawal 
probability is high or when the offer price range is narrow in percentage terms relative to 
its midpoint (thereby indicating a more binding lower boundary). Setting the offer price 
exactly at the lower bound of the price range presumably captures an underwriter’s 
reluctance to go below for fear of issuer withdrawal. Little or no evidence of deliberate 
overpricing is detected in the offerings priced below the lower boundary. This pattern is 
even more apparent in the 2001-2007 subsample, consistent with the view that bankers 
were more aggressive in getting deals done in the “cold” market following the burst of 
the Internet bubble in the spring of 2000.  
We find a similar pattern of results when we study a proxy of first-day 
aftermarket price support, consistent with our prediction that price stabilization 
accompanies deliberate overpricing to adequately compensate investors.  We focus the 
analysis on offerings which are likely to have been supported, and find that our proxy of 
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aftermarket price support is higher for issues priced at the lower boundary of the filing 
range, especially when ex ante probability of withdrawal is higher or when the associated 
price adjustment is a small percent of the midpoint of the filing range.  
Chapter 3 then analyzes the effect of the selective overpricing on the long-term 
profitability of the underwriter. We argue that aggressive pricing by an underwriter, 
especially selective overpricing, is meant to help avert issue withdrawal. Therefore, we 
explore whether and how an underwriter’s effort to avert the withdrawal of an offering 
impacts the underwriter’s future IPO market share. We measure the withdrawal-averting 
effort for the offering by the difference between an estimate of the offering’s ex ante 
likelihood of withdrawal and a dummy variable indicating whether the offering is 
actually withdrawn. 
We find that those banks which engage issuers with a higher ex ante propensity to 
withdraw and then aggressively price the offerings to actually avert withdrawal 
experience a pronounced increase in their future IPO market share. This effect is 
especially noticeable when the underwriter successfully supports the price during the first 
day of trading. Interestingly, no effect on future market share is detected for those banks 
that try to enhance their IPO completion rates by avoiding issuers with high likelihood of 
withdrawal. These results hold as well during the periods before and after the year 2000. 
We find that the results are more pronounced in the subsample of offerings underwritten 
by the banks with market share in excess of 2% (62.3% of the entire sample) and in the 
offerings with expected proceeds between $10 million and $100 million (76.3% of the 
sample). 
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We also find that withdrawals have more of an adverse effect on future market 
share than mere overpricing. Compared to withdrawal, overpricing accompanied by even 
a less price support during first-day trading, tends to exert significantly less adverse 
influence on the bank’s future market share. Overall, our results indicate that an 
underwriter’s effort to avert IPO withdrawal is a significant determinant of the 
underwriter’s future market share. Strategically overpricing moderately cold offerings, 
along with extending price support to these offerings when needed, increases the 
underwriter’s market share in the long run.  
Our analysis sheds a more accurate light on the related literature.   Nanda and Yun 
(1997) find that association with overpriced offerings adversely impacts the underwriter’s 
future market value.  Dunbar (2000) also reports that overpricing hurts the underwriter’s 
ability to compete for future business. However, both papers measure overpricing by a 
strongly negative initial return, which in reality reflects also the absence of a successful 
price support effort.3  Our results indicate that the key factor weakening the underwriter’s 
ability to compete for future business is not the association with overpricing per se but 
the non-fulfilment of aftermarket price support for the offerings that end up overpriced. 
Last, Chapter 4 extends the theoretical literature on IPO selling mechanisms by 
developing a model which encompasses the potential for IPO withdrawal (as in Busaba 
2006, and Brisley and Busaba, 2007), overpricing, and aftermarket price support 
altogether, and solving for the equilibrium offer-price-maximizing price/allocation 
                                                 
3 For example, Nanda and Yun (1997) categorize offerings with one-day or one-week excess return less 
than -5% as overpriced offerings. Dunbar (2000) uses the minimum abnormal first-day return of the 
offerings underwritten by a bank in one year as the proxy of the bank’s association with overpriced 
offerings.    
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schedule. The underwriter solicits and aggregates investor indications during the 
premarket, announces the result, and determines the offer price and individual share 
allocations. Investors understand the effect of their indications on the offer price and 
allocations, and realize the issuing firm will withdraw if the offer price comes out too 
low. They also understand the underwriter’s incentive to overstate premarket demand, 
especially when this serves to avert issue withdrawal. The analysis shows that 
overpricing of lukewarmly-received IPOs emerges as an equilibrium outcome which still 
ensures maximized proceeds to the issuer. The optimal price-allocation rule calls for 
allocation priority to be given to investors with strong indications; underpricing to occur 
when premarket demand is strong; and overpricing to be resorted to only as needed to 
avert withdrawal in lukewarmly-received offerings. Aftermarket price stabilization plays 
two roles in this equilibrium: It bonds the underwriter against deliberate overpricing 
when premarket demand is either strong or too weak; and it adequately compensates 
investors when overpricing is utilized to avert issue withdrawal. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2   Do Underwriters Overprice Initial Public Offerings to 
Avert Potential Withdrawals by the Issuers? 
2.1.  Introduction 
Issuers with high reservation value for their shares are more likely to withdraw if 
investor demand is weak (Busaba 2006; Busaba et al. 2001). We investigate empirically 
whether underwriters deliberately overprice IPOs of such firms to avert potential 
withdrawal. We argue and find evidence that, when faced with the potential of losing a 
deal due to withdrawal, an underwriter might find it optimal to overstate premarket 
demand and overprice the offering even when the underwriter commits to support the 
inflated price in the aftermarket. In other words, price stabilization commitment might 
not, as Benveniste et al. (1996) suggest, bond the underwriter against overpricing when 
withdrawal of the offering is a distinct possibility otherwise.  
Benveniste et al. (1996) demonstrate that a commitment to support the price in the 
aftermarket effectively destroys an underwriter’s incentive to overstate premarket interest 
and overprice offerings. While underwriters get to keep seven percent—the typical 
spread—of any inflation of the offer price, they bear the full cost of this inflation as they 
stand ready to buy back shares in the aftermarket at (or slightly below) the offer price. 
However, Benveniste et al. (1996) do not consider the case when the issuer might 
withdraw the offering if premarket interest suggests a price below the issuer reservation 
price. In such a case, overpricing to meet the issuer’s minimum acceptable price will 
augment the underwriting commission and, more importantly, avert the potential 
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withdrawal and the loss of the entire commission. When the overpricing needed to avert 
withdrawal is not too severe, the salvaged commission can outweigh the added cost of 
price support, and the underwriter thus still has an incentive to overprice. 
Our study complements the theoretical argument of Benveniste et al. (1996). The 
commitment to price stabilization is required in our framework to sustain overpricing in 
equilibrium. 4 It bonds an underwriter against overpricing when premarket demand is 
strong, for the very reason stated in Benveniste et al. (1996). It also bonds against 
overpricing when premarket demand is too week and aftermarket support is therefore too 
expensive. However, when overpricing does occur to avert the withdrawal of offerings 
with lukewarm reception, the stabilization commitment ensures that overpricing is 
implemented only to the extent needed, and that the participating investors are adequately 
compensated. We therefore hypothesize that overpricing is more likely to occur for 
offerings that are lukewarmly received, especially when the offerings have a high ex ante 
withdrawal probability. 
We test our hypothesis using offerings completed or withdrawn in the U.S. during 
the period 1996-2007. The issues are identified from Thomson Reuters SDC’s (TSDC) 
New Issues Database, complemented with variables manually collected from the 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) System on the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Web site. The basic elements of our 
empirical methodology are as follows. We use the closing stock price three days prior to 
                                                 
4 Different from the flippers theory of Fishe (2002), we argue that the underwriter aftermarket price support 
commitment, as a put option provided to the investors, is a cost to the banks. Knowing the existence of 
potential deliberate overpricing but also evaluating the put option, the investors rationally participate in the 
weak IPOs.  
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the end of the quiet period (hereafter, day-3 PEQ) as a proxy for the “true” market price 
of the shares. We assume that the underwriter forms an unbiased estimate of this price 
upon the premarket.5 Underwriter pricing intention is then measured by the NASDAQ-
adjusted percentage change from the offer price to this ‘true’ price, with a negative drift 
proxying for overpricing. The strength of investor premarket demand is proxied, as in the 
literature, by ‘price adjustment’, or the position of the offer price relative to the 
preliminary price range. And lastly, the ex ante withdrawal probability is imputed from a 
probit model estimating the decision to withdraw, from the withdrawn and completed 
IPOs during the sample period. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the negative price drift is more 
pronounced in the offerings priced at the lower boundary of the preliminary price range, 
especially when the ex ante withdrawal probability is high or when the price adjustment 
to the lower boundary represents a smaller percent of the range’s midpoint. The offer 
price set exactly at the lower boundary of the price range presumably captures an 
underwriter’s reluctance to go below for fear of issuer withdrawal. And the smaller the 
percentage difference between the preliminary range’s midpoint and the lower boundary 
is, the more binding the lower boundary of the range becomes. 
In comparison, and also in line with what we predict, little evidence of deliberate 
overpricing is found in the offerings priced below the lower boundary of the preliminary 
price range. Such offerings presumably met weak investor demand in the premarket and, 
at the same time, the respective underwriters were not constrained in their ability to set a 
                                                 
5 The end of the quiet period was the twenty-fifth calendar day for IPOs before July 2002 and extended to 
the fortieth calendar day for IPOs thereafter (Bradley et al. (2004). Also see NYSE Rule 472 and NASD 
Rule 2711, implemented on July 9, 2002, and the Global Settlement of SEC, finalized on April 28, 2003. 
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correspondingly low offer price. Specifically, offerings that receive severe negative 
information during bookbuilding either chose to withdraw and thus were excluded from 
our observation, or as Dunbar and Foerster (2008) argue, were more likely to deeply 
discount prices to ensure offering success, which can even result in underpricing in some 
cases.  
The pattern of these results is more apparent in the subsample period of 2001 to 
2007, which is consistent with the view that bankers were more aggressive in getting 
deals done in the weak market after the burst of the Internet bubble in the spring of 2000. 
We also study first-day aftermarket price support as a function of premarket 
demand and the ex ante likelihood of withdrawal and we focus our attention on offerings 
where price support is likely to have occurred. Similar to the pattern documented for 
overpricing, the first-day aftermarket price support is stronger for the issues priced 
exactly at the lower boundary of the preliminary price range when the percent price 
adjustment (relative to the range’s midpoint) is small. These results suggest that 
deliberate overpricing is accompanied by price support, lending support to the argument 
that underwriters optimally overprice offerings to avert potential withdrawal, while 
bearing the associated cost of price support. 
This chapter contributes to the literature on IPO pricing and the role of 
underwriters in primary markets along several dimensions. First, it is the first to argue 
and provide evidence that underwriters have an incentive to overprice offerings to avert 
possible withdrawal. Second, it extends the literature on aftermarket price support by 
showing that the incentive to overprice exists even if, and specifically, in the presence of 
11 
 
 
 
 
a commitment to extend price support in the aftermarket. Benveniste et al. (1996) 
postulate that, as part of an optimal bookbuilding mechanism, price support serves to 
eliminate the possibility of overpricing. Our paper, in a complementary sense, argues that 
price support is required to sustain overpricing in equilibrium so that IPO investors do not 
lose, and provides evidence that deliberate overpricing and price support do go hand in 
hand. Finally, we extend the literature on IPO withdrawals by investigating the 
determinants of withdrawal for a large sample of offerings using financial data obtained 
from EDGAR. The data provide a unique opportunity to observe the changes of factors 
affecting withdrawal, overpricing, and aftermarket price support before and after the 
burst of the internet bubble in the year 2000. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 2.3 describes the sample and the data, and 
presents the estimation of withdrawal probability and formation of different IPO 
portfolios grouped by price adjustment levels. Section 2.4 provides the model 
specifications and discusses the empirical results. Section 2.5 summarizes. 
2.2.  Theory Description and Hypothesis Development 
Bookbuilding is widely applied in initial public offerings, especially in the United 
States securities market. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model the bookbuilding procedure 
and described deliberate underpricing as a strategic incentive to investors for their 
information revealing. Benveniste et al. (1996) provide a theoretical model as a 
complement, ascertaining that an underwriter has the incentive to overstate premarket 
interest in a weak issuing, but such incentive is eliminated by the implicit commitment of 
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price support, which acts as a bonding mechanism. The economic rationale behind the 
bonding mechanism is that the implicit commitment of price stabilization “ensures that 
the underwriter captures only a small fraction of any proposed increase in the offer price, 
but bears the full marginal cost of providing price supporting in the secondary market.”6 
However, their model does not consider the possibility of withdrawal and, thus, is not 
applicable in examining the underwriter’s pricing behavior when faced with potential 
withdrawals. If overstatement of premarket outcome will avert the withdrawal of less-
demanded offering, the proposed proceeds increase is no longer that small and neither is 
the underwriting commission. The direct benefit from commissions increase can 
outweigh the cost of price stabilization even if, in the extreme situation, the underwriter 
repurchases 100% of the issue at the offer price in the secondary market. 
2.2.1.  An Algebraic Representation 
Consider a firm that is about to issue 𝑄 shares to 𝐻 investors. The underwriter 
conducts a marketing process, called bookbuilding, in which it solicits indications of 
interest from investors.  Let ℎ denote the strength of the aggregate indications, ranging 
from “0” when all investors reveal weak interest to “H” when all reveal ‘strong’ interest. 
Let 𝑉ℎ� denote the true market value of the issued stock (a stochastic process with mean 𝑉ℎ 
and variance 𝜎2), 𝑠 the underwriting spread (a percent commission agreed upon in the 
underwriting contract), and 𝑉𝑅the issuer’s reservation value of the share. The issuer will 
complete the offering if the offer price proposed by the underwriter, 𝑃ℎ, is higher than 𝑉𝑅  
                                                 
6  Although underwriters do not, as Aggarwal (2000) stated, place pure stabilization bids, the extant 
empirical evidences, such as the underwriter’s large stock inventories of cold IPOs on the first day of 
trading (Aggarwal 2000; Ellis et. 2000; Lewellen 2006), the high proportion of interdealer sell trades in 
cold IPOs (Ellis 2006), and the unusual bid rigidity at and below the offer price (Lewellen 2006), imply 
that price stabilization implicit in the aftermarket trading is costly for the underwriter.  
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and will withdraw otherwise. When bookbuilding reveals such a weak premarket demand 
that 𝑉ℎ does not exceed 𝑉𝑅, the underwriter can still avert issue withdrawal by setting the 
offer price above 𝑉𝑅 .  In that case, the underwriter receives underwriting 
commissions  𝑠𝑄𝑃ℎ , plus an expected profit from other related activities, like market 
making and short covering and the impact on future business, all denoted as 𝑄𝐸[𝛿].7 But 
it also bears the full cost of price stabilization. 
  The price stabilization commitment involves the underwriter committing to 
repurchasing the offered shares back from the initial investors at or near the offering price 
when the stock price would have dropped below that level in public trading.  The cost of 
the aftermarket price support commitment is therefore equivalent to the cost of a put 
option on the offered shares granted to the initial investors with a strike price at or near 
the offering price 𝑃ℎ (Benveniste et al. 1996; Chowdhry and Nanda 1996). Naturally, the 
total number of the implicit put options granted to investors is a proportion, 𝑟 ∈ (0,1], of 
the total of shares offered. We summarize the underwriter’s payoffs in table 1, 
where  𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝐾,𝑉ℎ,𝜎)  denotes the value of the put option as a function of the strike 
price, 𝐾, which for our purposes will be set to the offer price  𝑃ℎ, the true stock price, 𝑉ℎ, 
and the stock volatility, 𝜎. We suppress 𝜎 henceforth to reduce clutter. 
An equilibrium solution of the bookbuilding problem satisfies the incentive 
constraints and the participation constraints of all participants. The investors’ truth-telling 
incentive constraints are satisfied in the form of expected underpricing (in addition to the 
                                                 
7 Ellis et al. (2000) find that the lead underwriter is always the dominant market maker and the market-
making activity is a stand-alone profit center. Aggarwal (2000) finds that underwriters start out with a 
“naked short” position and, for offerings with first-day return less than or equal to 5%, the short covering is 
profitable on average, although the margin is very small compared to the underwriting commissions. For 
simplicity, we assume 𝐸[𝛿] an exogeneity, which does not change with the underwriter’s pricing intention.  
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put option value) in the strong demand states, and the participation constraints are 
satisfied state by state. Little does our overpricing argument affect the former one, so we 
focus our discussion on the later to show how the proper setting of 𝑟∗ can satisfy all the 
participation constraints in our overpricing context. We claim that, by overpricing weakly 
demanded offerings at 𝑃ℎ = 𝑉𝑅+1, the underwriter can lower the threshold for offering 
success to include certain weak demand states,  𝑉ℎ ∈ [𝑉ℎ∗ ,𝑉𝑅],  without changing the 
mechanism that works in the strong demand states. 
Table 2.1: Underwriter payoffs when issuer reservation price is higher than the 
expected market price: An algebraic illustration 
𝑉𝑅  denotes the issuer’s reservation price, at or below which the offering is withdrawn; 𝑠 denotes 
the underwriting spread; 𝑄 the number of shares to be offered; 𝑃ℎ denotes the offering price; and 
𝐸(𝛿) denotes other benefits from a completed offering.  
Offer price 𝑃ℎ > 𝑉𝑅 ≤ 𝑉𝑅 
Issuer’s decision on withdrawing Accept the offering Withdraw 
Underwriting commissions 𝑠𝑃ℎ 0 
Cost of price stabilization (a put option to the 
investors) where 𝑟ℎ ≤ 1 𝑟ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ, 𝑉ℎ, 𝜎) 0 
Profit from other relevant activities: market 
making, short covering, etc. 𝐸(𝛿) > 0 0 
Net gain/loss 𝑠𝑃𝑜 − 𝑟ℎ𝑃𝑝𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ,𝜎) + 𝐸(𝛿) 0 
 
We use 𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ) to denote the value of the put option with strike price 𝑃ℎ and 
stock price 𝑉ℎ. The payoff or participant constraints (PCs) for the underwriter and the 
investors are: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠:                       ΠU ≡ 𝑉ℎ − 𝑃ℎ + 𝑟𝑈,ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ) ≥ 0 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠:                  ΠL ≡ 𝑉ℎ − 𝑃ℎ + 𝑟𝐿,ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ) ≥ 0 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟:                             Π𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 ≡ 𝑠𝑃ℎ − 𝑟ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ) + 𝐸[𝛿] > 0 (1)  
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where 𝑟𝑈,ℎ   and 𝑟𝐿,ℎ  are the amount of put options distributed to the informed and 
uninformed investors respectively. 
The marginal payoff constraint, as stated by Benveniste et al. (1996), to eliminate 
the underwriter’s incentive to overstate premarket demand can be written as: 
𝜕Π𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
𝜕𝑃ℎ
|𝑃ℎ=𝑉ℎ = 𝑠 − 𝑟ℎ 𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑃ℎ |𝑃ℎ=𝑉ℎ ≤ 0 (2)  
The amount of put options required can be written as, 
𝑟ℎ ≥
𝑠
𝑃𝑢𝑡
′ ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑡′ ≡ 𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑃ℎ |𝑃ℎ=𝑉ℎ (3)  
The issuer accepts an offering if it is priced at or above 𝑉𝑅+1. The investors’ and 
the underwriter’s PCs are satisfied for non-overpriced offerings by default. To 
compensate the investors in cases of overpricing, where 𝑃ℎ = 𝑉𝑅+1 > 𝑉ℎ, the underwriter 
should provide a sufficient put option with a value no less than that of the overpricing to 
investors, regardless of the allocation between informed and uninformed investors. 
𝑟ℎ ≥
𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝑉ℎ
𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ) (4)  
Setting 𝑟ℎ
∗ = max � 𝑠
𝑃𝑢𝑡
′ , 𝑉𝑅+1−𝑉ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡�𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ�� satisfies the equation (1) and (2) for all 𝑉ℎ ∈[𝑉ℎ,𝑉𝑅+1). To conclude, we have: 
𝑟ℎ
∗ = max � 𝑠
𝑃𝑢𝑡
′ , 𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝑉ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡�𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ�� ,∀𝑉ℎ ∈ [𝑉ℎ∗,𝑉𝑅+1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉ℎ∗ = (1 − 𝑠)𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝐸[𝛿] 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑢𝑡′ ≡ 𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑃ℎ |𝑃ℎ=𝑉ℎ . (5)  
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We provide a complete solution with detail proof in chapter 4, section 4.3.2. 
𝑃𝑢𝑡
′ ≡
𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡
𝜕𝑃ℎ
|𝑃ℎ=𝑉ℎ is the sensitivity of the at-the-money put option value to the offer price. 
The less sensitive is the put option value to the offer price, the more amount of put 
options are required to bond the underwriter against overstating premarket interest in the 
strong demand states.  𝑠
𝑃𝑢𝑡
′ , the first part of 𝑟ℎ∗ , is unrelated to the extent of overpricing    
and thus is the lower boundary of the proportion of put option required as a valid 
commitment to aftermarket price support. 𝑉𝑅+1+𝑉ℎ
𝑃𝑢𝑡�𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ�, the second part, is the amount of 
put options needed to compensate the investors for their participating in the weak 
offering. 
𝑉ℎ
∗ = (1 − 𝑠)𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝐸[𝛿]  theoretically represents the weakest offering that can 
be completed by the underwriter. In this extreme case where, 𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝑉ℎ∗ = 𝑠𝑉𝑅+1 + 𝐸[𝛿], 
the underwriter exhausts all commission fees from the offering as well as all indirect 
profits from other relevant activities to compensate the overpricing effort. When indirect 
benefits are large—for example, when the underwriter expects the subsequent business of 
a large SEO of the same issuer and/or a number of IPOs in the same industry—the 
underwriter will complete a lukewarm offering by overpricing it at the reservation price 
even if the cost related to aftermarket price support will wipe out any case-specific profit. 
We diagrammatically present in figure 2.1 how underwriter pricing intention changes 
with the premarket demand states of an offering. The offering is priced at-the-price for 
states ℎ ∈ [𝑅 + 1,𝑄], underpriced for states ℎ ∈ (𝑄,𝐻], and overpriced for states ℎ ∈[ℎ,𝑅].  
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Figure 2.1: A diagram of offer pricing and the premarket demand states  
The vertical axis is the stock value and the horizontal axis represents premarket interest. The dot 
line represents the true price and the bold line is the offer price. The left side figure is the result of 
offering without considering the possibility of overpricing. The right side figure is a whole 
picture of the offering results including the states of overpricing. Offerings are priced at the true 
price for states ℎ ∈ [𝑅 + 1,𝑄], underpriced for ℎ ∈ (𝑄,𝐻], and overpriced for ℎ ∈ [ℎ,𝑅]. The 
shadowed area in the right figure represents the proceeds per share from the overpricing. The 
lower part shows the corresponding overpricing and underpricing. 
 
In practice, most IPOs have an overallotment option (OAO) that allows the 
underwriter to sell additional shares up to 15 percent of the offer size and exercise the 
option for 30 calendar days after the initial offering (Aggarwal 2000). Therefore 
aftermarket short-covering provides the underwriter a natural hedge for the cost of 
aftermarket price support.  In a weak offering, the underwriter repurchases stocks at or 
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near the offer price in the aftermarket as what is committed to the investors. The 
underwriter needs not to resell all the purchased stocks at the future market price if the 
price is lower. Instead, the bank can give up the OAOs so that part of the purchase will be 
short-covering. Short-covering alleviates the underwriter’s cost because, for each share 
shorted in the IPO, the committed put option is less than one. 
2.2.2.  A Case Illustration 
To gain some appreciation of how much an underwriter might benefit from this 
pricing strategy, we examine the NASDAQ IPO of Williams Scotsman International, Inc. 
on September 19, 2005. The 15.3 million common shares was finally offered at $16, an 
adjusted price exactly at the lower boundary of the preliminary price range of $16 to $18 
by the three joint book runners including Citigroup, Lehman Brothers and CIBC World 
Markets. With a 6.5% gross spread, the underwriters gained a total of underwriting 
commission up to $15.9 million. The trading information for the first thirty days of the 
stock is illustrated in figure 2.2.8 The lower part of the open-high-low-close chart, or 
simply bar chart, shows the daily trading volume of the stock. The closing price at day-3 
prior to the end of the quiet period (the twenty-seventh trading day) was $15. The total 
trading volume of the first sixteen days was about eleven million shares, of which the 
volume on the first trading day accounts for 67.0%. Before offering, the issuer granted to 
the underwriters an overallotment option, exercisable for 30 days from the date of 
prospectus to purchase up to 2,298,875 additional shares (or 15% of total stocks offered) 
at the public offer price less the underwriting discount. The OAO was exercised by the 
                                                 
8 The IPO information comes from SDC and EDGAR; the trade information comes from CRSP. 
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underwriters to purchase 400,000 shares thirty days later, as documented in the firm’s 10-
Q quarterly report after the offering. 
 
Figure 2.2: Trading information for the first thirty days after the NASDAQ IPO of 
Williams Scotsman International, Inc.  
The joint book runners, Citigroup, Lehman Brothers and CIBC World Markets, underwrote the 
NASDAQ IPO of Williams Scotsman International, Inc. The 15.3 million common shares was 
finally offered at $16, an adjusted price exactly at the lower boundary of the preliminary price 
range of $16 to $18, and started public trading on September 19, 2005. With a 6.5% gross spread, 
the underwriters gained a total of underwriting commission up to $15.9 million.  
 
Applying the Black-Scholes pricing formula, we calibrate the value of committed 
aftermarket price support as a put option, the optimal proportion of put option, and the 
payoffs to the underwriters and investors under the overpricing strategy described in 
equation (5). 
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The formulas are as following,9 
𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ,𝜎,𝑇) = 𝑃ℎ𝑒−𝑟𝑇Φ(−𝑑2) − 𝑉ℎΦ(−𝑑1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑑1 = 1
𝜎√𝑇
ln �𝑉ℎ
𝑃ℎ
� + 𝑟√𝑇
𝜎
+ 𝜎√𝑇2 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎√𝑇 
𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑡
′ = 𝑒−𝑟𝑇Φ�−𝑟√𝑇
𝜎
−
𝜎√𝑇2 � − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇𝜎√𝑇 𝜙 �𝜎√𝑇2 + 𝑟√𝑇𝜎 � + 1𝜎√𝑇𝜙 �𝜎√𝑇2 − 𝑟√𝑇𝜎 � 
(6)  
Given an offer price of $16, we assume a risk-free rate of 3%, an annual stock 
volatility of 0.308 and an exercise period of one year.10 This stock volatility is calculated 
from the ex post daily stock returns of the 20th trading day to one year after the IPO, 
while the exercise period reflects the long term support from the underwriters. Figure 2.3 
shows the graph of put option value, the optimal proportion of put option and the payoffs 
to investors and underwriters under the overpricing scheme. The overpricing needed to 
complete the offering varies from $1.6 to $0 corresponding to the change of the assumed 
true stock price from $14.4 to $16. The investors are always compensated for the 
overpriced offering so that their payoffs are non-negative. The underwriters’ payoffs are 
positive for the offerings with stock price higher than $14.96. At this price, to 
compensate the investors for the $1.04 overpricing per share, the underwriters provide 
0.48 unit of put option, which is worth $2.16 per option. The required proportion of put 
option decreases as overpricing decreases, although the put option value per unit also 
decreases. The least proportion of put option is 0.124, which starts to bind at a true price 
of $15.84. This minimum put option eliminates the underwriters’ incentive to overprice 
the offering when the true price is above $16 by generating a zero marginal profit for the 
                                                 
9  𝜕𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑡
𝜕𝑃ℎ
= 𝑒−𝑟𝑇Φ(−𝑑2) + 𝑃ℎ𝑒−𝑟𝑇𝜙(−𝑑2) 𝜕(−𝑑2)𝜕𝑃ℎ − 𝑉ℎϕ(−𝑑1) 𝜕(−𝑑2)𝜕𝑃ℎ , by taking 𝑃ℎ = 𝑉ℎ, we have the 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑡′  
as stated. 
10 Considering price stabilization as a quasi-option lasting for a short period but at a large volatility, we can 
simplify equation (6) by setting 𝑟√𝑇 = 0 and result 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑡′ = 1 −Φ�𝜎√𝑇2 �. 
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underwriters. When short-covering is considered, the line of underwriter payoff shifts up 
and the payoffs start to be positive at a true price of $14.64, which represents similar 
effects of positive indirect profits from completing the offering. 
Figure 2.3: Calibrations on put option value, optimal proportion of put option and 
payoffs to underwriters and investors under IPO overpricing scenarios 
Given an offer price of $16, we assume a risk-free rate of 3%, an annual stock volatility of 0.308 
and an exercise period of one year. This stock volatility is calculated from the ex post daily stock 
returns of the 20th trading day to one year after the IPO, while the exercise period reflects the 
long term support from the underwriters. 
 
We also observe different scenarios by varying the volatility between 0.2 and 0.7, 
which is the range of annual volatilities for most stocks. The adjustment of stock 
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volatility does not affect the pattern of our results and generates little change to the lower 
boundary of the proportion of put option per share, although the put option value and the 
required proportion of put option per share are quite sensitive to the adjustment. 
Intuitively, when underwriters have to overprice to complete an offering, investors may 
require less put options if they have more confidence on the underwriter’s commitment to 
fulfill aftermarket price support, e.g., less degree if overpricing, longer support period, 
and etc. 
While capitalizing an underwriter’s commitment to support in the aftermarket as a 
put option to investors is a theoretical abstraction, which in practice relies on the 
empirically arguable setting of parameters such as exercise period and stock volatility, 
another way to observe the underwriters’ fulfillment of their commitment in our case is to 
study, ex post, the aftermarket trading. The trading volume shrunk greatly after the first 
trading day and continued to shrink in the following days while the trading prices 
maintained around the offer price. It seems that the investors who wanted to flip at the 
offer price had done so and we can conclude that the underwriters did live up to their 
commitment in this case. 
Presumably, the underwriters collected sufficient information from bookbuilding 
and expected a true stock price of $15, which was the closing price of the twenty-seventh 
trading day (also day-3 PEQ). By pricing the stock at $16, the underwriters promised to 
repurchase the flipped shares at $16 and re-sell them back to the market later at $15—
bearing a cost of $1 per share for each share repurchased. We illustrate in table 2.2 the 
underwriters’ net gain from the offering. Observing that the closing prices fluctuated 
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between $16.11 and $15.75 for the first sixteen days and dropped to $15.29 on the 
seventeenth day, we assume the underwriters, at maximum, repurchased eleven million 
shares, which is almost the total trading volume of the first sixteen days, to fulfill their 
price support commitment. After deducting the $11 million cost of price support, the net 
gain from the underwriting deal is still $4.9 million, which increases to $7.2 million once 
we consider the exercise of OAOs and the cost reduced by short-covering. In contrast, if 
the offer price were set to $15, the payoff would have been zero, if the issuer had 
withdrawn, or $14.9 million, if the issuer had accepted the hypothetical offer price. 
If the issuer would accept an offer price of $15, by pricing the offering at $16, the 
underwriters would have increased the underwriting commissions by $1 million 
($15.9M-$14.9M) but had to bear $11 million to support the price in the aftermarket.11 It 
is thus unwise for the underwriters to overstate premarket interest, and price stabilization 
as a bonding mechanism remains valid as predicted by Benveniste et al. (1996). 
However, if the issuer would reject any offer below $16 and withdraw, by setting the 
price at $16, the underwriters would have averted issuer withdrawal and still generated a 
positive gain (after fully fulfilling the commitment of price stabilization), compared to 
zero if the issuer had withdrawn.12 Hence, it is optimal for the underwriters to overprice 
the offering at $16 and complete the offering by averting the possible withdrawal. 
 
                                                 
11 Even if we calculate the cost of price support based on the ex post first-day trading volume, which is 7.4 
million shares, instead of all trading volume in the first sixteen days, we will estimate a cost of about $5 
million, still much higher than the $1 million increase of underwriting commissions. 
12 Even if all the 15.3 million shares were flipped to the underwriters at $16, the gross spread is still 
sufficient to cover the $1 difference, because 6.5% of $16 is $1.04.  
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Table 2.2: Underwriter payoffs when issuer reservation price is higher than the 
expected market price: A case illustration 
Presumably, the underwriter collected sufficient information from the bookbuilding and 
generated an expected aftermarket price at $15, which is the closing price of the twenty-seventh 
trading day (day-3 PEQ). By pricing the stock at $16, the underwriter promised to repurchase the 
flipped shares at $16 and re-sell them back to the market later at $15—bearing a cost of $1 per 
share for each share repurchased. We assume that the underwriters, at maximum, repurchased 
eleven million shares, which is almost the total trading volume of the first sixteen days, to fulfill 
their price support commitment. The issuer offered an OAO up to around 2.3 million additional 
shares at the time of offering to the underwriters who exercised the option with 400,000 shares 30 
days later. This also implies a short-covering of1.9 million share. 
Offer price, 𝑃ℎ $ 16 $ 15 
Issuer’s withdrawal decision Issuing Withdrawal Issuing 
Underwriting commissions = 𝑠𝑄𝑃ℎ  $ 15.9 M 0 $ 14.9 M 
Ex post cost of price support = 𝑟𝑄(𝑉ℎ − 𝑃ℎ) ($ 11.0 M) 0 0 
Underwriting commissions on exercised OAO $ 0.4 M 0 0 
Cost short-covered = 𝑞(𝑉ℎ − 𝑃ℎ) $ 1.9 M 0 0 
Net gain/loss (excluding short-covering and 
OAO) 
$ 4.9 M 0 $ 14.9 M 
Net gain/loss (with short-covering and OAO 
exercise) 
$ 7.2 M 0 $ 14.9 M 
 
2.2.3.  Relevant Studies and Hypothesis Development 
In practice, temporary demand in a weak premarket can be generated from “strike 
bids.”13 Overpriced offerings can be sold to uninformed or even informed investors as 
long as they believe that the underwriter will compensate them for attending these 
offerings. Two methods of compensation have been modeled in earlier literature. The 
extended leverage model of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) showed that “the underwriter 
occasionally induces regular investors to take the badly received IPO off the 
                                                 
13 A strike bid is a bid for a specified number of shares or amount of money regardless of the offer price. 
See Cornelli and Goldreich (2003). 
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underwriter’s hand.” Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) argued that “uninformed investors can 
be compensated ex post by underwriters buying back shares at the offer price in 
aftermarket trading.” Although both methods can be employed to increase the issue 
proceeds and make overpricing achievable, persistent price support is necessary to keep a 
sufficient number of retail and/or uninformed investors as a buffer in the weak-demanded 
offerings, because it is vital for the underwriter to maintain a strong market position to 
execute the strategic overpricing in the long-term equilibrium.  
The selective overpricing argument we present here does not destroy the 
bookbuilding mechanism described in Benveniste and Spindt (1989), nor does it 
necessarily contradict the hypotheses of other theories of IPO underpricing. On the 
contrary, our argument of strategic overpricing complements the previous studies on the 
IPO mechanism since it reveals a unique but underspecified advantage of the 
bookbuilding mechanism. With such a pricing flexibility, the bookbuilding process and 
the accompanying price support can improve the odds of offering success, which is in 
line with the evidence provided by Dunbar (1998) that firm commitment produces a 
higher probability of success than the best-efforts offering method does. Meanwhile, our 
argument of deliberate overpricing accompanied by aftermarket price support enriches 
extant literature with theoretical extension and empirical evidence regarding the price 
support activities of underwriters. The commitment of price support resolves underwriter 
incentive problem by deterring deliberate overpricing when premarket demand is strong 
(Benveniste et al. 1996),  and, in the case of lukewarmly weak demand, compensating 
uninformed investors for taking part in a deliberately overpriced offering (Chowdhry and 
Nanda 1996). The argument predicts that price support should be observed more in the 
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later scenario as it is expected to accompany the selective overpricing. Indeed, Lewellen 
(2006) observes that banks with retail brokerage operations stabilize to a greater degree 
than other banks, suggesting that price support allows the underwriter to discriminate 
among investors. Our argument presents a clear incentive and application of this 
discrimination. 
We argue that, when faced with the potential of losing a deal due to issuer 
withdrawal, an underwriter may find it optimal to overstate premarket demand and 
overprice the offering even if it is committed to support the price in the aftermarket. The 
resulting hypothesis is that overpricing should be more pronounced for offerings with 
higher ex ante withdrawal probability, especially when investor demand is mildly weak. 
There is less need to overprice offerings with low ex ante withdrawal probability or when 
investor demand is strong. There is also less incentive to overprice offerings when 
investor demand is hopelessly weak, since the cost of aftermarket price support for such 
offerings would be unjustifiably high. We test the hypothesis as follows. 
First, we use the day-3 PEQ closing price as proxy for the “true” market price. 
The timeline of the IPO pricing process and the underwriter’s aftermarket price support 
activities is illustrated in figure 2.4. Past research on IPO stock price has found that 
aftermarket price support has a tangible impact on stock prices and that stock prices 
decline when aftermarket price support is assumed to be suspended (Hanley 1993; 
Hanley, Kumar and Seguin 1993; Ruud 1993; Asquith, Jones and Kieschnick 1998), and 
other research on the underwriter’s price stabilization activities suggests that aftermarket 
price support usually lasts for fifteen to twenty trading days (Aggarwal 2000; Ellis et al. 
27 
 
 
 
 
2000; Boehmer and Fishe 2004; Lewellen 2006). These observations suggest that 
underwriter price support and its effect on the market price of the stock usually fade-out 
several days into the aftermarket. However, while recovering from the effect of price 
support, stock prices might be affected by incoming information, especially from the 
initial analyst coverage after the quiet period. Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003), for 
instance, found significant abnormal returns in the (−2, +2)-day window by the end of 
the quiet period, suggesting that the stock price of the last trading day before the five-day 
window is less affected by the event.14 Thus, we measure underwriter pricing intention as 
the NASDAQ-adjusted percentage change from the offer price to this true price. 
Second, the ex ante withdrawal probability is imputed from a probit model, 
whereas investor premarket demand is a function of the position of the offer price relative 
to the preliminary price range. Several papers indicate the factors affecting the 
withdrawal decision. Dunbar (1998) finds that the determinants of offering success 
include offering size, offer price, underwriter reputation and the clustering of filings. 
Benveniste, Busaba and Guo (2001) find that withdrawal is correlated with leverage, 
intended usage of proceeds, expected issue size, venture backing, firm revenues, 
NASDAQ returns, and IPO activity, but is insignificantly correlated with underwriter 
reputation. Benveniste et al. (2003) test the effect of information spillovers on the 
probability of withdrawal while controlling for the choice effect and the cost-transferring 
effect (Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm 2002) of the underwriter. Dunbar and Foerster 
(2008) find that the industry market share of the underwriter, industry average book-to-
                                                 
14 Lewellen (2006), in table VI, also showed the positive returns from the sixteenth to twentieth trading day, 
which is approximately the (-2, +2)-day widow surrounding the end of the quiet period.  
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market ratio, yield spreads, and the probability of successful return are also important 
factors in a firm’s decision to withdraw. In all of these papers, including our own, the ex 
ante probability of withdrawal is estimated with a probit model, of which the dependent 
variable equals one for withdrawn IPOs and zero for completed ones (or the reverse for 
probability of success). The independent variables are observable characteristics of all 
filed offerings, including both withdrawals and completions. As all the information is 
publicly available, our estimate of withdrawal probability could represent withdrawal 
potential from the perspective of investors. 
Figure 2.4: Timeline for the IPO pricing process 
An IPO process is publicly observable when the issuer and its underwriters file the initial 
registration with the SEC. The filing is updated with IPO information, such as the preliminary 
price range, underwriter commissions, the issuing firm’s financial statements, and so on. The 
offer price is finally decided by the issuer and its underwriters, and this information is released in 
the final prospectus. The underwriter provides aftermarket price support after the initial public 
trading of the stock. Literature suggests that such activities last for, and fade out in, the next 
fifteen to twenty trading days. The end of the quiet period used to be the twenty-fifth calendar day 
after the initial public trading for IPOs issued before July 2002, and was extended to the fortieth 
calendar day for IPOs issued thereafter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filing an initial registration with the SEC (E.g., S-1 form) 
Preliminary price range, underwriter’s 
commissions, financial statements, etc. 
Date0: offer price 
Date1: first-day closing price 
 
Date2: closing price three days prior to 
            the end of quiet period (PEQ)  
Filing information update 
Final prospectus release  
Opening for public trading 
Aftermarket price support 
End of the quiet period 
Post-IPO trading in the secondary market 
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Another crucial element affecting the issuer’s final decision of withdrawal is the 
aggregate information collected in bookbuilding—the investor manifested premarket 
demand. We argue that the ex ante estimate on withdrawal probability is insufficient, 
from the underwriter’s perspective, to represent withdrawal potential unless this 
estimation is adjusted with premarket demand, which is a function of the position of the 
offer price relative to the preliminary price range. If the offer price is above the midpoint 
of the price range, premarket demand is strong, withdrawal potential is weak, and, 
therefore, the need to overprice the offering is low. If the offer price is below the 
midpoint of the price range, premarket demand is weak, withdrawal potential is 
enhanced, and so is the underwriter’s intention to prevent withdrawal. However, when 
the offer price has to be set below the preliminary price range, indicating that the cost of 
price support can be higher than the gain from completing a probably withdrawal, an 
underwriter might be less motivated to go with the withdrawal-avert strategy. Hence, 
deliberate overpricing is more likely to be observed for offerings with higher estimated 
withdrawal probability and mildly weak premarket demand. 
According to this line of reasoning, we form several IPO portfolios grouped by 
the position of the offer price relative to the preliminary price range. We predict that the 
overpricing will be more pronounced for offerings with higher ex ante withdrawal 
probability, especially when premarket demand is mildly weak, and that no deliberate 
overpricing should be detected in IPO portfolios with an offer price below the 
preliminary price range.  
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We also study aftermarket price support as a function of premarket demand and 
the ex ante likelihood of withdrawal. Earlier researchers investigated aftermarket price 
support activities of underwriters by examining the pattern of bid-ask spreads (Hanley et 
al. 1993), intraday transactions (Schultz and Zaman 1994; Ellis 2006), and stock 
inventory of underwriters serving as market makers (Ellis et al. 2000; Ellis 2006; 
Lewellen 2006). They suggested a close relationship between these aftermarket activities 
and the first-day IPO returns. Hence, we measure aftermarket support for selected 
offerings by the initial returns deducting a portion of stock price change towards the 
offering’s true price. We examine the offerings with negative or mildly positive initial 
returns and require the day-3 PEQ excess return of the offering to be negative or mildly 
positive if its initial return is around zero. The price support for the excluded offerings is 
either illegal or too vague to measure.15 The selected subsample of offerings represents 
the first-day aftermarket price support we can observe. We argue that deliberate 
overpricing should be accompanied with price support, and hence predict a similar 
pattern as what we have explained in the previsions sections on overpricing under the 
same empirical framework. Again, we find evidence consistent with our prediction. 
2.3.  Data and Methodology 
In this section, we introduce the data and the model used to estimate the ex ante 
withdrawal probability. We also compile IPO portfolios based on offer price adjustment 
levels, defined as the relative position of the offer price to the preliminary price range. 
                                                 
15 The maximum support price is the offer price according to Rule 10b-7 [§17 CFR 240.10b-7(j)(1)] of the 
Securities Exchanges Act of 1934. 
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The estimated withdrawal probability, combined with the offer price adjustment level, 
will then be used to test our hypotheses.  
2.3.1.  Data 
Our study examines all the firm commitment IPOs in the United States that ended 
in either success or withdrawal between 1996 and 2007. Data on completed and 
withdrawn IPOs between 1995 and 2007 are obtained from the Thomson Reuters SDC’s 
(TSDC) New Issues Database. For each offering, we gather data from TSDC on the issue 
firm features, the offering characteristics including offering size and price, and 
information to calculate underwriter IPO market shares. We update and complete our 
data set on the offering characteristics and past financial information by checking the 
filings of these offerings through the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
(EDGAR) System on the SEC Web site. As EDGAR’s coverage of IPOs starts in 1996 
and is complete after the middle of 1996, we narrow our analysis on offerings of the 
twelve years between 1996 and 2007. Additional information on venture capital backing 
is obtained from VentureXpert. Following Busaba et al. (2001) and Dunbar and Foerster 
(2008), we exclude unit issues, foreign issues, REITs, and closed-end funds and trusts. 
We also exclude withdrawals without information on offering size—for example, those 
without an expected offer price and/or the amount of shares to be offered. 
Data on market returns around the time of the proposed offerings are collected 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. CUSIPs (both 
historical and concurrent), stock tickers, and company names are used to match the stocks 
with the offerings of TSDC. Defining the day when an issuer decides to withdraw or 
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issue as Date0 and the first trading day from CRSP as Date1, we match and update Date0 
according to Date1. When the first trading day from CRSP is no later than the recorded 
filing date from EDGAR (or TSDC), the last market trading day before Date1 is used as 
Date0 on which the decision of offering was made. For offerings with a first trading day 
later than the recorded offering date from EDGAR (or TSDC), we keep the offering if the 
difference between Date0 and Date1 is less than sixty days but exclude those offerings 
with differences greater than that span.16 For offerings without trading data from CRSP 
(e.g., some stocks were initially listed on the OTC market), we keep them for the 
estimation on the probability of withdrawal but exclude them from the analysis of 
aftermarket trading. For completed offerings, we also update the offerings’ SIC codes 
according to the historical records on CRSP. If the SIC code of an offering was updated 
within sixty days after the offering, the updated SIC code is applied. 
Data on market interest rates are obtained from the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System website (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm). 
The Carter-Manaster ranking of investment bank is obtained from Carter and Manaster 
(1990), Carter et al. (1998), and Loughran and Ritter (2004). Information on bank 
mergers is obtained from TSDC.  
In table 2.3 we report the number of observations in our database, grouped by the 
year of issue/withdrawal. Overall we have 3,684 firm commitment IPOs in our database, 
582 of which were withdrawals (approximately 15.80%). Of those withdrawals, only 33 
                                                 
16 Most of the remaining sample offerings, except for ten, have a recorded initial trading day no later than 
fifteen days after the offering day.  
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(approximately 5.67%) returned for a successful offering within two years after the 
earlier withdrawal.  
Table 2.3: IPO filings 
The table lists the numbers of IPO filings from 1996 to 2007. The sample is obtained from TSDC 
New Issues Database, updated and screened with CRSP database. Unit issues, foreign issues, 
REITs, and closed-end funds and trusts are excluded. Withdrawals without information on 
offering size (e.g., no expected offer price and/or no data on the number of shares to be offered) 
are also excluded. 
Year of 
offering / 
withdrawal 
Number 
of IPOs 
offered 
in year 
Number of 
withdrawals 
in year 
Total 
number of 
offerings/ 
withdrawals 
in year 
Number of 
withdrawals that 
successfully 
returned within 
two years 
Percentage 
of 
withdrawn 
IPOs 
Percentage of 
returned 
withdrawals 
1996 687 46 733 2 6.28 4.35 
1997 458 76 534 4 14.23 5.26 
1998 299 94 393 10 23.92 10.64 
1999 461 70 531 5 13.18 7.14 
2000 338 91 429 2 21.21 2.20 
2001 75 88 163 1 53.99 1.14 
2002 73 26 99 1 26.26 3.85 
2003 64 13 77 3 16.88 23.08 
2004 173 16 189 0 8.47 0.00 
2005 158 22 180 2 12.22 9.09 
2006 164 23 187 3 12.30 13.04 
2007 152 17 169 0 10.06 0.00 
Subtotal – 
pre-2000 
2243 377 2620 23 14.39 6.10 
Subtotal –
post-2001 
859 205 1064 10 19.27 4.88 
Total 3102 582 3684 33 15.80 5.67 
  
During the burst of the Internet bubble in 2001, more than half of the IPOs were 
withdrawals, and the number of IPOs decreased significantly after 2001, from an average 
524 IPOs (449 completions) per year from 1996 to 2000, to 150 (131 completions) per 
year from 2002 to 2007. To reflect the regime change from a “hot” IPO market before 
2001 to a “cold” market after 2001, we separate the observations into two subsamples in 
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our later analysis to compare the results and see how robust our key findings are after 
controlling for this market environment shift. Offerings in 2001 are included in the whole 
sample but not for either subsample periods.  
2.3.2.  Estimating Probability of Withdrawal 
We use the following probit model to estimate the probability of withdrawal. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝑦 = 1) = Φ(𝛼𝑋) (7)  
The dependent variable equals one for IPO filings that are withdrawn and zero for 
completed offerings, and Φ is the cumulative standard normal function. The probit model 
describes an estimate of the span between the issuer reservation price and the expected 
offer price, without considering the information of price adjustment after bookbuilding. 
Following the earlier literature, we consider explanatory variables related to the offering, 
the investment banks, and the market.17 
Firm characteristics include the following: Logarithm of revenue is the logarithm 
of the firm’s revenue (in thousand dollars) in the latest financial statement before the 
offering. Logarithm of proceeds is the logarithm of the gross proceeds (in thousand 
dollars), measured by the offer price (or the midpoint of the preliminary price range for 
withdrawals) multiplied by the number of shares and excluding the overallotment.18 Debt 
ratio is the ratio of total debt (including short- and long-term debt, subordinated debt, 
capital lease obligations, and debt due to affiliates) to total assets. Technology dummy 
                                                 
17 See Dunbar (1998), Busaba et al. (2001), and Dunbar and Foerster (2008) for detailed discussions on 
these variables. 
18 Filing size and gross proceeds are deflated to the 1982-1984 price level using CPI as a deflator. 
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equals one for issuers from the Fama and French (1997) industries 34 (business services) 
and 36 (chips), and zero otherwise. VC/PE-backing dummy equals one for issuers with 
venture capital and/or private equity (VC/PE) backing prior to the offering, and zero 
otherwise. Debt retirement dummy equals one if the dominant usage of proceeds is to 
retire debt. Additionally, we consider the Debt ratio * equity ratio to reflect the 
interaction of equity ratio on debt ratio’s effect, where equity ratio is the ratio of total 
equity, including preferred shares, to total assets. As a proxy for the resource of financing 
from shareholders, equity ratio is expected to enhance the effect of debt ratio on the 
decision to withdraw. A lower equity ratio represents the exhausted financing capability 
of the issuer from shareholders and hence decreases its debt financing potential even if 
the debt ratio is high, whereas a higher equity ratio enhances its debt financing potential, 
even if the debt ratio is relatively low. The Market dummies equal one for issuers to be 
listed on NASDAQ, NYSE, or AMEX separately, and zero otherwise. The more stringent 
regulations of listing on these markets should increase the withdrawal probability of the 
offerings. 
Following Dunbar and Foerster (2008), we consider three variables to reflect the 
underwriters’ reputation and market power (Booth and Smith 1986; Grinblatt and Hwang 
1989; Carter and Manaster 1990; Carter et al. 1998; Loughran and Ritter 2004). Carter-
Manaster rank is the average bank ranking of the book runners. Bank market share is 
measured by the sum of gross proceeds of the offerings completed by the book runner in 
the past year divided by the sum of gross proceeds of all completed offerings during that 
period. In the case of recently merged banks, the gross proceeds of all offerings by the 
precedent banks are summed up. Equal weights are allocated to each bank for IPOs with 
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multiple book runners. Bank industry market share is measured by the sum of gross 
proceeds over the preceding year in the same Fama-French industry divided by the sum 
of gross proceeds of all IPOs in the that industry over the same period. It is defined as 
zero for industries with no offerings in the past year. 
Finally, market conditions at the time of the issue/withdrawal decision are 
controlled as what Dunbar and Foerster (2008) suggested. Number of offerings in prior 
two months is the number of completed offerings during the two months prior to the 
current offering. Number of industry offerings in prior two months is the number of 
completed offerings in the same Fama-French industry during the two months prior to the 
current one. BAA-AAA yield spread at issue/withdrawal is the spread between BAA and 
AAA corporate bonds (from the Moody’s) on the day of the offering. Change in BAA-
AAA yield spread in prior two months is the BAA-AAA yield spread on the day of the 
offering less the yield spread two months before the offering date. Ten-year Treasury 
yield at issue/withdrawal is the average yield on U.S. Treasury bonds that have ten years 
to maturity measured on the day of issue/withdrawal. Change in ten-year spread in prior 
two months is the ten-year treasury yield at the time of the issue/withdrawal decision less 
the yield two months before the offering date. Industry average book-to-market ratio 
before issue/withdrawal is the book-to-market ratio for the firms in the issuer’s Fama-
French industry at the end of the year prior to the issue/withdrawal decision. Return on 
the NASDAQ composite index in prior thirty days is the return on the index over the thirty 
days before issue/withdrawal. To represent the different effects of the positive and 
negative market trend on the probability of withdrawal, we add Positive return on the 
NASDAQ composite index in prior thirty days, which equals the NASDAQ composite 
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index in the prior thirty days if positive, and zero otherwise, thus separating the possible 
asymmetric effects. In addition to the number of IPOs before the offering, we also 
consider Logarithm of proceeds of offerings in prior two months, measured by the 
logarithm of the sum of gross proceeds of completed offerings in the two months prior to 
the current one, and Logarithm of proceeds of industry offerings in prior two months, 
measured by the logarithm of the sum of gross proceeds of completed offerings in the 
same Fama-French industry in the two months prior to the current one. In addition to the 
information spillover effect shared with the number of IPOs and the number of same-
industry IPOs (Booth and Chua 1996; Dunbar 1998; Busaba et al. 2001; Benveniste, 
Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu 2003), these two variables represent the short-term primary 
capital availability at the whole market level and the individual industry level 
respectively. A stronger information spillover and/or a larger capital availability should 
lead to a lower withdrawal probability. 
We report descriptive statistics for the variables in table 2.4. The t-stats are 
calculated to test the null hypothesis that the variable means of completions and that of 
withdrawals are equal, using the unequal variance t-test (the Welch-Satterthwaite test) 
method. The univariate analysis shows some results different from the earlier empirical 
literature, representing the change in the sample periods selected. For example, the odds 
of offering success is positively associated with the technology dummy in the 1985-2000 
IPO samples of Dunbar and Foerster (2008), yet the opposite is true in our 2001-2007 
subsample. This is partially due to the clustering of withdrawals in the business service 
industry after the burst of the Internet bubble in 2000. Although association with 
withdrawal can be detrimental to the public image of technology firms, as Dunbar and 
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Foerster (2008) argued, technical firms do appear to have more ex ante valuation 
uncertainty and are more adversely affected in the bookbuilding mechanism (Benveniste 
and Spindt 1989).  
Another exception is that the debt retirement dummy is positively associated with 
completions in our sample, an opposite result to the sample statistics of Busaba et al. 
(2001) and Dunbar and Foerster (2008). We attribute this to the difference in sample 
periods and data collection. Busaba et al. (2001) exclude from their 1990-1994 sample 
those offerings of financial (SIC code 6000-6999) and certain services firms (SIC code 
large than 8100). Dunbar and Foerster (2008), in comparison, do not exclude these 
industries from their sample of 1985-2000 IPOs but had two-thirds of the data missing for 
the withdrawals on the debt retirement variable. We collect and update the data from 
TSDC by tracking the SEC’s EDGAR and, as reported in table 2.4, have little data 
missing on this variable.19 This variable, as Busaba et al. (2001) and Dunbar and Foerster 
(2008) argued, represents the firms’ ability to access alternative capital; moreover, it 
clearly indicates the usage of proceeds. A more salient debt retirement purpose decreases 
the uncertainty associated with future investments (especially for the projects launched in 
the services industries) and reduced the potential problem associated with free cash flow 
(Jensen 1986) after the offering; thus, less discount on price is required by investors. The 
effect of the debt retirement dummy on the withdrawal decision might change as the 
sample period changes. 
                                                 
19 Excluding the debt retirement dummy variable from the model does not affect the key results of our 
study, although it decreases the pseudo R-square of our probit model in estimating the withdrawal 
probability.  
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Our regression results of the probit model are presented in table 2.5. We include 
all the variables at first, and then “dismiss” variables of which the coefficients in any 
regression of the three subsamples are insignificant while those of other similar but 
competitive variables produce significant results. For example, Bank market share and 
Bank industry market share have more significant effect than Carter-Manaster rank. 
Number of offerings in prior two month and Logarithm of proceeds of industry offerings 
in prior two months beat Number of industry offerings and Logarithm of proceeds of all 
offerings. As a result, we dismiss five variables with insignificant coefficients. We also 
report the marginal effect of each variable 𝑥, defined as 𝜙(𝛼�?̅?) ∙ 𝛼�𝜎�𝑥, where 𝜙(∙) is the 
density function of standard normal probability distribution, 𝛼�  is the estimated 
coefficient, ?̅? is the sample mean and 𝜎�𝑥 is the standard deviation of the variable (which 
is set to 1 for dummy variables). 
The results of our probit regressions are largely consistent with those of Busaba et 
al. (2001) and Dunbar and Foerster (2008), in view of our sample differences and the 
adjustments of variable measurements.20 The probability of withdrawal is significantly 
negatively related to firm revenue, VC/PE-backing dummy, bank industry market share, 
number of offerings in prior two months, industry average B/M ratio before 
issue/withdrawal, and NASDAQ composite index return in the prior thirty days, but 
positively related to filing size and firm debt ratio.  
                                                 
20 For example, we use the issue/withdrawal date, instead of the initial filing date, as the reference point 
when measuring the market conditions. Hence, the market conditions at/before the issue/withdrawal 
decision in our study are similar to those after the filing in the earlier studies.  
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics on completed and withdrawn IPOs during 1996-2007, 1996-2000, and 2001-2007. 
The sample means and univariate test statistics for the differences in key variables between completed and withdrawn IPOs are 
reported in the table. The t-statistics are calculated to test the null hypothesis that the variable means of completions and that of 
withdrawals are equal, using the unequal variance t-test (the Welch-Satterthwaite test). Statistics with significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels are denoted with * and **, respectively.  
 1996-2007 1996-2000 2002-2007 
 Completion Withdrawal t-Value Completion Withdrawal t-Value Completion Withdrawal t-Value 
Firm characteristics 
Logarithm of revenue 9.508 8.800 5.46 ** 9.197 8.769 2.75 ** 10.320 8.853 6.28 ** 
Logarithm of proceeds 10.378 10.167 5.00 ** 10.201 10.024 3.44 ** 10.838 10.417 6.11 ** 
Debt ratio 0.403 0.450 -1.61  0.400 0.435 -1.10  0.411 0.477 -1.13  
Debt ratio * Equity ratio -0.372 -0.419 0.27  -0.362 -0.254 -0.68  -0.397 -0.707 0.77  
Technology dummy 0.339 0.357 -0.81  0.385 0.357 1.03  0.220 0.358 -3.78 ** 
VC/PE-backing dummy 0.540 0.402 6.10 ** 0.488 0.337 5.53 ** 0.675 0.515 4.16 ** 
Debt retirement dummy 0.280 0.157 7.08 ** 0.277 0.188 3.88 ** 0.290 0.103 7.09 ** 
Market dummy – AMEX  0.026 0.061 -3.26 ** 0.021 0.048 -2.25 * 0.040 0.083 -2.13 * 
Market dummy – NASDQ 0.738 0.780 -2.21 * 0.770 0.775 -0.23  0.654 0.789 -4.10 ** 
Market dummy – NYSE  0.160 0.111 3.34 ** 0.116 0.110 0.38  0.275 0.113 6.02 ** 
Underwriter characteristics 
Carter-Manaster rank 7.388 7.024 3.31 ** 7.251 6.787 3.30 ** 7.745 7.437 1.79  
Bank market share 6.920 5.264 4.80 ** 5.161 4.037 3.26 ** 11.509 7.404 5.65 ** 
Bank industry market share  18.276 6.124 17.70 ** 13.223 4.476 12.71 ** 31.466 8.999 15.30 ** 
Market conditions at time of issue/withdrawal 
Number of offerings in prior two months 71.154 51.177 11.61 ** 88.374 70.256 9.65 ** 26.208 17.882 9.12 ** 
Logarithm of proceeds of offerings in prior two months 8.141 7.814 7.06 ** 8.324 8.162 4.02 ** 7.665 7.207 5.01 ** 
Number of industry filings in prior two months 10.722 5.914 9.56 ** 13.719 8.553 7.19 ** 2.900 1.309 10.97 ** 
Logarithm of proceeds of industry offerings in prior two months 5.332 3.673 14.47 ** 5.498 4.213 9.28 ** 4.900 2.730 11.84 ** 
BAA-AAA yield spread at issue/withdrawal 0.752 0.800 -5.91 ** 0.692 0.722 -4.61 ** 0.909 0.936 -1.86  
Change in BAA-AAA yield spread in prior two months -0.006 0.020 -5.21 ** -0.009 0.014 -3.73 ** 0.001 0.031 -3.36 ** 
Ten-year Treasury yield at issue/withdrawal 5.666 5.414 6.71 ** 6.098 5.843 7.18 ** 4.538 4.666 -3.66 ** 
Change in ten-year Treasury yield in prior two months 0.022 -0.096 7.03 ** 0.026 -0.074 4.53 ** 0.010 -0.134 5.86 ** 
Industry average B/M ratio pre-issue/withdrawal 0.357 0.321 2.92 ** 0.320 0.281 3.02 ** 0.453 0.391 2.60 ** 
Return on the NASDAQ composite index in prior thirty days 0.020 -0.010 6.61 ** 0.024 0.002 4.18 ** 0.009 -0.030 4.95 ** 
Positive return on the NASDAQ index in prior thirty days 0.038 0.035 1.34  0.043 0.039 1.26  0.027 0.028 -0.53  
Observations 3101 560   2242 356   859 204   
Note: One completion and twenty-two withdrawals are excluded because of missing data on financial information.  
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Table 2.5: The probit analysis of withdrawal decision for IPO filings between 1996 
and 2007 
The dependent variable is one for withdrawals and zero for completed offerings. The 
coefficient estimates are presented with the p-value (of a 𝜒2 Wald test on whether the 
coefficient is different from zero) reported in parentheses. Pseudo 𝑅2 equals one minus 
the log likelihood of the model divided by the log likelihood for a zero-slopes model. The 
marginal effect of variable 𝑥  is defined as  𝜙(𝛼�?̅?) ∙ 𝛼�𝜎�𝑥 , where  𝜙(∙)  is the density 
function of standard normal probability distribution, 𝛼� is the estimated coefficient, ?̅? is 
the sample mean and 𝜎�𝑥 is the standard deviation of the variable (which is set to 1 for 
dummy variable).  
 Probability of Withdrawal 
 Whole sample: 1996-2007 Subsample 1: 1996-2000 Subsample 2: 2001-2007 
 Coefficient – Marg. effect Coefficient – Marg. effect Coefficient – Marg. effect 
Intercept -1.286 (0.03)   -0.264 (0.74)   -4.219 (0.00)   
Firm characteristics 
Logarithm of revenue -0.044 (0.00) -0.02  -0.033 (0.04) -0.01  -0.092 (0.00) -0.04  
Logarithm of proceeds 0.150 (0.00) 0.03  0.080 (0.18) 0.01  0.321 (0.00) 0.05  
Debt ratio 0.348 (0.00) 0.04  0.313 (0.00) 0.03  0.537 (0.00) 0.05  
Debt ratio * Equity ratio 0.045 (0.00) 0.04  0.037 (0.07) 0.03  0.076 (0.01) 0.06  
Technology dummy 0.419 (0.00) 0.07  0.267 (0.01) 0.04  0.644 (0.00) 0.10  
VC/PE-backing dummy -0.379 (0.00) -0.06  -0.408 (0.00) -0.06  -0.180 (0.20) -0.03  
Debt retirement dummy -0.358 (0.00) -0.06  -0.233 (0.01) -0.04  -0.899 (0.00) -0.14  
Market dummy – AMEX  0.859 (0.00) 0.14  0.914 (0.00) 0.15  1.485 (0.00) 0.23  
Market dummy – NASDQ 0.753 (0.00) 0.12  0.732 (0.00) 0.12  1.365 (0.01) 0.21  
Market dummy – NYSE  0.944 (0.00) 0.15  1.104 (0.00) 0.18  1.471 (0.01) 0.22  
Underwriter characteristics 
Bank market share 0.014 (0.01) 0.02  0.014 (0.04) 0.01  0.015 (0.11) 0.02  
Bank industry market share -0.032 (0.00) -0.12  -0.035 (0.00) -0.11  -0.031 (0.00) -0.13  
Market environment  
Number of IPOs in prior two  
   months -0.005 (0.00) -0.03  -0.004 (0.00) -0.02  -0.010 (0.13) -0.02  
Logarithmic industry proceeds in 
prior two months -0.341 (0.00) -0.10  -0.293 (0.00) -0.08  -0.488 (0.00) -0.13  
BAA-AAA yield spread at 
issue/withdrawal 0.259 (0.29) 0.01  0.958 (0.02) 0.02  -0.301 (0.43) -0.01  
Change in BAA-AAA yield spread 
in prior two months 0.065 (0.85) 0.00  -0.546 (0.21) -0.01  1.614 (0.01) 0.03  
Ten-year Treasury yield at 
issue/withdrawal 0.052 (0.40) 0.01  -0.101 (0.24) -0.01  0.399 (0.02) 0.02  
Change in ten-year Treasury yield 
in prior two months -0.361 (0.00) -0.02  -0.442 (0.00) -0.03  -0.276 (0.22) -0.01  
Industry average B/M ratio pre-
issue/withdrawal -0.460 (0.01) -0.03  -0.745 (0.01) -0.05  0.150 (0.59) 0.01  
NASDAQ index return in prior 
thirty days -6.570 (0.00) -0.08  -5.316 (0.00) -0.07  -9.677 (0.00) -0.10  
Positive NASDAQ return in prior 
thirty days 8.178 (0.00) 0.06  6.068 (0.00) 0.05  12.724 (0.00) 0.07  
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.31 0.24 0.50 
Number of observations 3661 (3101 vs. 560) 2598 (2242 vs. 356) 1063 (859 vs. 204) 
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Consistent with our univariate test but different from the finding of Busaba et al. 
(2001) and Dunbar and Foerster (2008), the probability of withdrawal is negatively 
related to the debt retirement dummy but positively related to the technology dummy. As 
discussed in the above paragraph, we attribute the discrepancy to the alternative 
explanations presented in their original arguments and to the differences in our sample 
periods and regression models. In our view, a value of one on the debt retirement dummy 
represents the clarity on the usage of proceeds, and thus decreases the uncertainty related 
with the future usage of proceeds, whereas technology firms are riskier and are thus more 
adversely affected in the process of information revealing during bookbuilding. Overall, 
the offerings that are associated with lower agent cost and/or lower uncertainty have a 
lower probability of withdrawal.  
Our probit regression indicates that debt ratio, when interacts with equity ratio, is 
still positively related to the probability of withdrawal, confirming our argument that 
equity ratio enhances debt ratio’s effect on the decision to withdraw. An issuing firm’s 
higher debt ratio may still signal a higher capability of alternative financing if the firm 
maintains a higher equity ratio. With a lower or negative equity ratio, however, a firm 
with higher debt ratio obviously has little room for obtaining additional debt financing 
and has to rely on the current offering, so it is less likely to withdraw. 
Another new variable introduced in our model is the logarithm of proceeds of 
industry offerings in prior two months. The probability of withdrawal is significantly 
negatively related to the number of offerings and the logarithm of proceeds of industry 
offerings in prior two months. Compared to the number of offerings that represents 
information spillover from earlier offerings, the logarithm of proceeds represents both 
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information spillover and capital availability in the primary market. Hence, we interpret 
that both information spillover and industry capital abundance in the primary market 
decrease the likelihood of withdrawal. 
The probability of withdrawal is also significantly negatively related to the 
VC/PE-backing dummy, but this significance disappears after 2000. Accompanying the 
shrinkage of the VC industry and the deficits of many funds (significantly “underwater”) 
after the burst of the Internet bubble in 2000, the VC/PEs’ certification power and/or their 
ability to provide alternative financing decrease. The insignificant coefficient of the 
VC/PE-backing dummy for the subsample 2002-2007 reinforces this explanation in view 
of the significant corresponding coefficients in the whole sample and the 1996-2000 
subsample. Similarly, the diminished significance of the coefficient of the industry 
average B/M ratio in the subsample after 2000 reinforces the “misvaluation” explanation 
(Dunbar and Foerster 2008) for the negative significance of this variable in the offerings 
before 2000.  
Other variables affecting the likelihood of withdrawal include the market 
dummies and the concurrent performance of the bond market and the equity market. The 
positive association of all three market dummies to the probability of withdrawal shows 
that withdrawals are associated more with the three main markets than with other smaller 
markets. We also find that the significance of coefficients of the four variables on spread 
yield and Treasury yield changes from one period to another, suggesting that the IPO 
market interprets the performance of the bond market differently from time to time. 
However, the prior equity market performance consistently affects the withdrawal 
probability. Overall, return on the NASDAQ composite index in the prior thirty days is 
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significantly negatively related to the likelihood of withdrawal, but this effect is 
insignificantly positive if the NASDAQ return is positive. Specifically, the estimated 
coefficient is -6.570 (sample 1996-2007) for a negative NASDAQ return, but is 1.608 (-
6.570 plus 8.178) if the NASDAQ return of the prior thirty days is positive. A negative 
NASDAQ return increases the likelihood of withdrawal much more than a corresponding 
positive NASDAQ return does. 
We use the probit model to estimate the ex ante probability of withdrawal of the 
completed IPOs in our sample. This estimate, combined with the offer price adjustment 
levels as defined in the next section, is used to proxy an offering’s withdrawal potential 
ex post the information collection in the bookbuilding process, and to explain the 
underwriter pricing intentions and aftermarket price support activities. 
2.3.3.  Forming IPO Portfolios Based on Price Adjustment 
Levels 
We propose that the incentive to avert withdrawal directly influences the 
underwriter’s overpricing intention through a mechanism different from the underpricing 
mechanism to compensate investors for their information revealing (Benveniste and 
Spindt 1989) and the option to withdrawal threatening the investors to decrease such 
underpricing requirement (Busaba 2006). In the bookbuilding process, investors do not 
know the exact reservation price of the issuer but estimate the likelihood of withdrawal 
for the current offering based on their knowledge and experience from the past. However, 
the underwriter, negotiating directly with the issuer after having collected information 
from investors, has more information about the issuer’s reservation price. In the case of 
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an issuer on the verge of withdrawal, regardless of whether the underwriter overprices the 
offering to avert the probable withdrawal or takes the withdrawal as is, the underwriter 
knows the issuer’s bottom line. Therefore, the probit model estimation, by itself, is 
insufficient to proxy an offering’s true withdrawal potential that the underwriter might 
reveal. However, we can draw some information about the aggregated premarket demand 
from the later adjustment of the offer price relative to its preliminary price range. We 
argue that price adjustment is the result of negotiation between the issuer and the 
underwriter after premarket information collection, thus containing more complete 
information about issuer withdrawal potential and underwriter’s pricing intention.  
The preliminary price range proposed in the earlier filing represents the range 
within which the underwriter and the issuer set out to decide the offer price.21 The final 
price adjustment, in our opinion, reflects the investors’ information revealed in the 
bookbuilding process as well as underwriter’s pricing intention. For example, the 
underwriter might underprice offerings with strong premarket demand to compensate the 
revealing investors, or overprice offerings with weak premarket demand to avert potential 
withdrawals. By categorizing the price adjustments based on the preliminary price range, 
we group the offerings into seven IPO portfolios with different price adjustment levels 
defined as follows. 
𝐴3
−: 𝑃ℎ < 𝑃𝐿 < 𝑃𝑈 . Offer price 𝑃ℎ  is less than the lower boundary of the initial price 
range, [𝑃𝐿 ,𝑃𝑈]. Information collection from the investors reveals extremely bad news and 
                                                 
21 The price range is not compulsory in the preliminary prospectus. Among those offerings that did not 
propose offer price expectations in the initial filings, some updated with a price range later, whereas many 
others updated with an expected offer price instead. On rare occasions (e.g., Carolina National Corporation, 
listed Dec. 16th, 2005, on NASDAQ SMCAP and First Capital Bancorp, listed June 15th, 2007, on 
NASDAQ), we find neither price ranges nor expected offer prices throughout all filings available in the 
EDGAR system. 
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withdrawal potential is high. Considering the substantial cost of aftermarket price 
support, the underwriter might give up “saving” the potential withdrawal. Hence, the 
underwriter has weak intention to overprice offerings among this IPO portfolio. The 
completed offerings that are finally priced below the lower boundary of the preliminary 
price range are less likely to be the result of underwriter’s selective overpricing, unless in 
a cold IPO market when the underwriter values the “in-hand” contract and is willing to 
“save” a high-risk withdrawal at a higher cost. In addition, as Dunbar and Foerster (2008) 
argued, firms with higher ex ante withdrawal probability that receive negative 
information during bookbuilding are more likely to deeply discount prices to ensure 
offering success, which could result, in some cases, in underpricing if they reduce prices 
more than necessary. 
𝐴2
−: 𝑃ℎ = 𝑃𝐿 < 𝑃𝑈. Offer price 𝑃ℎ  is mildly adjusted down, but stopped at exactly the 
lower boundary of the preliminary price range. No underpricing is required here, whereas 
overpricing is highly likely to be observed in this group for the reasons we specified 
above.22  
𝐴1
−: 𝑃𝐿 < 𝑃ℎ < 𝑃𝐿+𝑃𝑈2 , 𝑜𝑟 𝑃ℎ < 𝑃𝐿 = 𝑃𝑈. Offer price 𝑃ℎ is a modest adjustment regardless 
of the percentage of price adjustment. For offerings with no price range but a pre-set 
expectation price, we interpret this single price as the middle price of a very wide price 
range. The underwriter might overprice offerings with higher withdrawal probability to 
                                                 
22 We are not focusing on the causality between price adjustment level and the underwriter’s overstatement 
intention. A mildly weak demand might lead to a higher intention of overpricing to avert withdrawal. 
Alternatively but not exclusively, overpricing might lead to a sticky price adjustment at exactly the lower 
boundary of the preliminary price range. This mutual effect can also work for other price adjustment levels. 
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avert potential withdrawals, but may underprice offerings in other cases. A mixture of 
overpricing effect and underpricing effect might be observed in this group. 
𝐴0: 𝑃ℎ = 𝑃𝐿+𝑃𝑈2 . The offer price is not adjusted.23  
𝐴1
+ : 𝑃𝐿+𝑃𝑈
2
< 𝑃ℎ < 𝑃𝑈 , 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝐿 = 𝑃𝑈 < 𝑃ℎ. This is a softly strong adjustment on the offer 
price. 
𝐴2
+: 𝑃𝐿 < 𝑃𝑈 = 𝑃ℎ  and  𝐴3+: 𝑃𝐿 < 𝑃𝐻 < 𝑃ℎ . This represents positive adjustments due to 
strong market feedbacks. 
We report in table 2.6 (Panel A) the observations of IPO portfolios formed on the 
price adjustment levels. The offer prices of the completed offerings appear to cluster at 
three levels—the midpoint, the upper boundary and the lower boundary of the 
preliminary price range—with 738, 607 and 461 observations for each category. In other 
words, the price adjustments cluster at 𝐴2−, 𝐴0 and 𝐴2+, representing 14.9%, 23.8% and 
19.6% of the 3,101 competed offerings. We see an increase of observations within 
portfolio 𝐴2− as the withdrawal probability deciles increase but no such result exists in 
portfolio 𝐴3−. This suggests that offerings with higher withdrawal probabilities are either 
withdrawn (if priced below the preliminary price range) from our observations or are 
more likely to be priced at exactly the lower boundary. In either case, the binding power 
of the lower boundary is stronger for offerings in this group. 
                                                 
23 The two offerings without preliminary price range mentioned in footnote 20 are regarded as offerings 
with no price adjusted.  
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We further investigate, as reported in table 2.6 (Panel B), the observations of IPOs 
with positive/negative PEQ excess returns for portfolios grouped by both price 
adjustment levels and ex ante estimated withdrawal probability deciles. PEQ excess 
return is the NASDAQ-adjusted percentage change from the offer price to the closing 
price day-3 PEQ. Specifically with the one-sided p-value, we test whether there is an 
increasing proportion of IPOs with negative PEQ excess return as the withdrawal 
probability deciles increase. The test on the whole sample shows a significant trend 
towards an increased portion of negative PEQ excess return along with the increase of 
withdrawal probability, consistent with the argument of Busaba (2006) and Busaba et al. 
(2001) that less underpricing is required for offerings with higher ex ante estimated 
withdrawal probability. A significant in-group trend exists for portfolio 𝐴2−, the offerings 
with price adjusted to the lower boundary, and portfolio 𝐴0, the offerings with no price 
adjustment. Offerings with higher withdrawal potential in these groups are more likely to 
generate negative PEQ excess returns, i.e. more likely to be overpriced. The 1996-2000 
subsample contributes to the significant trend in portfolio 𝐴0 of the whole sample period, 
whereas the 2001-2007 subsample contributes to the trend in 𝐴2− . More interestingly, 
whereas almost all IPO portfolios have more offerings with positive PEQ excess return 
than with negative return, portfolio 𝐴2− for the 2001-2007 subsample shows an opposite 
result, in that there are seventy-three completed offerings obtaining negative PEQ excess 
returns but only fifty-six realizing positive ones. We interpret this significant trend as the 
result of selective overpricing based on the ex ante likelihood of withdrawal instead of 
the phenomenon of IPO underpricing.  
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The observations in table 2.6 may be intuitive but should be interpreted with 
caution. We leave the task of testing the existence of deliberate overpricing to the 
ensuring regression analysis. 
Table 2.6: Observations of completed IPO portfolios formed on offer price 
adjustment 𝐀𝐣
±s and grouped by withdrawal probability deciles 𝐏𝐰𝐢: 1996-2007 
Completed IPOs are grouped by their relative price adjustment levels according to their 
preliminary price ranges. Portfolio  𝐴0 consists of all IPOs with an offer price equal to the middle 
of the preliminary price range. 𝐴1+  and 𝐴1−  are IPO portfolios with an offer price in the 
upper/lower half of the price range. 𝐴2+ and 𝐴2− are IPO portfolios with an offer price at exactly 
the upper/lower boundary of the price range. 𝐴3+ and 𝐴3− are IPO portfolios with an offer price 
above/below the price range. Offerings with no price range but an expected offer price are 
regarded as offerings priced within the preliminary price range. Withdrawal probability deciles of 
the completed offerings are calculated based on the ex ante estimate likelihood of withdrawal 
from the probit model of table 2.5 with the whole sample from 1996 to 2007.  
Panel A: Observations of completed IPOs 
Panel A: observations 
 𝐴3− 𝐴2− 𝐴1− 𝐴0 𝐴1+ 𝐴2+ 𝐴3+ All 
𝑃𝑤0 43 32 20 74 20 61 60 310 
𝑃𝑤1 48 32 9 68 11 73 69 310 
𝑃𝑤2 36 40 12 73 13 66 70 310 
𝑃𝑤3 42 29 12 55 14 72 86 310 
𝑃𝑤4 36 38 14 69 8 67 78 310 
𝑃𝑤5 34 48 12 68 10 66 73 311 
𝑃𝑤6 36 53 11 77 12 58 63 310 
𝑃𝑤7 53 54 10 75 11 58 49 310 
𝑃𝑤8 48 67 11 83 11 50 40 310 
𝑃𝑤9 49 68 24 96 9 36 28 310 
All 425 461 135 738 119 607 616 3101 
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Panel B: Observations of Positive/Negative PEQ Excess Returns 
The one-sided p-values are from the asymptotic Cochran-Armitage trend test with null hypothesis 
(H0): there is no linear trend in the binomial proportions of the positive/negative (+/-) PEQ excess 
returns across increasing levels of the withdrawal probability deciles  𝑃𝑤𝑖  of all completed 
offerings. The probability of withdrawal and corresponding deciles of the subsamples are 
estimated and calculated within the subsamples respectively. 
Note: Of all the 3,101 completed offerings, 50 small market IPOs have no recorded price. 
  
Panel B: Observations of Positive/Negative (+/-) PEQ Excess Returns 
Price 
adjustment 
𝑨𝟑
− 𝑨𝟐− 𝑨𝟏− 𝑨𝟎 𝑨𝟏+ 𝑨𝟐+ 𝑨𝟑+ All 
+ - all + - all + - All + - all + - all + - all + - all + - all 
19
96
 –
 2
00
7 
𝑃𝑤0 27 16 43 19 13 32 12 8 20 48 24 72 13 6 19 53 8 61 56 4 60 228 79 307 
𝑃𝑤1 21 26 47 18 14 32 6 3 9 46 17 63 6 4 10 55 18 73 64 5 69 216 87 303 
𝑃𝑤2 18 18 36 21 19 40 5 6 11 45 22 67 7 6 13 54 11 65 64 6 70 214 88 302 
𝑃𝑤3 26 16 42 14 15 29 7 5 12 38 16 54 9 3 12 58 14 72 83 3 86 235 72 307 
𝑃𝑤4 22 14 36 21 17 38 6 7 13 47 20 67 5 3 8 49 18 67 73 5 78 223 84 307 
𝑃𝑤5 19 15 34 32 16 48 5 7 12 44 22 66 8 1 9 58 8 66 64 9 73 230 78 308 
𝑃𝑤6 25 11 36 32 21 53 6 5 11 52 24 76 9 3 12 42 16 58 58 4 62 224 84 308 
𝑃𝑤7 20 33 53 26 28 54 8 2 10 47 25 72 6 5 11 50 8 58 46 3 49 203 104 307 
𝑃𝑤8 25 23 48 30 37 67 6 5 11 47 33 80 9 2 11 42 8 50 37 3 40 196 111 307 
𝑃𝑤9 33 16 49 29 39 68 12 12 24 45 37 82 5 4 9 30 5 35 28  28 182 113 295 
Sum 236 188 424 242 219 461 73 60 133 459 240 699 77 37 114 491 114 605 573 42 615 2151 900 3051 
p-values 0.40 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.38 0.30 0.35 0.00 
Price 
adjustment 
𝑨𝟑
− 𝑨𝟐− 𝑨𝟏− 𝑨𝟎 𝑨𝟏+ 𝑨𝟐+ 𝑨𝟑+ All 
+ - all + - all + - All + - all + - all + - all + - all + - all 
19
96
 –
 2
00
0 
𝑃𝑤0 13 12 25 15 11 26 8 4 12 40 13 53 11 3 14 35 10 45 46 2 48 168 55 223 
𝑃𝑤1 9 9 18 13 8 21 4 4 8 42 14 56 1 4 5 35 14 49 58 5 63 162 58 220 
𝑃𝑤2 15 10 25 17 8 25 3 4 7 26 17 43 6 1 7 50 4 54 50 7 57 167 51 218 
𝑃𝑤3 12 7 19 12 14 26 6 5 11 33 14 47 7 5 12 40 13 53 49 4 53 159 62 221 
𝑃𝑤4 18 8 26 19 13 32 4 5 9 32 14 46 5 1 6 38 11 49 52 3 55 168 55 223 
𝑃𝑤5 9 11 20 21 17 38 5 5 10 40 13 53 5 2 7 36 9 45 46 3 49 162 60 222 
𝑃𝑤6 15 17 32 15 12 27 7 2 9 38 23 61 4 2 6 34 8 42 43 5 48 156 69 225 
𝑃𝑤7 11 16 27 29 14 43 2 3 5 36 16 52 6 2 8 34 13 47 35 3 38 153 67 220 
𝑃𝑤8 20 12 32 20 26 46 5 3 8 34 22 56 7 3 10 33 1 34 33 3 36 152 70 222 
𝑃𝑤9 19 10 29 25 23 48 7 9 16 30 27 57 2  2 27 7 34 24  24 134 76 210 
Sum 141 112 253 186 146 332 51 44 95 351 173 524 54 23 77 362 90 452 436 35 471 1581 623 2204 
p-values 0.39 0.15 0.32 0.01 0.31 0.23 0.37 0.00 
Price 
adjustment 
𝑨𝟑
− 𝑨𝟐− 𝑨𝟏− 𝑨𝟎 𝑨𝟏+ 𝑨𝟐+ 𝑨𝟑+ All 
+ - all + - all + - all + - all + - all + - all + - all + - all 
20
01
 –
 2
00
7 
𝑃𝑤0 7 4 11 4 3 7 6 1 7 4 6 10 2 5 7 21 4 25 14 1 15 58 24 82 
𝑃𝑤1 12 6 18 5 3 8 2 2 4 10 6 16 5 2 7 15 2 17 14 1 15 63 22 85 
𝑃𝑤2 11 5 16 5 1 6 1 1 2 14 6 20 2 1 3 19 2 21 14 3 17 66 19 85 
𝑃𝑤3 9 13 22 4 6 10 1 2 3 10 2 12 1  1 11 2 13 23  23 59 25 84 
𝑃𝑤4 11 7 18 6 5 11 1 1 2 11 8 19 2 1 3 13  13 20  20 64 22 86 
𝑃𝑤5 8 10 18 9 10 19 2  2 11 7 18 4  4 8 6 14 11  11 53 33 86 
𝑃𝑤6 8 6 14 5 12 17 1 3 4 9 6 15 2 1 3 12 2 14 16 1 17 53 31 84 
𝑃𝑤7 9 10 19 7 7 14 3 1 4 11 6 17 2 2 4 13 3 16 10  10 55 29 84 
𝑃𝑤8 12 12 24 7 11 18  2 2 11 7 18 2 1 3 10 1 11 9 1 10 51 35 86 
𝑃𝑤9 8 3 11 4 15 19 5 3 8 17 13 30 1 1 2 7 2 9 6  6 48 37 85 
Sum 95 76 171 56 73 129 22 16 38 108 67 175 23 14 37 129 24 153 137 7 144 570 277 847 
p-values 0.24 0.01 0.21 0.40 0.23 0.24 0.17 0.00 
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2.4.  Empirical Analysis 
As stated earlier, we proxy the true market price of the offering shares with the 
closing price day-3 PEQ. Hence, underwriter’s pricing intention is measured by the 
NASDAQ-adjusted percentage change from the offer price to this true price, and the first-
day aftermarket support is measured by the initial return deducting the portion of price 
changing towards the true price, which is a proportion of day-3 PEQ excess return. We 
introduce a set of dummy variables representing different price adjustment levels in the 
linear regressions on three different dependent variables: the first-day initial return, the 
overpricing, and the first-day aftermarket price support.  
2.4.1.  Variables and Models  
The linear models are specified as follows:  
𝑌 = 𝜶𝑫′ + 𝑫𝜷𝑿′ + 𝜸𝒁 + 𝜇 
𝑫 = �… ,𝐷𝑗 , … � = (𝐷𝐴0 ,𝐷𝐴+ ,𝐷𝐴1− ,𝐷𝐴2− ,𝐷𝐴3−) 
𝑿 = (𝑃𝑊,𝑃𝐴,𝑃𝑊 ∗ 𝑃𝐴) (8)  
where 𝑫 is a dummy variable vector with 𝑗 denoting different price adjustment levels, 
𝜶 is the coefficients vector of the additive dummy variable, and 𝜷 is the 𝑗 ∗ 3 matrix of 
coefficients for the independent variable vector 𝑿 interacted with the 𝑗 dummy variables, 
and 𝒁 and 𝜸 are the control variables and their corresponding coefficients. 𝑃𝑊 is the ex 
ante withdrawal probability estimated from the probit model in section 2.3. 𝑃𝐴 is the 
relative within-portfolio price adjustment, defined as the raw price adjustment divided by 
the portfolio mean of the raw price adjustment and then subtracted by one. 𝑃𝐴|𝐷𝑗 =
�
𝑝𝑖
?̅?𝑗
− 1�, where the raw price adjustment 𝑝𝑖 equals the offer price divided by the middle 
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of the preliminary price range, 𝑝 = 2𝑃0
𝑃𝑙+𝑃ℎ
, and ?̅?𝑗  is the portfolio mean.
24 We use the 
within-portfolio relative price adjustment to account for scale effects, first among the 
price adjustment levels where a higher level accounts for a larger raw price adjustment, 
and then within a price adjustment level where the raw price adjustment is asymmetric. 
The interaction  𝑃𝑊 ∗ 𝑃𝐴 , short as  𝑃𝑃 , is the interaction of estimated withdrawal 
probability and the relative within-portfolio price adjustment, which catches the above 
two variables’ joint effect, within the analyzed group, on the pricing of an offering. 
The dependent variables are the NASDAQ-adjusted first-day initial returns (𝑦1), 
the NASDAQ-adjusted percentage change from the offer price to day-3 PEQ (𝑦2), and 
the first-day aftermarket price support ( 𝑦3 = 𝑦1 − 𝑞 ∗ 𝑦2) , where 𝑞  represents the 
momentum of stock price changing towards its true price, in other words, represents how 
fast the stock price changes towards the offering’s true price. We take 𝑞 = 0.9 and 0.5 in 
our empirical study. The larger 𝑞 represents a faster returning to the true price of an 
offering when it is mispriced.  
As we discussed earlier, testing the ex ante estimated probability of withdrawal 
alone is insufficient to reflect the effect of premarket investor demand on the 
issuer/underwriter’s pricing behaviours. Price adjustment does contain information of 
premarket demand; however, to compare a larger price adjustment that still falls within 
the preliminary price range with a smaller price adjustment that falls out of the price 
                                                 
24 Under the content of our definition, the notation 𝑃𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝑗 is not the simple multiplication of the raw price 
adjustment and the dummy variable, but the mean-centered relative price adjustment within the portfolio 
group under the same price adjustment level 𝑗. Alternatively, we also tried a direct method to demean the 
price adjustment using the raw price adjustment minus the portfolio mean 𝑃𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝑗 = �𝑝𝑖 ?̅?𝑗⁄ − 1�. The 
results are almost the same.  
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range can be improper and misleading. To break the logjam, we subdivide the completed 
offerings on the basis of price adjustment levels, using the additive dummies to catch the 
difference among adjustment levels and adopt the relative within-portfolio price 
adjustment variable to reflect the variations within the same group. We thus might 
observe a clearer relationship between IPO stock returns and withdrawal potential, which 
is composed of two parts—the ex ante estimated withdrawal probability and the within-
portfolio relative price adjustment.  
The regressions on the first-day initial return 𝑦1, which is often biased up by the 
underwriter’s aftermarket price support activities, reflect mainly the pricing behavior of 
underpriced offerings. The regressions on the PEQ excess return 𝑦2, which is recovered, 
at least partially, from the effect of underwriter aftermarket price support, catch the 
pricing behavior of both underpriced and overpriced offerings regardless of whether the 
observed overpricing is due to deliberate overpricing or simply a pricing error. Finally, 
the regressions on the proxy of aftermarket price support (𝑦3 = 𝑦1 − 𝑞 ∗ 𝑦2), which is 
observed only on selected samples, show the strength the underwriters executed their 
aftermarket price support on the first trading day and its fade out in the following days. 
Although premarket demand, in a general framework, is a continuous concept that 
allows both underpricing and overpricing to occur at all price adjustment levels, the 
extent of such pricing intention varies from one level to another. It is more likely to 
observe the effects of underpricing at the positive adjustment levels, where the degrees of 
underpricing is higher (Benveniste and Spindt 1989) and underwriter’s incentive to 
overstate premarket interest is eliminated by aftermarket price support commitment 
(Benveniste et al. 1996). On the other hand, selective overpricing, as we have argued so 
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far, occurs to avert potential withdrawals, and thus is more likely to be observed in the 
mildly weak demand states.  
Our study focuses on how withdrawal potential affects the underwriter’s pricing 
intention. An issuer accepts an offer price and goes public when its reservation price is 
below the proposed offer price, which is a function of premarket demand and the 
underwriter’s pricing intention. Since the underwriter needs not to underprice an offering 
if the demand is weak (Benveniste and Spindt 1989), nor will it overprice an offering 
when the demand is strong (Benveniste et al. 1996), underpricing occurs only in the states 
of strong premarket demand and overpricing is required only for weak offerings. 
Consequently, underpricing intention, under no circumstances, affects the issuer’s 
withdrawal/completion decision, so we need not to consider selection bias when studying 
underpricing with a regression on selective sample of only completed offerings. If 
overpricing is not in our consideration, the estimate of withdrawal probability is an 
exogenous variable. 
As we argue that overpricing can be employed to avert potential withdrawals, we 
have to deal with endogeneity. When true stock value is lower than the reservation price, 
the underwriter overpricing intention is to keep the offer price above the reservation 
price. Thus, the decision of withdrawal/completion is also affected by the underwriter’s 
overpricing intention, in addition to premarket demand. Specifically, we observe a 
withdrawal if both of the following criteria are satisfied: a) premarket demand is weaker 
than the reservation price and b) the underwriter has no (or insufficient) intention to 
overprice the offering above the reservation price. For those offerings with weak 
premarket demand, an offering is a success if it is overpriced sufficiently by the 
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underwriter. The regressions on the observations of offerings that had weak demand but 
managed to complete after deliberate overpricing could generate selection bias. Heckman 
(1976, 1979) suggests a two-stage procedure to correct this bias. We include the Inverse 
Mill’s Ratio (IMR) as a control variable in the alternative regressions. We calculate IMR 
as 𝜙(𝛼 �𝑥𝑖)
Φ(𝛼 �𝑥𝑖), where 𝜙(∙) and Φ(∙) are the pdf and cdf of the standard normal distribution,𝛼� 
are the estimates of coefficient from the probit regression on the sample of withdrawals 
(𝑦 = 0) and completed offerings (𝑦 = 1) that are followed with a negative day-3 PEQ 
excess returns. The independent variables are the same ones used in section 2.3.2 when 
estimating the probability of withdrawal.  
We first regress on 𝑦1  and 𝑦2 without considering the selection bias, as if 
overpricing, like underpricing, does not affect the issuer’s withdrawal decision. We 
should observe a pattern of deliberate overpricing on the mildly weakly demanded 
offerings from these regressions. We then control the selection bias by introducing the 
IMR mentioned above. If the deliberate overpricing affects the issuer’s withdrawal 
decision conditional on the same weak premarket demand, we should observe a 
significant negative correlation between IMR and the excess returns—these completions 
should be correlated with more overpricing in comparison to the withdrawals (conditional 
on same premarket demand). Finally, we regress on 𝑦3 = 𝑦1 − 𝑞 ∗ 𝑦2, with 𝑞 = 0.9 and 
0.5 separately, to see whether and how aftermarket price support might be different for 
the overpriced offerings. Next, we describe the predicted effects on underpricing, 
overpricing, and price support accordingly, as well as introduce the effects of the 
controlled variables. 
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The theory of information collection (Benveniste and Spindt 1989) predicts that 
the degree of underpricing required is directly and positively related to the amount of 
information revealed. Using price adjustment as the proxy for information revealing, 
Hanley (1993) studies the “partial adjustment” phenomenon. Applying to our model 
specification, the theory predicts that excess returns (regressions on 𝑦1 and  𝑦2 ) are 
positively related to price adjustment levels among different IPO groups and positively 
related to the within-group price adjustment in the strong demand states. Busaba (2006) 
argue that the option to withdraw decreases the underpricing required by the investors for 
their information revealing. Similarly, we predict that the probability of withdrawal 
decreases the effect of price adjustment on the excess returns. 
Benveniste et al. (1996) argue that the underwriter’s incentive to overstate 
premarket interest is bonded by the commitment of aftermarket price support; we add that 
the selective overpricing to avert potential withdrawal is more likely to occur in weak 
demand states, especially in the situation where the offering is priced at the lower 
boundary of the preliminary price range because such pricing presumably captures the 
underwriter’s reluctance to go below for the fear of issuer withdrawal. Overpricing that 
occurs widely and indiscriminately within an IPO portfolio should result in a significant 
coefficient for the additive dummy variable of that group. Selective overpricing aimed to 
avert potential withdrawals should be correlated with the ex ante withdrawal probability. 
The effects of deliberate overpricing should be revealed in the regressions on 𝑦2, and the 
accompanied price support should be observable in the regressions on 𝑦3. We predict 
that, for offerings with mildly weak premarket demand, underwriters are more likely to 
overprice the offerings with higher withdrawal potential; consequently, offerings with 
57 
 
 
 
 
larger ex ante estimated withdrawal probability are more likely to be overpriced and 
generate lower excess returns. This effect should be diminished after we introduce IMR, 
which itself should be negatively correlated to the excess returns since IMR captures the 
positive correlation between overpricing intention and the completion of offerings that 
are weakly demanded and are in danger of been withdrawn. Furthermore, we argue that 
selective overpricing should also be accompanied with the commitment of aftermarket 
price support, so we predict that IMR should be positively correlated with such price 
support.  
Offerings with mildly weak premarket demand can appear in any part of the 
offerings with negative price adjustments, e.g. IPO portfolios priced within the lower half 
of the preliminary price range, exactly at the lower boundary, or below the price range. 
However, we have different predictions for each group. Generally, larger downward 
adjustments represent weaker premarket demand; hence, if the underwriter overprices 
these offerings to avert them from withdrawals, we should observe a positive correlation 
between price adjustment and overpricing—i.e. a negative correlation between the price 
adjustment and the excess returns. On the other hand, less downward adjustments may 
represent better premarket demand; and, if the underwriter still underprices the offering 
to compensate investors, we should observe a positive correlation between price 
adjustment and underpricing—i.e. a positive correlation between price adjustment and 
excess returns. For offerings priced within the preliminary price range, a mixture of 
underpricing and overpricing effects, of which both can be weak, should co-exist, and 
might cancel out each other to show no coefficient significance. For offerings priced 
exactly at the lower boundary of price range, a smaller price adjustment also indicates a 
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shorter price range, which can be more binding. Offerings with weak demand revealed in 
the bookbuilding are more likely to show up in this group if overpricing is required to 
avert potential withdrawals. We predict a significantly negative correlation between price 
adjustment and excess returns for this group. Finally, for offerings priced below the 
preliminary price range, overpricing might be rare since the cost to support the 
aftermarket can be substantially high. The coefficients of price adjustment, in such cases, 
might be negative but insignificant. After we introduce IMR as a control variable, the 
correlation between price adjustment and excess returns should change little in most 
cases since IMR is estimated without revealed information on price adjustment. 
However, for offerings priced below the price range, this correlation might change after 
we control IMR of overpriced offerings, because it might then reflect mainly the rare 
underpricing cases described in Dunbar and Foerster (2008)—the issue firms with high 
ex ante withdrawal probability may choose to reduce prices deeply to ensure offering 
success.  
Additionally, since the ex ante estimated withdrawal probability always competes 
with price adjustment in predicting the overall withdrawal potential, it always decreases 
the effect of price adjustment on overpricing whenever such an effect exists; as a result, 
the interaction of PW and PA should have an effect on overpricing opposite to that from 
price adjustment.25 
Overall, we should observe the underpricing effect on offerings with positive 
price adjustment and selective overpricing effect on offerings with negative price 
                                                 
25 Since the relative price adjustment 𝑃𝐴 is mean centered, it is easier to interpret the coefficient of the 
interaction variable by asking how the 𝑃𝑊 affects the partial effect of 𝑃𝐴 on the dependent variable.  
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adjustment. The underpricing effect, if still observable on offerings with negative price 
adjustment, should fade out as we move from the offering group priced within the 
preliminary price range to the offering groups priced at or below the lower boundary of 
price range. The selective overpricing effect, on the contrary, should be significant for 
weaker offerings, especially those priced at exactly the lower boundary.   
Several control variables, other than the variables concerned with our main 
contentions, are also included in the regression. We include all the variables used in 
estimating the withdrawal probability and some other control variables (in reference to 
relevant literature) in our regression models. Past studies have found that underpricing is 
associated with the following variables: IPO proceeds (Ritter 1987; Chalk and Peavy 
1987; Carter and Manaster 1990; Hanley 1993); Firm revenue (Busaba et al. 2001); Debt 
(James and Wier 1990); Number of book managers (Corwin and Schultz 2005); Dilution 
(the inverse of overhang in Bradley and Jordan 2002), defined as the number of shares 
offered in the IPO divided by the number of shares outstanding after the IPO, both as net 
of the overallotment option; Technology dummy (Dunbar and Foerster 2008 and the 
“nascent” industry in Benveniste et al. 2003); VC/PE-backing dummy (Barry, Muscarella, 
Peavy and Vetsuypens 1990; Megginson and Weiss 1991); Firm standard deviation 
(Johnson and Miller 1988; Carter et al. 1998; Dunbar and Foerster 2008), defined here as 
the standard deviation of stock returns from days +2 to +32 after the end of the quiet 
period; Market dummy (Lowry and Schwert 2004); Bank reputation (Carter and Manaster 
1990; Carter et al. 1998; Loughran and Ritter 2004); Bank (industry) market share 
(Dunbar 2000); information spill-over (Booth and Chua 1996; Benveniste et al. 2003) 
represented by Number of (industry) offerings in prior two months and Logarithm of 
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proceeds of prior (industry) offerings (the later also representing the capital availability 
on the primary market); and market environment before the offerings, including Lagged 
average return, Market return and Positive market return (Loughran and Ritter 2004; 
Lowry and Schwert 2004), Bond market yields, Interest rate curve, and Industry average 
book/market ratio (Dunbar and Foerster 2008).  
Deliberate overpricing is directly constrained by the cost of aftermarket price 
support (Busaba et al. 2001; also see our discussion of the underwriter payoff equation in 
section 2.2). Holding preparatory information about the issuer, the underwriter should 
avoid overpricing offerings with higher risk, since the short-term direct cost related to 
aftermarket price support will be higher.26 To separate the underwriter’s aftermarket price 
support activity from other IPO-relevant activities such as market making (Ellis et al. 
2000), we include the interaction of the firm standard deviation and positive price 
adjustment dummy as a control variable. As aftermarket price support is mainly related to 
the offerings with negative price adjustment, selective overpricing should be affected by 
the firm standard deviation asymmetrically between offerings with positive price 
adjustment and those with negative adjustment. 
2.4.2.  Empirical Results 
Table 2.7 reports the results of our regressions on first-day initial returns, PEQ 
excess returns, and first-day aftermarket price support with the models stated earlier. 
                                                 
26 In this chapter, we keep silent on the potential long-term effect of overpricing (e.g., on underwriter 
market share change), and leave it to chapter 3.  
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Models 1 and 2 show the effects on first-day initial returns (𝑦1) and day-3 PEQ 
excess returns (𝑦2) without considering the selective effect of deliberate overpricing on 
the issuer’s withdrawal decision. Models 3 and 4 introduce IMR to correct the selection 
bias. The additive dummy variables of positive (negative) price adjustment levels 
(𝐷𝐴+ ,𝐷𝐴1− ,𝐷𝐴2− ,𝐷𝐴3− ) have corresponding positive (negative) coefficients, accompanied 
with the positively associated relative price adjustment within the portfolio of positive 
price adjustment (𝑃𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝐴 ). The results are consistent with Hanley’s (1993) “partial 
adjustment” phenomenon of information revealing (Benveniste and Spindt 1989). The 
negative coefficients for probability of withdrawal (𝑃𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝐴) and for the interaction of 
price adjustment and ex ante estimated probability of withdrawal for offerings with 
positive price adjustment (𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐷𝐴+ ) show that the estimated withdrawal probability 
decreases the effect of price adjustment on underpricing, a result consistent with Busaba 
et al. (2001). In particular, we find, in Model 2, the significant coefficients of the 
withdrawal probability (𝑃𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝐴2−) and the relative price adjustment (𝑃𝐴 ∗ 𝐷𝐴2−) in IPO 
portfolios priced at exactly the lower boundary of the preliminary price range. 
Overpricing is more pronounced in the offerings priced exactly at the lower boundary of 
the preliminary price range, especially when the ex ante withdrawal probability is high, 
or when pricing at the lower boundary represents a smaller percentage adjusted from the 
midpoint of the range. Furthermore, as we predict, no deliberate overpricing is detected in 
the poorly received offerings that are priced below the lower boundary of the preliminary 
price range. Our selective overpricing argument, therefor, appears to complement the 
partial adjustment argument and the option to withdraw in explaining the pattern of 
overpricing.  
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In Model 3 and 4, the coefficients of IMRs are significantly and negatively 
correlated to excess returns. The completion of weakly demanded offerings is positive 
correlated with the underwriter’s overpricing intention and thus negatively correlated to 
excess returns. As predicted, the significance of the negative correlation between 
withdrawal probability and excess returns for offerings priced at exactly the lower 
boundary of price range in Model 1 and 2 disappear in Model 3 and 4 after we introduce 
IMR to control selection bias.    
To study first-day aftermarket price support, we first exclude offerings with initial 
returns (𝑦1) larger than 2%. Since the legal maximum support price is no higher than the 
offer price, an offering with higher initial return is less likely to be the result of 
aftermarket price support but more likely to be the result of a strong aftermarket. We also 
exclude offerings with initial returns between -1% and 2% and day-3 PEQ excess returns 
above 5%. Although within the range of price support, the mild initial returns, rather than 
reflecting price support, might represent the start of the stock price change towards the 
offering’s true price. We define 𝑦3 = 𝑦1 − 0.9 ∗ 𝑦2 for Model 5 and 𝑦3 = 𝑦1 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑦2 
for Model 6. The coefficient (𝑝) of 𝑦2 in this definition represents the proportion of day-
3 PEQ excess return that is integrated in the first-day trading. A higher 𝑝 means a more 
prompt market reaction to the mispricing and a lower 𝑝 indicates a stronger momentum 
effect on the stock price. The significantly positive coefficient of IMR, as we predict, 
shows that, among the offerings requiring the first day aftermarket price support, more 
aftermarket price support is applied to offerings that are overpriced and averted from 
potential withdrawals. In addition, the significantly positive coefficient of price 
adjustment for the offering group priced exactly at the lower boundary of price range 
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reemphasizes the conclusion. Other coefficients show little differences among various 
offering groups. For example, the coefficients of ex ante withdrawal probability for most 
groups, except for that of the offerings priced within the lower half of the preliminary 
range, are negative; and the coefficients of the group dummies are negative for offerings 
priced exactly at or below the lower boundary of price range. Offerings, other than those 
deliberately overpriced ones, are supported in the aftermarket indifferently. 
The effects of the control variables on underpricing (Models 1 - 4) are consistent 
with the findings in earlier studies. Excess returns are positively related to lagged average 
returns, the technology dummy, positive NASDAQ returns in the prior month, and firm 
standard deviation of offerings with positive price adjustment, but are negatively 
associated with debt ratio, firm revenues, number of book managers, dilution, and the 
market dummies. We also find a negative correlation between excess returns and the 
logarithm of industry offerings proceeds in prior two months, which represents, as stated 
earlier, industry capital abundance in the primary market. Comparing the regressions on 
𝑦2 to those on 𝑦1, we find that the coefficient on industry average B/M ratio at the prior 
year end and that on negative NASDAQ returns in the prior thirty days become 
negatively significant, suggesting that these offerings are more likely to be overpriced 
and supported in the aftermarket. The coefficients of variables in Model 5 and 6 are 
largely consistent with the analysis of excess returns. Offerings that are likely to be 
overpriced (or less underpriced) are supported in the aftermarket.  
 
 
 
 
64 
Table 2.7: Initial returns, PEQ excess returns, and the first-day price support of IPOs: 1996-2007 
The dependent variables are the first-day initial returns (𝑦1), defined as the first-day ending price divided by the offer price minus the NASDAQ 
return during the same period; the PEQ excess returns (𝑦2), defined as the stock price of three trading days prior to the end of the quiet period 
divided by the offer price and then minus the NASDAQ return during the same period; and the first-day price, defined as 𝑦3 = 𝑦1 − 0.9 ∗ 𝑦2 for 
Model 5 and 𝑦3 = 𝑦1 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑦2 for Model 6. Offerings with 𝑦1 greater than 2%, as well as offerings with 𝑦1 between -1% and 2% and 𝑦2 greater 
than 5%, are excluded from regression 5 and 6. 𝐷𝑗 is the dummy variable equalling one for offerings with price adjustment level of 𝑗. 𝑃𝑊 is the ex 
ante withdrawal probability estimated. 𝑃𝐴 is the relative within-portfolio price adjustment, defined as the raw price adjustment divided by the 
portfolio mean of the raw price adjustment and then minus one, where the raw price adjustment equals the offer price divided by the midpoint 
value of the preliminary price range. 𝑃𝑃 is the interaction of 𝑃𝐴 and 𝑃𝑊. The heteroskedasticity consistent t-value with significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels are denoted with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
Panel A: Whole sample from 1996 to 2007 
 
First-day initial returns: 𝒚𝟏, and Day-3 PEQ excess returns: 𝒚𝟐 1st-day price support: 𝒚𝟑 = 𝒚𝟏 − 𝒒 ∗ 𝒚𝟐 
Model 1 - 𝑦1 Model 2 - 𝑦2 Model 3 - 𝑦1 Model 4 - 𝑦2 Model 5 - 𝑞 = 0.9 Model 6 - 𝑞 = 0.5 
Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat 
Intercept 0.266 1.91 * 0.296 1.65 * 0.264 1.95 * 0.289 1.72 * -0.001 -0.01  -0.021 -0.35  
Probability of withdrawal (PW)* 𝐷0 -0.218 -0.84  -0.402 -2.23 ** 0.056 0.21  0.108 0.61  -0.270 -3.44 *** -0.178 -3.41 *** 
𝐷𝐴+ 0.009 0.21  -0.017 -0.39  0.000 -0.01  -0.036 -0.85  -0.023 -0.76  -0.012 -0.61  
PW * 𝐷𝐴+ -0.650 -3.81 *** -0.511 -2.08 ** -0.622 -3.92 *** -0.457 -2.07 ** -0.436 -3.32 *** -0.270 -3.07 ** 
PA * 𝐷𝐴+ 1.564 4.27 *** 1.001 2.83 ** 1.495 4.10 *** 0.871 2.52 ** -0.061 -0.20  0.016 0.08  
PP * 𝐷𝐴+ -5.758 -2.40 ** -2.024 -0.80  -6.248 -2.64 ** -2.897 -1.21  -1.180 -1.00  -1.875 -2.47 ** 
𝐷𝐴1− -0.025 -0.78  -0.050 -1.20  -0.019 -0.60  -0.039 -1.03  -0.017 -1.00  -0.011 -1.00  
PW * 𝐷𝐴1− -0.289 -1.00  -0.843 -1.81 * -0.018 -0.04  -0.338 -0.84  -0.057 -0.38  0.011 0.11  
PA * 𝐷𝐴1− 0.339 0.86  0.694 1.37  0.467 0.96  0.930 2.02 ** -0.021 -0.09  -0.061 -0.39  
PP * 𝐷𝐴1− 2.690 1.00  -3.603 -0.80  1.554 0.32  -5.749 -1.83 * 2.377 2.10 ** 1.769 1.98 ** 
𝐷𝐴2− -0.083 -2.93 ** -0.058 -1.79 * -0.078 -2.77 ** -0.050 -1.60  -0.038 -2.00 ** -0.021 -1.82 * 
PW * 𝐷𝐴2− -0.397 -3.70 *** -0.651 -4.24 *** 0.059 0.44  0.197 1.15  -0.236 -2.45 ** -0.153 -2.63 ** 
PA * 𝐷𝐴2− -0.184 -0.49  -1.541 -2.45 ** -0.109 -0.29  -1.398 -2.34 ** 0.741 1.98 ** 0.409 1.69 * 
PP * 𝐷𝐴2− 0.185 0.13  2.882 1.36  0.938 0.60  4.263 1.58  -0.826 -0.74  -0.381 -0.49  
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𝐷𝐴3− -0.126 -4.33 *** -0.141 -4.87 *** -0.100 -3.44 *** -0.093 -3.44 *** -0.034 -2.13 ** -0.022 -2.16 ** 
PW * 𝐷𝐴3− -0.122 -1.00  -0.163 -1.05  0.126 0.94  0.300 1.75 * -0.290 -3.13 ** -0.155 -2.60 ** 
PA * 𝐷𝐴3− -0.132 -1.04  -0.163 -0.95  -0.249 -2.08 ** -0.380 -2.53 ** 0.056 0.69  -0.028 -0.50  
PP * 𝐷𝐴3− 0.966 1.51  0.428 0.54  2.055 2.75 ** 2.437 2.65 ** -0.738 -1.21  -0.218 -0.56  
Control variables 
Lagged Average first-day initial Return 0.369 6.35 ***    0.381 6.74 ***    -0.009 -0.47  -0.036 -2.40 ** 
Lagged Average PEQ excess Return     0.410 6.10 ***    0.423 6.59 ***       
Logarithm of revenue -0.004 -1.18  -0.004 -0.80  -0.007 -1.97 ** -0.008 -1.96 * -0.003 -1.80 * -0.001 -1.10  
Logarithm of proceeds 0.024 1.51  0.022 1.19  0.028 1.80 * 0.029 1.69 * -0.021 -2.35 ** -0.009 -1.73 * 
Debt ratio -0.044 -2.27 ** -0.056 -2.42 ** -0.034 -1.82 * -0.037 -1.75 * 0.004 0.32  0.004 0.55  
Debt ratio * Equity ratio -0.002 -1.18  -0.002 -0.68  -0.001 -0.64  0.000 0.18  0.001 0.44  0.001 0.68  
Technology dummy 0.093 3.97 *** 0.164 5.43 *** 0.100 4.33 *** 0.176 6.09 *** -0.058 -2.80 ** -0.035 -2.82 ** 
VC/PE-backing dummy 0.000 0.01  0.009 0.44  -0.010 -0.69  -0.010 -0.56  0.021 2.01 ** 0.010 1.39  
Debt retirement dummy -0.009 -0.52  0.009 0.40  -0.019 -1.10  -0.009 -0.42  0.022 1.96 * 0.013 1.75 * 
AMEX dummy -0.075 -1.65 * -0.028 -0.51  -0.034 -0.77  0.047 0.90  0.000 -0.01  0.014 0.51  
NASDAQ dummy -0.090 -2.08 ** -0.055 -1.06  -0.073 -1.70 * -0.023 -0.47  -0.002 -0.04  0.014 0.56  
NYSE dummy -0.159 -3.03 ** -0.142 -2.23 ** -0.139 -2.69 ** -0.105 -1.73 * 0.003 0.06  0.023 0.84  
Bank market share 0.012 5.79 *** 0.014 5.67 *** 0.012 6.06 *** 0.015 6.13 *** -0.001 -1.17  -0.001 -1.23  
Bank industry market share -0.002 -3.62 *** -0.002 -3.05 ** -0.002 -4.70 *** -0.003 -4.74 *** 0.001 3.62 *** 0.000 2.54 ** 
Number of IPOs in prior two months 0.000 0.80  0.001 1.82 * 0.000 0.36  0.001 1.26  0.000 -0.99  0.000 -0.08  
Log proceeds of industry IPOs in prior months -0.048 -4.34 *** -0.059 -4.55 *** -0.051 -4.73 *** -0.066 -5.22 *** 0.015 2.41 ** 0.005 1.34  
BAA-AAA yield spread at offering 0.076 1.44  0.148 2.19 ** 0.081 1.57  0.157 2.45 ** 0.024 0.78  -0.007 -0.31  
Change of yield spread in prior two months -0.042 -0.34  0.076 0.53  -0.047 -0.38  0.068 0.50  -0.042 -0.88  0.002 0.07  
Treasury yield at issue/withdrawal -0.005 -0.36  -0.015 -0.75  -0.002 -0.13  -0.008 -0.43  0.019 1.35  0.010 1.20  
Change of Treasury yield in prior two months 0.027 1.19  0.117 3.79 *** 0.017 0.78  0.099 3.40 *** -0.011 -0.80  0.001 0.07  
Industry average B/M ratio in prior -0.014 -1.15  -0.034 -2.38 ** -0.015 -1.17  -0.036 -2.33 ** 0.013 4.85 *** 0.007 5.00 *** 
NASDAQ return in prior thirty days -0.408 -1.45  -1.116 -2.95 ** -0.386 -1.41  -1.081 -3.09 ** 0.523 2.82 ** 0.290 2.39 ** 
Positive NASDAQ returns 1.843 3.61 *** 2.246 3.41 *** 1.822 3.67 *** 2.220 3.57 *** -0.644 -2.34 ** -0.291 -1.62  
Firm std. deviation 0.266 0.55  -0.145 -0.27  0.289 0.61  -0.089 -0.18  0.361 1.49  0.113 0.68  
Firm std. deviation * 𝐷𝐴+ 5.072 5.99 *** 5.179 5.16 *** 5.104 6.18 *** 5.265 5.55 *** 1.175 2.46 ** 0.675 2.19 ** 
Dilution -0.373 -8.18 *** -0.425 -7.41 *** -0.345 -7.86 *** -0.374 -7.08 *** 0.021 0.91  0.010 0.64  
Number of book managers -0.055 -3.11 ** -0.070 -3.03 ** -0.052 -3.03 ** -0.065 -3.01 ** 0.020 2.31 ** 0.014 2.46 ** 
Inverse Miller’s Ratio       -0.437 -14.2 *** -0.811 -24.5 *** 0.296 8.83 *** 0.161 8.31 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.311 0.405 0.381 0.217 0.177 
Number of observations 3047 3047 3047 3047 759 759 
Note: Lagged average returns are missing in four cases since there was no offering in the prior month.  
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Panel B: 1996-2000 subsample (pre-2000) 
 
 Day-3 PEQ excess returns: 𝒚𝟐 
Price support:  
𝒚𝟑 = 𝒚𝟏 − 𝟎.𝟓 ∗ 𝒚𝟐 
Model 2 Model 4 Model 6 
Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat 
Intercept 0.238 0.83  0.290 1.11  0.069 0.98  
Probability of withdrawal (PW)* 𝐷0 -0.719 -2.51 ** 0.091 0.33  -0.104 -1.79 * 
𝐷𝐴+ -0.062 -1.02  -0.069 -1.23  0.021 0.70  
PW * 𝐷𝐴+ -0.745 -2.23 ** -0.640 -2.12 ** -0.133 -0.52  
PA * 𝐷𝐴+ 1.195 3.01 ** 1.047 2.75 ** -0.356 -1.49  
PP * 𝐷𝐴+ -5.460 -1.78 * -6.401 -2.20 ** 4.087 0.75  
𝐷𝐴1− -0.063 -1.11  -0.055 -1.03  0.006 0.54  
PW * 𝐷𝐴1− -1.305 -1.58  -0.116 -0.21  -0.038 -0.27  
PA * 𝐷𝐴1− 0.975 1.37  1.039 1.47  0.217 1.12  
PP * 𝐷𝐴1− -4.402 -0.67  -4.585 -0.94  0.736 0.59  
𝐷𝐴2− -0.087 -1.96 * -0.056 -1.33  -0.012 -1.12  
PW * 𝐷𝐴2− -0.871 -3.50 *** 0.009 0.04  -0.085 -1.26  
PA * 𝐷𝐴2− -0.749 -0.83  -1.356 -1.68 * 0.444 1.72 * 
PP * 𝐷𝐴2− -0.840 -0.23  5.355 1.43  -1.587 -1.14  
𝐷𝐴3− -0.184 -4.26 *** -0.089 -2.20 ** -0.011 -0.84  
PW * 𝐷𝐴3− -0.238 -1.07  0.223 0.87  -0.148 -1.88 * 
PA * 𝐷𝐴3− -0.599 -2.16 ** -0.915 -3.85 *** -0.011 -0.14  
PP * 𝐷𝐴3− 2.693 2.18 ** 5.392 3.81 *** -0.022 -0.03  
Control variables          
Lagged Average PEQ excess Return  0.297 3.24 ** 0.329 3.80 *** -0.016 -0.74  
Logarithm of revenue -0.008 -1.25  -0.011 -1.90 * 0.000 -0.07  
Logarithm of proceeds 0.032 1.29  0.037 1.60  -0.010 -2.14 ** 
Debt ratio -0.048 -1.58  -0.038 -1.35  -0.002 -0.24  
Debt ratio * Equity ratio 0.000 -0.16  0.001 0.33  0.000 0.06  
Technology dummy 0.230 5.48 *** 0.240 5.99 *** -0.029 -2.68 ** 
VC/PE-backing dummy 0.013 0.49  -0.008 -0.33  0.014 1.73 * 
Debt retirement dummy 0.022 0.72  0.008 0.29  0.013 1.57  
AMEX dummy -0.003 -0.04  0.069 1.05  -0.029 -1.71 * 
NASDAQ dummy -0.040 -0.66  -0.014 -0.23  -0.032 -2.11 ** 
NYSE dummy -0.178 -2.12 ** -0.135 -1.69 * -0.024 -1.28  
Bank market share 0.024 6.01 *** 0.025 6.55 *** -0.001 -1.24  
Bank industry market share -0.004 -3.59 *** -0.005 -4.77 *** 0.001 4.30 *** 
Number of IPOs in prior two months 0.000 0.82  0.000 0.36  0.000 0.78  
Log proceeds of industry IPOs in prior months -0.088 -4.96 *** -0.092 -5.36 *** 0.009 2.41 ** 
BAA-AAA yield spread at offering 0.608 2.57 ** 0.584 2.59 ** -0.150 -2.94 ** 
Change of yield spread in prior two months -0.094 -0.41  -0.158 -0.75  0.009 0.16  
Treasury yield at issue/withdrawal -0.027 -0.91  -0.037 -1.30  0.005 0.59  
Change of Treasury yield in prior two months 0.135 3.14 ** 0.118 2.90 ** 0.009 0.77  
Industry average B/M ratio in prior -0.022 -1.71 * -0.026 -1.58  0.007 4.05 *** 
NASDAQ return in prior thirty days -1.309 -2.78 ** -1.174 -2.72 ** 0.401 2.76 ** 
Positive NASDAQ returns 2.687 3.45 *** 2.471 3.40 *** -0.460 -2.11 ** 
Firm std. deviation -0.391 -0.64  -0.340 -0.62  0.243 1.75 * 
Firm std. deviation * 𝐷𝐴+ 5.278 4.72 *** 5.262 5.00 *** 0.140 0.38  
Dilution -0.480 -5.92 *** -0.442 -6.03 *** 0.046 2.21 ** 
Number of book managers -0.080 -0.69  -0.021 -0.21  0.027 1.25  
IMR (Inverse Mill’s Ratio)    -0.950 -22.0 
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Panel C: 2001-2007 subsample (post-2000) 
 
 Day-3 PEQ excess returns: 𝒚𝟐 
Price support:  
𝒚𝟑 = 𝒚𝟏 − 𝟎.𝟓 ∗ 𝒚𝟐 
Model 2 Model 4 Model 6 
Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat 
Intercept 0.033 0.17  -0.014 -0.08  -0.122 -1.05  
Probability of withdrawal (PW)* 𝐷0 0.035 0.26  0.318 2.95 ** -0.250 -3.51 *** 
𝐷𝐴+ 0.131 3.08 ** 0.114 3.11 ** -0.078 -2.62 ** 
PW * 𝐷𝐴+ 0.197 1.18  0.224 1.43  -0.462 -3.81 *** 
PA * 𝐷𝐴+ 1.497 4.69 *** 1.426 4.52 *** 0.111 0.46  
PP * 𝐷𝐴+ -0.653 -0.17  -2.457 -0.66  -4.357 -3.35 *** 
𝐷𝐴1− -0.037 -0.80  -0.024 -0.59  -0.041 -0.87  
PW * 𝐷𝐴1− -2.485 -1.78 * -1.851 -1.60  -0.662 -1.21  
PA * 𝐷𝐴1− 0.843 0.74  0.607 0.60  -0.654 -0.89  
PP * 𝐷𝐴1− -31.149 -1.80 * -27.020 -1.88 * -7.857 -1.05  
𝐷𝐴2− 0.004 0.11  -0.001 -0.02  -0.051 -1.47  
PW * 𝐷𝐴2− -0.327 -2.62 ** 0.409 2.24 ** -0.177 -2.12 ** 
PA * 𝐷𝐴2− -2.899 -2.86 ** -2.365 -2.46 ** 1.779 1.78 * 
PP * 𝐷𝐴2− 6.100 2.88 ** 5.441 2.12 ** -3.458 -1.80 * 
𝐷𝐴3− -0.045 -1.61  -0.029 -1.15  -0.038 -2.10 ** 
PW * 𝐷𝐴3− 0.012 0.09  0.303 2.14 ** -0.116 -1.58  
PA * 𝐷𝐴3− -0.196 -1.18  -0.340 -2.38 ** -0.078 -0.95  
PP * 𝐷𝐴3− 1.063 1.04  3.431 3.06 ** -0.196 -0.27  
Control variables          
Lagged Average PEQ excess Return  -0.090 -0.91  -0.106 -1.16  -0.116 -1.03  
Logarithm of revenue 0.010 3.07 ** 0.005 1.73 * -0.003 -1.39  
Logarithm of proceeds 0.026 1.59  0.025 1.70 * -0.015 -0.94  
Debt ratio -0.071 -2.79 ** -0.050 -2.11 ** 0.026 1.19  
Debt ratio * Equity ratio -0.007 -2.05 ** -0.004 -1.33  0.002 0.45  
Technology dummy 0.050 1.85 * 0.057 2.27 ** -0.039 -1.89 * 
VC/PE-backing dummy -0.022 -1.12  -0.020 -1.08  -0.009 -0.92  
Debt retirement dummy -0.010 -0.47  -0.026 -1.37  0.017 0.79  
AMEX dummy -0.085 -0.65  -0.051 -0.40  0.230 1.81 * 
NASDAQ dummy -0.046 -0.36  -0.026 -0.21  0.245 1.85 * 
NYSE dummy -0.045 -0.36  -0.025 -0.20  0.250 1.92 * 
Bank market share -0.001 -0.58  -0.001 -0.49  0.000 -0.58  
Bank industry market share 0.000 0.95  0.000 -0.05  0.000 0.31  
Number of IPOs in prior two months 0.001 0.88  0.001 0.76  0.000 -0.39  
Log proceeds of industry IPOs in prior months -0.025 -2.15 ** -0.025 -2.40 ** 0.002 0.21  
BAA-AAA yield spread at offering -0.050 -0.96  -0.037 -0.80  0.004 0.11  
Change of yield spread in prior two months -0.014 -0.18  0.028 0.38  0.029 0.55  
Treasury yield at issue/withdrawal -0.008 -0.36  0.009 0.44  0.018 1.15  
Change of Treasury yield in prior two months -0.061 -2.30 ** -0.065 -2.68 ** 0.010 0.70  
Industry average B/M ratio in prior -0.062 -2.97 ** -0.045 -2.32 ** -0.002 -0.15  
NASDAQ return in prior thirty days -0.077 -0.25  0.077 0.26  0.033 0.19  
Positive NASDAQ returns 0.437 0.86  0.240 0.52  0.113 0.39  
Firm std. deviation 0.019 0.03  -0.163 -0.25  -0.495 -0.87  
Firm std. deviation * 𝐷𝐴+ 0.734 0.54  1.334 1.13  3.134 3.26 ** 
Dilution -0.183 -3.76 *** -0.117 -2.67 ** -0.031 -1.23  
Number of book managers 0.004 0.24  0.008 0.51  0.017 2.27 ** 
IMR (Inverse Mill’s Ratio)    -0.477 -13.1 *** 0.124 4.76 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.384 0.245 
Number of observations 843 843 260 
Note: Lagged average returns are missing in four cases since there was no offering in the 
prior month.  
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We also examine whether our key results are robust to the specification of data 
sample periods. As reported in panel B and panel C of table 2.7, the support of our 
selective overpricing hypotheses does not change for the two subsamples, and the 
comparison between the two subsample periods suggests some changes in overpricing 
styles over time. 
In comparison with the results for offerings before the burst of the Internet 
bubble, the significant coefficients of price adjustment for offerings during 2001-2007 
show a more prominent pattern of selective overpricing. It matches up with our 
observation from table 2.6 (Panel B) that the IPO portfolio 𝐴2− has more offerings with 
negative PEQ excess returns than with positive returns for 2001-2007 subsample. The 
results are consistent with the view that bankers were more aggressive in getting deals 
done in the bearish market following the burst of the Internet bubble. In a cold market, an 
underwriter values the “in-hand” contract and is more willing to “save” a potential 
withdrawal. On the other hand, the increased competition in the shrunk IPO market also 
pressures the underwriter to minimize its association with withdrawals.27  
2.4.3.  Robustness  
The observed IPO returns contain a mixture of underpricing and overpricing 
effects reflecting underwriter pricing intention. To isolate the overpricing effect from the 
mixture, we regress PEQ excess return (𝑦2) on a subsample of the offerings priced at or 
below the middle point of preliminary price range. This makes the model free form any 
potential influence of a regime change in the market makeup. For example, some control 
                                                 
27 Dunbar (2000) finds that association with pre-withdrawals decreases an underwriter’s future market 
share. 
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variables might have different effects on underpricing than on overpricing. The results 
are reported in table 2.8. The coefficients of IMR are significantly negative and so are the 
coefficients of price adjustment for offerings priced at and below the lower boundary of 
the preliminary price range. The evidence of selective overpricing is still clear. 
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Table 2.8: Robustness test on subsample with non-positive price adjustment 
The dependent variable is PEQ excess return (𝑦2 ). The subsample is selected from offerings priced at or below the middle point of the 
preliminary price range. The heteroskedasticity consistent t-value with significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted with *, ** and ***, 
respectively. 
 
𝒚𝟐 - PEQ excess returns 𝒚𝟐 - PEQ excess returns (with IMR) 
1996-2007 1996-2000 2001-2007 1996-2007 1996-2000 2001-2007 
Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat 
Intercept -0.012 -0.08  -0.050 -0.21  0.127 0.53  0.004 0.03  0.023 0.11  0.045 0.20  
Probability of withdrawal (PW)* 𝐷0 -0.177 -1.00  -0.376 -1.42  0.078 0.51  0.139 0.84  0.129 0.52  0.322 2.82 ** 
𝐷𝐴1− -0.097 -2.49 ** -0.120 -2.34 ** -0.054 -1.16  -0.086 -2.49 ** -0.108 -2.32 ** -0.045 -1.11  
PW * 𝐷𝐴1− -0.306 -0.68  -0.752 -1.12  -2.945 -2.02 ** 0.016 0.06  0.028 0.06  -2.339 -1.92 * 
PA * 𝐷𝐴1− 0.215 0.41  0.433 0.64  1.306 1.08  0.342 0.79  0.436 0.72  1.045 0.97  
PP * 𝐷𝐴1− -2.748 -0.59  -3.943 -0.72  -36.487 -2.04 ** -4.026 -1.67 * -3.809 -0.98  -32.356 -2.17 ** 
𝐷𝐴2− -0.076 -2.50 ** -0.099 -2.48 ** 0.014 0.37  -0.071 -2.51 ** -0.080 -2.19 ** 0.008 0.22  
PW * 𝐷𝐴2− -0.332 -2.34 ** -0.484 -2.22 ** -0.305 -2.28 ** 0.235 1.63  0.092 0.45  0.347 1.95 * 
PA * 𝐷𝐴2− -1.268 -2.14 ** -0.728 -0.91  -2.960 -2.89 ** -1.138 -2.08 ** -1.132 -1.64  -2.430 -2.49 ** 
PP * 𝐷𝐴2− 2.750 1.48  1.146 0.41  5.443 2.70 ** 3.607 1.69 * 5.036 1.91 * 4.908 2.02 ** 
𝐷𝐴3− -0.143 -5.44 *** -0.199 -5.43 *** -0.032 -1.09  -0.107 -4.48 *** -0.129 -3.85 *** -0.016 -0.62  
PW * 𝐷𝐴3− 0.068 0.46  0.095 0.47  0.009 0.05  0.351 2.42 ** 0.363 1.70 * 0.248 1.67 * 
PA * 𝐷𝐴3− -0.131 -0.86  -0.279 -1.16  -0.203 -1.16  -0.282 -2.23 ** -0.532 -2.58 ** -0.335 -2.25 ** 
PP * 𝐷𝐴3− 0.563 0.78  1.417 1.43  0.897 0.85  1.928 2.84 ** 3.311 3.11 ** 3.010 2.95 ** 
Control variables                   
Lagged Average PEQ excess Return  0.193 2.88 ** 0.176 1.57  0.134 1.22  0.202 3.24 ** 0.192 1.85 * 0.107 1.10  
Logarithm of revenue 0.003 0.99  -0.001 -0.15  0.009 2.55 ** 0.000 -0.16  -0.003 -0.70  0.006 1.66 * 
Logarithm of proceeds 0.013 0.83  0.015 0.69  0.035 1.73 * 0.018 1.23  0.016 0.80  0.033 1.72 * 
Debt ratio -0.056 -2.90 ** -0.059 -2.33 ** -0.056 -1.97 ** -0.039 -2.29 ** -0.047 -2.12 ** -0.047 -1.80 * 
Debt ratio * Equity ratio -0.003 -1.53  -0.003 -1.02  -0.006 -1.52  -0.001 -0.65  -0.001 -0.57  -0.004 -1.25  
Technology dummy 0.061 2.59 ** 0.069 2.25 ** 0.037 1.22  0.081 3.73 *** 0.090 3.24 ** 0.050 1.80 * 
VC/PE-backing dummy 0.035 2.03 ** 0.036 1.53  -0.016 -0.71  0.011 0.73  0.008 0.38  -0.011 -0.52  
Debt retirement dummy -0.010 -0.54  -0.007 -0.29  -0.009 -0.35  -0.028 -1.59  -0.017 -0.76  -0.027 -1.18  
AMEX dummy -0.021 -0.41  0.031 0.47  -0.183 -1.04  0.035 0.78  0.073 1.23  -0.163 -0.94  
NASDAQ dummy -0.021 -0.48  0.020 0.37  -0.151 -0.86  0.015 0.37  0.046 0.93  -0.142 -0.82  
NYSE dummy -0.049 -0.92  -0.035 -0.47  -0.136 -0.78  -0.014 -0.28  -0.003 -0.04  -0.125 -0.73  
Bank market share 0.001 0.35  0.000 0.04  0.000 0.03  0.002 1.13  0.004 1.32  0.000 -0.25  
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Bank industry market share 0.000 -0.45  -0.001 -0.89  0.000 0.38  -0.001 -2.24 ** -0.002 -2.28 ** 0.000 -0.34  
Number of IPOs in prior two months 0.001 3.13 ** 0.001 2.21 ** 0.000 0.21  0.001 2.43 ** 0.001 1.51  0.000 0.29  
Log proceeds of industry IPOs in prior months -0.009 -0.80  -0.015 -1.10  -0.020 -1.53  -0.018 -1.62  -0.023 -1.77 * -0.021 -1.88 * 
BAA-AAA yield spread at offering 0.049 0.99  0.111 0.48  -0.033 -0.55  0.065 1.54  0.168 0.78  -0.021 -0.39  
Change of yield spread in prior two months 0.071 0.58  0.117 0.54  0.022 0.23  0.066 0.61  0.009 0.05  0.084 0.94  
Treasury yield at issue/withdrawal -0.020 -1.22  -0.016 -0.69  -0.038 -1.35  -0.014 -1.00  -0.023 -1.15  -0.014 -0.56  
Change of Treasury yield in prior two months 0.060 2.02 ** 0.074 1.81 * -0.033 -1.15  0.048 1.72 * 0.059 1.54  -0.031 -1.28  
Industry average B/M ratio in prior -0.023 -3.88 *** -0.020 -3.56 *** -0.059 -1.80 * -0.024 -3.89 *** -0.020 -3.45 *** -0.036 -1.25  
NASDAQ return in prior thirty days -0.952 -2.91 ** -1.284 -3.16 ** -0.067 -0.18  -0.871 -2.91 ** -1.029 -2.79 ** 0.004 0.01  
Positive NASDAQ returns 2.157 3.68 *** 2.745 3.82 *** 0.096 0.16  2.139 4.03 *** 2.451 3.82 *** 0.050 0.10  
Firm std. deviation 0.755 1.48  0.755 1.30  0.175 0.27  0.849 1.83 * 0.803 1.54  0.019 0.03  
Dilution -0.148 -3.22 ** -0.194 -2.93 ** -0.117 -2.21 ** -0.100 -2.45 ** -0.175 -2.94 ** -0.009 -0.20  
Number of book managers 0.011 0.61  0.044 0.43  -0.023 -1.46  0.008 0.53  0.072 0.82  -0.015 -1.05  
Inverse Miller’s Ratio          -0.582 -22.6 *** -0.650 -18.1 *** -0.423 -12.1 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.110 0.079 0.270 0.271 0.284 
Number of observations 1714 1204 510 1714 1204 510 
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2.5.  Summary 
This study presents evidence on an underwriter’s strategic overpricing behavior 
when facing a potential withdrawal. Using the stock price three days prior to the end of 
the quiet period (day-3 PEQ) as a proxy for the true market price recovered from the 
underwriter’s aftermarket price support and representing withdrawal potentials with two 
components—the ex ante estimated withdrawal probability and the later price adjustment 
relative to the preliminary price range that reflects aggregated premarket demand, we 
present evidence that underwriters selectively overprice offerings to avert likely 
withdrawals and fulfill their price support commitment in the aftermarket. We find that 
overpricing is more pronounced for offerings priced at exactly the lower boundary of the 
preliminary price range, especially when the ex ante withdrawal probability is high, or 
when the preliminary price range is narrow relative to its midpoint (thereby indicating a 
more binding lower boundary). Little evidence of deliberate overpricing is found in 
poorly received offerings that are priced below the lower boundary of the preliminary 
price range.  
Using the initial return deducting a portion of stock price changing towards the 
offering’s true price as the proxy for the underwriter’s first-day aftermarket price support, 
we find a similar pattern. The results suggest that price support accompanies an 
underwriter’s strategic overpricing and leans towards potential withdrawals.  
The study splits the observation period into two phases—that before 2000 and that 
after, and thus provides a unique context for investigating the changes of selective 
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overpricing following the burst of the Internet bubble as well as the cooling down of the 
IPO market. As competition in the IPO market intensifies, deliberate overpricing is 
reinforced during the period of 2001 to 2007.  
Overall, this study adds to our understanding of the pricing behavior of IPOs. 
Underwriters selectively overprice offerings to avert potential withdrawals and such 
strategic overpricing, in complement to the underpricing mechanism and the underwriter 
aftermarket price stabilization commitment plays an important role in the IPO procedure, 
especially after 2000 when the primary market is relatively cold.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
3   Withdrawal versus Overpricing: the Effect of 
Withdrawal-Averting Effort on Underwriter Market Share 
3.1.  Introduction 
Association with earlier withdrawals or overpriced IPOs decreases an investment 
bank’s future market share (Dunbar 2000).28 To avoid withdrawals, banks can screen out 
offerings with higher withdrawal probability before setting up the underwriting contract. 
Alternatively but not exclusively, they may try to avert potential withdrawals (for 
example, as we analyze in chapter 2, by overpricing the risky offerings when premarket 
demand is weak) and complete the inadequately-demanded offering. The questions then 
arise: will these tactics provide the banks similar impunity from the negative impact of 
being associated with withdrawals? And, we might also ask, in the cases where 
overpricing and withdrawal are the either-or results of an offering facing meagre demand, 
which one, in practice, generates less adverse effect on the corresponding underwriter’s 
future market share?  
We argue that withdrawal screening is part of the result of optimized mutual 
selection or matching between the underwriter and the issuer, and thus its effect on an 
underwriter’s market share should be invisible in equilibrium since the estimation of 
withdrawal likelihood should have been consolidated as a trade-off in the underwriting 
contract. On the other hand, for underwriters associated with earlier withdrawals, their 
incompetence to avert potential withdrawals, not the association itself, explain for their 
                                                 
28 Also see Nanda and Yun (1997), who found that the lead underwriter’s market value is negatively 
associated with substantially overpriced offerings. 
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loss of future IPO market shares. We also argue that overpricing does not necessarily hurt 
investors as long as the underwriter compensates the investors through aftermarket price 
support or other past or future underpriced offerings, and it also benefits the issuer with 
offering success. Hence, an underwriter’s future market share should be better-off if the 
bank overprices an offering to avert potential withdrawal, even though it provides only 
limited aftermarket price support.  
To test the hypotheses generated from these arguments, we first estimate the ex 
ante withdrawal probability of all completed and withdrawn offerings from 1996 to 2007 
using a probit model. The imputed withdrawal probability is then the result of withdrawal 
screening that is a component of the mutual selection process between underwriters and 
issuers, whereas the prediction error of the probit model represents an underwriter’s 
effort to avert an offering from withdrawal to completion. We then conduct multivariable 
regressions on underwriter market share change for individual offerings, controlling the 
underwriter group effect by introducing the pooled performances of IPOs underwritten by 
the same banks responsible for the current offering as well as the changes in these 
performances. Whereas the regression on the offering level helps in revealing how the 
performance of an individual offering correlates with the corresponding underwriter’s 
market share change, it is inevitably affected by the sequential effects of other offerings 
underwritten by the same bank. The dynamic pooling reflects the changing performance 
of the bank from time to time and proxies the sequential effects grouped by the bank. 
Finally, we compare the underwriter market share changes among offering groups that 
were withdrawn, overpriced, and provided with successful first-day aftermarket price 
support. 
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The empirical results are consistent with our arguments. We find that those banks 
engaging issuers with a higher ex ante propensity to withdraw and making effort to 
actually avert withdrawal experience a pronounced increase in their future IPO market 
shares. The effect is especially noticeable when the underwriter successfully supports the 
price during the first day of trading. Interestingly, no effect on future market share is 
detected for banks trying to enhance their IPO completion rates by avoiding issuers with 
high likelihood of withdrawal. These results hold in both regressions of withdrawal 
probability estimated separately for the hot period of IPO market before 2000 and the 
cold period thereafter. The results are more pronounced in the subsample of offerings 
underwritten by banks with market share in excess of 2% (representing 63% of the entire 
sample) and in the subsample of the offerings with expected proceeds between $10 
million and $100 million (representing 76% of the entire sample).  
We also find that withdrawals have more of an adverse effect on future market 
share than mere overpricing does. Furthermore, when overpricing is accompanied by 
even a low level of price support during the first-day trading, it effect on a bank’s future 
market share is significantly less adverse in comparison with the otherwise negative 
effect of letting the issuer withdraw. Among overpriced offerings, those with successful 
first-day aftermarket price support significantly improve the underwriter’s market share 
in comparison with those with unsuccessful support. 
In addition, we find that the market share of an underwriter, when associated with 
a successful offering, increases more if the ex ante withdrawal probability is higher. 
Meanwhile, the market share of an underwriter associated with a withdrawal decreases 
more if the ex ante withdrawal probability is lower. The negative incentive for 
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withdrawal, shown as the later effect, is more prominent than the former effect of positive 
incentive for completion.  
Overall, our results on the control variables are largely consistent with the earlier 
literature and supplement these studies with more details.  
This chapter adds to the empirical literature on underwriter IPO market share by 
examining two key hypotheses, generates several implications for investment banks 
willing to improve their underwriter market share, and suggests that, when premarket 
demand is weak, underwriters can gain future IPO business by putting effort on averting 
potential withdrawals, e.g., by selectively overpricing the at-risk offering. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review the earlier literature and 
lay out our hypotheses in section 3.2, and present our data and empirical method in 
section 3.3. We then discuss and analyze the empirical results and the robustness tests in 
section 3.4, and summarize in section 3.5.  
3.2.  Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
IPO underwriting is one of the most lucrative businesses for investment banks, 
which act as a credible third party in resolving information frictions in this market. Banks 
with accurate information accumulate their reputation capital and gain economic rents 
from future offerings.29 However, only a few papers have examined how this reputation 
capital is accumulated and, more specifically, the effect of past IPO performance on 
investment bank IPO market share. For example, Beatty and Ritter (1986) found that 
                                                 
29  See Booth and Smith (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Carter and 
Manaster (1990), and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994). 
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abnormal first-day returns have a negative effect on investment bank market share, a 
study followed by Nanda and Yun (1997), who found that the lead underwriter’s market 
value, as a proxy for the bank’s reputation capital, is positively associated with 
moderately underpriced offerings but negatively associated with substantially overpriced 
offerings.  
In a major study on the effect of past offering performance on the underwriter’s 
IPO market share, Dunbar (2000) examines several factors (including IPO first-day 
returns, one-year abnormal performance, abnormal compensation, industry specialization, 
analyst reputation, and association with withdrawn offers) and suggested that investment 
banks attempting to increase their market shares should pay attention to these factors. 
Dunbar find a significantly negative effect of maximum abnormal first-day return of IPOs 
on an underwriter’s market share change, and suggested that an established bank should 
not leave too much money on the table. He also found that association with overpricing 
and association with withdrawals harm a bank’s ability to compete for future business.30 
However, the interpretations of these two negative impacts on market share are not as 
instructive to the banks as many other factors.  
We raise two questions based on these results and extend the study as follows. 
First, to avoid being associated with withdrawals, the banks can either screen out issuers 
that are more likely to withdraw before signing the underwriting contract, or try to avert 
an offering from potential withdrawal (for example, by overpricing it) during the 
bookbuilding procedure. Which strategy will improve the underwriter’s market share? Or 
                                                 
30 Earlier literature measured the overpricing with the negative first-day initial return, which is a combined 
result of the overpricing and the first-day aftermarket price support. 
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will both suffice? Second, since the extant literature suggest that association with either 
overpricing or withdrawal will harm the banks’ market share, when facing a likely 
withdrawal, should the bank overprice the offering to avert it or accept it as an issuer 
withdrawal?  
In the first question, we differentiate withdrawal avoidance into a withdrawal-
screening strategy and a withdrawal-averting strategy. Before preparing the underwriting 
contract, an underwriter can stay away from offerings with a higher likelihood of 
withdrawal, which is predictable as the result of a mutual selection between the 
underwriter and the issuer when considering the underwriter characteristics as 
endogeneity. 31  Alternatively, if an underwriter finds the premarket interest is mildly 
weak-demanded from the bookbuilding, it can still have the option to avert the at-risk 
withdrawal. For example, in chapter 2 we investigate empirically how underwriters 
deliberately overprice IPOs with weak premarket demand to avert potential 
withdrawals. 32  We also demonstrate the rationale of an underwriter adopting such a 
withdrawal-averting strategy as a trade-off between the gains from underwriting fees and 
the costs related to aftermarket price support, which are partially the compensation to the 
investors participating in the offerings. Withdrawal screening and withdrawal averting, of 
course, are not mutually exclusive efforts. The question is whether and how these two 
efforts affect an underwriter’s future market share. 
                                                 
31  For example, Dunbar and Foerster (2008) find that the likelihood of withdrawal is affected by 
underwriter (industry) market share. 
32 We admit that overpricing is not necessarily the only withdrawal-averting strategy. Underwriters might 
also persuade the issuer, who is reluctant, to cancel the reservation price and accept a lower offer price.  
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From the perspective of withdrawal screening, an offering can be successful due 
to its own features, such as the characteristics of the issuer, the underwriter, as well as the 
concurrent market situation. If we take the underwriter characteristics as exogeneity, the 
underwriter adds no value to the issuer for increasing the odds of offering success and 
hence should not expect an increase in its market share simply by choosing an offering 
that is likely to be completed anyway. However, while an underwriter may screen the 
issuer based on the firm characteristics such as the offering size and the ex ante 
probability of withdrawal, which will in turn affect the underwriter’s short-term profits 
and/or long-term profitability, the issuer may also choose an underwriter according to the 
bank’s past IPO performance and characteristics that might improve the issuer’s 
likelihood of offering success. This mutual selection results in an equilibrium of 
matching between the issuer and the underwriter, as stated by Fernando, Gatchev and 
Spindt (2005).33 If the ex ante likelihood of withdrawal is one of the objectives to be 
matched in such a mutual selection process, the increase of success expectation (due to 
underwriter ability) should be optimized and integrated into the current underwriting 
contract for a trade-off. In other words, banks specializing in increasing an offering’s 
likelihood of success will underwrite that offering as the result of mutual selection. 
Hence, in a market with stable makeup, underwriter market shares should be relatively 
stable. It is unlikely to observe a market-wide correlation between withdrawal screening 
and underwriter market share. This prediction is consistent with the rational expectation 
theory: since the result of matching (based on the predicted likelihood of withdrawal) is 
                                                 
33 Also see Beatty and Ritter (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990) and Liu and Ritter (2011) for the idea of 
quality matching between the underwriter and the issuer.  
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within the expectation of all participants, withdrawal screening, by itself, should not 
generate additional market share systematically. 
Withdrawal averting, on the other hand, should be a different story. An 
underwriter’s effort to avert at-risk withdrawal is also what an issuer is pursuing when 
choosing underwriters. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict and estimate 
in advance the effort of an underwriter’s withdrawal-averting effort. First, banks are 
different in their willingness and capability to implement withdrawal averting, which 
might require many other costly activities, such as pumping up premarket demand at the 
last moment and supporting the trading price in the aftermarket. Such activities can be 
optimal for one bank but inefficient for another when dealing with the same offering. 
Furthermore, the strategy of withdrawal averting is not applicable universally to all 
offerings but conditioned on the aggregated information the bank collects from 
bookbuilding.34 An underwriter’s withdrawal-averting effort, however, is detectable ex 
post the offerings as it systematically biases the outcomes towards successful offerings. 
Future issuers could identify the banks’ effort in averting withdrawal by observing the 
prediction error of the withdrawal probability of past offerings—the magnitude of 
withdrawal-averting effort is larger for successful offerings with higher ex ante likelihood 
of withdrawal and smaller for withdrawn offerings with lower ex ante likelihood of 
withdrawal. An underwriter that often completes offerings with higher ex ante 
withdrawal probability, therefore, should have a larger pie of the IPO market, whereas a 
bank associated with withdrawn offerings that have lower ex ante withdrawal probability 
                                                 
34 We find, in chapter 2, that strategic overpricing (to avert withdrawal) is more likely to be adopted by 
banks when the premarket demand of the offering is mildly weak.  
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and should lose future market share. Therefore, our hypothesis on withdrawal-averting 
effort is as follows.  
H1: The change of corresponding underwriter’s IPO market share from before to 
after an offering is positively correlated with the underwriter’s withdrawal-averting 
effort on that offering.  
We then study the effects of overpricing and withdrawal, relative to each other, on 
the underwriter’s market share change. If a bank overprices an at-risk offering to 
complete it and then provide sufficient aftermarket price support, it is the bank that 
carries the costs related to the overpricing endeavor. The issuer benefits from, and the 
investors do not lose in, such an offering, and hence the underwriter should be rewarded 
by the market and its future market share should be enhanced. If a bank overprices an 
offering to complete it but follows up with insufficient aftermarket price support, the 
withdrawal-averting effort still benefits the issuer, but may hurt the investors. However, 
to complete such an overpriced offering, the investors’ willingness to buy the offering is 
necessary. We argue that investors will not participate in an offering unless they believe 
that they will get a direct benefit from the offering and/or indirect compensation from the 
banks. When we observe an overpriced offering with inadequate aftermarket price 
support, it is highly likely that the investors have been compensated in past offerings or 
will be so in the future.35 It should still be the case that neither the issuer nor the investors 
lose in long-term equilibrium. Thus, we hypothesize that deliberate overpricing, in 
                                                 
35 For example, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) point out that underwriters could leverage the current 
offering with the expected profit of future offerings. Benveniste et al. (2002) also find that underwriters 
could enforce the cost-sharing of information production by implicitly bundling IPOs with similar 
“factors.”  
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comparison to withdrawal, improves an underwriter’s market share to a greater extent. 
Our hypothesis on overpricing is therefore as follows. 
H2: The IPO market share increase of the corresponding underwriter from before to 
after an overpriced offering is, on average, greater than that from before to after a 
withdrawal.  
We estimate the ex ante likelihood of withdrawal as the preliminary to test our 
hypotheses. Following Dunbar (1998), Busaba et al. (2001), Benveniste et al. (2003), and 
Dunbar and Foerster (2008), we introduce in chapter 2 a probit model to estimate the 
withdrawal probability with several factors, including the characteristics of the offerings, 
those of the underwriting banks, as well as the contemporary market situation. This 
withdrawal estimation represents the result of an underwriter’s ex ante withdrawal 
screening, whereas the prediction error, defined as the estimation of withdrawal minus 
the dummy of withdrawal, represents the underwriter’s withdrawal-averting effort as a 
continues variable range from minus one to one. For example, the withdrawal-averting 
effort is close to one for a completed offering with higher ex ante likelihood of 
withdrawal, and close to negative one for an observed withdrawal with lower ex ante 
estimation.    
We argue that the mutual selection between the issuer and the bank results in an 
optimized matching between them, and predict that the corresponding underwriter’s IPO 
market share after the offering will be improved by the bank’s withdrawal-averting effort 
but will be affected little by the ex ante estimation of withdrawal, after controlling the 
bank’s group effect in other offerings before and after the current offering. Variables 
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representing the bank’s group effect include the statistics of the first-day and one-year 
abnormal returns of offerings underwritten by the same bank, and those of abnormal 
compensation, industry specialization and percentage of withdrawn offering of that bank, 
as well as the change in these statistics around the time of the current offering. 
In additional tests, we examine the robustness of the effect of withdrawal-averting 
effort on underwriter market share before and after the burst of the Internet bubble. We 
also examine the robustness of this effect for different IPO market segments – by offering 
size and by underwriter IPO market share, separately. Dunbar (2000) finds factors 
affecting underwriter market share to be more significant for the established banks in 
low-volume IPO markets. Fernando et al. (2005) argue that the result of matching 
between underwriters and issuers is affected by the level of activity in the equity issue 
market. For instance, higher IPO volume before the burst of the Internet bubble can be 
associated with more successful offerings underwritten by the less-established banks, 
whereas larger offerings are still associated with the more-reputable underwriters 
(Benveniste et al. 2003; Fernando et al. 2005). As a result, underwriter market share 
change might be the result of the evolving market structure rather than the result of the 
withdrawal-averting effort by the bank.36 The additional tests provide more controlled 
evidence on the robustness of the effect of withdrawal-averting effort. We also introduce, 
in the additional tests, an alternative set of explanatory variables to compare the 
withdrawals with the successful offerings.  
                                                 
36 A similar argument, as raised by Tinic (1988), is that the combined market share for the less-reputable 
banks can increase significantly when large numbers of speculative firms go public, or, in a different 
scenario, highly reputable banks crowd out less-reputable banks in low-volume markets as the reputable 
banks compete more for issuers with less quality.  
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We then test our hypothesis on overpricing controlling the group effect of the 
banks and the withdrawal probability of the offerings. We introduce a set of dummy 
variables as proxies for offerings that are withdrawn, overpriced, successful, or less-
supported in the immediate aftermarket, and the interactions of these dummies. By 
examining the coefficients of these dummy variables, we compare the effects of these 
offering groups on the corresponding underwriter’s IPO market share change at the 
transactional level. As discussed earlier, we predict that overpricing, compared to 
withdrawals, improves the corresponding underwriter market share, even if the bank does 
not provide sufficient aftermarket support to the overpriced offering. 
3.3.  Data and Methods 
3.3.1.  Data 
We use exactly the same raw data set in chapter 2 for this study, but here we 
examine the IPO market share changes of the corresponding underwriters for all U.S. 
firm commitment IPOs that made their issue/withdrawal decisions between 1996 and 
2007. We extend our data to include IPOs in 1995 and 2008 to calculate the IPO market 
share.  
3.3.2.  Variable Measures and Preliminaries  
We define the underwriter IPO market share of a certain period, following Dunbar 
(2000), as the sum of the gross proceeds raised (and expected to be raised for 
withdrawals) in offerings where the bank acts as the book manager, divided by the sum of 
the gross proceeds raised (and expected to be raised for withdrawals) in all offerings 
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during that period. The underwriter market share change before and after an offering is 
then calculated as the difference between the market share of the book manager from one 
year before to that of one year after (including the day of) the current issue/withdrawal. 
Following Dunbar (2000), we adopt the Herfindahl index (short as HI) as a 
commonly used measurement of market concentration, and we calculate a similar index 
to measure a bank’s business concentration. HI is calculated as ∑ (𝑠𝑖)249𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑖 is the 
percentage of gross proceeds raised (or to be raised) in industry 𝑖 in comparison to the 
total gross proceeds raised (or to be raised) in all industries. Individual industries are 
identified using the forty-eight industry classification of Fama and French (1997). To 
measure a bank’s industry concentration, 𝑠𝑖 is calculated as the gross proceeds raised (or 
to be raised) by the bank in industry 𝑖 divided by the total gross proceeds raised (or to be 
raised) by the bank in all industries that year. All proceeds are measured in 1984-constant 
dollars.  
We report in table 3.1 the descriptive statistics on the IPO market for each year 
from 1996 to 2007. The table reports the following: the number of offerings; IPO market 
volume measured by the total proceeds raised; the mean, maximum, and minimum of 
offering sizes; the number of investment banks acting as book managers in the year; the 
mean and maximum of underwriter market shares by banks; the Herfindahl index of the 
market; the mean, maximum, and minimum of proceeds raised by banks; the mean and 
maximum number of offerings underwritten by banks; the mean and maximum number 
of industries covered by the offerings underwritten by banks; and the mean and minimum 
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of Herfindahl index on the banks’ business concentration.37 Panel A contains all IPOs 
including both completed and withdrawn offerings; panel B, as a reference, provides the 
statistics for the completed offerings only. All means, maximums, and minimums are 
calculated over the number of offerings and banks in the year noted. 
The number of offerings ranged from 77 in 2003 to 733 in 1996. Accompanying 
the reduction in the number of offerings (from over 400 before the year 2000 to less than 
200 thereafter), the total proceeds decreased from $38.3 billion in 1999 to $5.4 billion in 
2003, although the average offering size was larger during the later period. The largest 
single IPO ($6.2 billion) occurred in 2000, but the average size of offerings reached its 
peak in 2001 and 2002, with $139.5 million and $117 million, respectively. The number 
of book managers varied from 144 in 1996 to 29 in 2001. Although none of the annual HI 
for the market in panel A is larger than 1,800, the market HI of 2001 in panel B is 
2,003.5, which can be classified as highly concentrated. However, the high HI of that 
year and the large increase of HI between 2000 and 2001 are more likely to be the result 
of the sudden market shrinkage than the result of the horizontal mergers in the investment 
banking industry. The mean proceeds raised by banks ranged from $133.8 million in 
1997 to $784.1 million in 2001, whereas the mean number of offerings underwritten by 
banks ranged from 2.6 in 2002 to 8.0 in 1999. The maximum number of industries 
covered by one bank ranged from nine in 2002 and 2003 to nineteen in 1997, but the 
minimum business concentration index of the banks varied from 0.09 in 1996 and 2005 
to 0.18 in 1999 and 2000. 
                                                 
37 For each year, the minimum market share by banks is almost zero, the minimum number of IPOs by 
banks is one, the minimum number of industries covered by banks is one, and the maximum of the business 
concentration index is one. These statistics are intuitive and not reported in table 1.  
88 
 
 
 
 
To identify the effect of IPO performance on market share changes, we first 
define the measures of abnormal first-day returns and abnormal fees for each offering, 
since only the unexpected results should affect market share. Following Dunbar (2000), 
we regress the first-day excess returns on the gross proceeds of the offering, the 
logarithm of the gross proceeds, and a set of dummy variables representing the price 
adjustments to generate the prediction of the first-day returns. The first-day excess return 
is calculated as the closing price of the firm at the first day closing price divided by the 
offer price and then minus the NASDAQ composite index at the first trading day 
dividend by the index on the offering date. The dummy variables take the value of one if 
the offer price is above the upper boundary, at the upper boundary, among the upper half, 
among the lower half, at the lower boundary, or below the lower boundary of the 
preliminary price range.38 Similarly, we also regress the percentage spread, calculated as 
the gross spread per share divided by the offer price, on the gross proceeds of the 
offering, the logarithm of the gross proceeds, and a dummy variable valued as one if the 
offering was registered with form SB2.39  
                                                 
38 We introduce more dummies than the earlier literature does because the offer price of the completed 
IPOs clusters at the midpoint and at the upper and lower boundaries of the preliminary price range. See 
chapter 2 for details.  
39 Although 7% seems to be the norm of underwriting spread for many offerings, we find the underwriting 
spreads for most offerings registered with form SB2 cluster at 10%. SB2 filing is required for small 
business with revenues and public market float of less than $25 million.  
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics on the initial public offering market for each year from 1996 to 2007  
The market share for a book manager in a given year is the sum of the gross proceeds raised in IPOs in which the investment bank acts as book 
manager, divided by the sum of the gross proceeds raised in all IPOs in that year. The Herfindahl index is the sum of the squared percentage of 
market shares. All proceeds are measured in 1984-constant dollars. 
Panel A: All IPOs including completed and withdrawn offerings 
Year No. 
of 
IPOs 
Total 
proceeds 
(B$) 
Proceeds by IPOs No. of 
book 
mgrs. 
Mkt. share by 
banks (%) 
Herfindahl 
index for 
IPO market 
Proceeds by banks No. of IPOs by 
banks 
Industries No. 
by banks 
Business 
concentration Mean 
(M$) 
Max. 
(B$) 
Min. 
(M$) 
Mean 
(M$) 
Max. 
(B$) 
Min. 
(M$) Mean Max Mean Max. Mean Max. Mean Min. 
1996 733 27.3 37.3 1.9 1.9 144 0.7 16.2 775.7 189.8 4.4 1.9 5.1 44.0 3.2 18 0.67 0.09 
1997 534 18.6 34.8 0.5 2.2 139 0.7 12.8 555.1 133.8 2.4 2.2 3.8 33.0 2.8 19 0.71 0.10 
1998 393 23.5 59.7 2.7 1.8 114 0.9 25.7 1351.0 205.8 6.0 1.8 3.4 23.0 2.4 13 0.75 0.12 
1999 531 38.3 72.1 3.3 3.0 97 1.0 21.0 1156.4 394.8 8.0 3.0 5.5 49.5 2.8 17 0.75 0.18 
2000 429 36.1 84.1 6.2 4.1 56 1.8 21.3 1151.3 644.3 7.7 4.1 7.7 62.0 3.4 14 0.69 0.18 
2001 163 22.7 139.5 4.9 3.4 29 3.4 28.9 1731.4 784.1 6.6 3.4 5.6 28.0 4.0 14 0.57 0.13 
2002 99 11.6 117.0 2.6 3.0 38 2.6 27.6 1462.0 304.9 3.2 1.9 2.6 11.5 2.8 9 0.74 0.15 
2003 77 5.4 69.6 0.3 3.5 32 3.1 20.3 987.4 167.6 1.1 3.5 2.4 7.5 2.5 9 0.67 0.16 
2004 189 16.6 88.0 1.5 3.4 48 2.1 19.8 1130.3 346.6 3.3 3.1 3.9 20.8 3.8 16 0.67 0.10 
2005 180 13.9 77.0 0.7 3.6 55 1.8 12.9 833.5 252.1 1.8 1.2 3.3 16.0 3.8 18 0.67 0.09 
2006 187 15.6 83.7 1.2 5.0 52 1.9 13.6 782.0 300.9 2.1 5.0 3.6 15.4 4.1 15 0.62 0.13 
2007 169 15.1 89.3 2.0 3.0 50 2.0 13.7 889.3 301.7 2.1 3.0 3.4 19.9 3.3 13 0.71 0.13 
Panel B: Completed offerings only 
Year No. 
of 
IPOs 
Total 
proceeds 
(B$) 
Proceeds by IPOs No. of 
book 
mgrs. 
Mkt. share by 
banks (%) 
Herfindahl 
index for 
IPO market 
Proceeds by banks No. of IPOs by 
banks 
Industries No. 
by banks 
Business 
concentration Mean 
(M$) 
Max 
(B$) 
Min 
(M$) 
Mean 
(M$) 
Max 
(B$) 
Min 
(M$) Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Min 
1996 687 25.6 37.3 1.9 1.9 140 0.7 16.5 782.8 182.9 4.2 1.9 4.9 41.0 3.1 18 0.67 0.09 
1997 458 16.8 36.6 0.5 2.2 127 0.8 13.9 607.0 132.0 2.3 2.2 3.6 30.0 2.7 18 0.74 0.10 
1998 299 19.6 65.5 2.7 2.0 99 1.0 26.0 1497.1 197.9 5.1 2.0 3.0 20.0 2.2 11 0.80 0.13 
1999 461 36.4 78.9 3.3 3.4 75 1.3 21.8 1227.5 485.3 8.0 3.4 6.1 49.5 2.9 16 0.75 0.19 
2000 338 32.2 95.1 6.2 4.1 48 2.1 23.3 1225.6 669.9 7.5 4.1 7.0 43.0 3.4 14 0.69 0.19 
2001 75 18.5 246.1 4.9 3.4 23 4.3 31.9 2003.5 802.6 5.9 3.4 3.3 11.5 3.2 11 0.64 0.18 
2002 73 10.5 143.8 2.6 3.3 31 3.2 30.2 1638.9 338.6 3.2 3.3 2.4 9.5 2.6 9 0.77 0.16 
2003 64 4.9 77.1 0.3 3.5 27 3.7 22.0 1062.7 182.8 1.1 3.5 2.4 6.5 2.6 8 0.65 0.16 
2004 173 15.6 90.0 1.5 3.4 45 2.2 20.9 1213.9 346.1 3.3 3.1 3.8 20.3 3.7 15 0.66 0.11 
2005 158 13.1 83.2 0.7 3.6 52 1.9 13.0 853.9 252.8 1.7 1.2 3.0 14.1 3.7 17 0.67 0.09 
2006 164 14.5 88.6 1.2 5.0 47 2.1 14.1 792.5 309.2 2.0 3.6 3.5 14.3 4.1 14 0.63 0.15 
2007 152 14.2 93.4 2.0 3.0 46 2.2 13.9 905.4 309.4 2.0 3.0 3.3 18.6 3.4 13 0.70 0.13 
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Table 3.2: Regressions of first-day excess return and IPO spread on offering characteristics of the year noted for the period 
1995-2007  
Panel A: Regressions of IPO first-day excess return on offering characteristics 
The dependent variable is defined as 100 ∗ [𝑃1 𝑃0⁄ − 𝐼1 𝐼0⁄ ], where 𝑃1 is the closing price for the firm at the end of its first public trading day, 𝑃0 is the offer 
price, and 𝐼1 and 𝐼0 are the corresponding NASDAQ index of the days. The independent variables include the following: the gross proceeds raised in the IPO in 
millions of dollars; the natural logarithm of the gross proceeds raised in the offering; and the dummy variables taking a value of one if the offer price is above the 
upper boundary (𝐷3+), at the upper boundary (𝐷2+), among the upper half (𝐷1+), among the lower half (𝐷1−), at the lower boundary (𝐷2−), or below the lower 
boundary (𝐷3−) of the preliminary price range.  
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Intercept 31.93 *** 30.34 *** 16.62 *** 25.12 *** 8.76 17.20 17.29 ** 7.75 -1.65 -10.80 0.40 1.18 0.35 
Gross proceeds 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 *** -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.07 ** -0.02 ** -0.02 ** -0.01 -0.01 * 
Log of proceeds -5.72 *** -5.01 *** -1.12 -1.83 10.21 * 1.74 -0.67 0.40 2.82 4.66 ** 1.16 0.74 1.91 
𝐷3
+ 29.45 *** 22.00 *** 17.63 *** 32.67 *** 79.56 *** 101.88 *** 20.89 *** 18.51 ** 21.29 *** 19.95 *** 21.98 *** 33.44 *** 26.67 *** 
𝐷2
+ 11.68 *** 12.19 *** 14.37 *** 19.98 * 31.15 ** 24.87 *** 11.33 ** 6.17 12.95 ** 13.82 *** 17.83 *** 7.86 *** 16.77 *** 
𝐷1
+ 0.24 -5.45 * 3.60 -4.08 -15.96 -4.78 -3.84 -6.16 11.87 * 10.09 * 0.76 -3.76 10.85 
𝐷1
− -8.64 *** -9.84 *** -4.89 -13.72 -33.78 *** -14.97 * -15.95 *** 1.09 7.30 -1.75 0.51 6.21 1.34 
𝐷2
− -5.97 * -12.43 *** -8.80 *** -15.94 * -27.51 *** -15.99 *** -6.14 -9.61 * -5.95 -0.17 0.00 -0.20 -4.09 
𝐷3
− -12.03 *** -13.13 *** -8.65 *** -16.52 * -42.84 *** -17.82 *** -7.62 -7.94 1.39 -0.52 -0.49 -0.97 -6.00 ** 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.39 0.24 0.23 0.31 0.29 0.34 0.37 0.33 
Number of Obs. 452 677 450 288 453 337 75 73 63 167 155 163 151 
Panel B: Regressions of underwriter’s IPO spread on offering characteristics for completed offerings 
The dependent variable is defined as the gross spread per share in the offering divided by the offer price and then multiplied by100. The independent variables 
include the gross proceeds, the natural logarithm of the gross proceeds, and the dummy variables taking the value one if the offering was registered with form 
SB2. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Intercept 9.55 *** 8.87 *** 8.38 *** 8.56 *** 8.08 *** 8.09 *** 8.45 *** 7.48 *** 7.67 *** 7.65 *** 7.26 *** 7.29 *** 7.97 *** 
Gross proceeds .002 *** .000 .000 -.001 ** -.001 *** -.001 *** -.001 *** -.001 *** -.003 -.003 *** -.004 *** -.003 *** -.001 *** 
Log of proceeds -0.83 *** -0.59 *** -0.44 *** -0.47 *** -0.29 *** -0.30 *** -0.41 *** -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 ** -0.06 -0.08 -0.28 *** 
Form SB2 IPO 0.78 *** 0.78 *** 1.31 *** 0.66 *** 0.55 ** 1.49 *** 2.17 *** 1.14 * 1.51 * 0.49 0.74 0.90 ** -0.48 
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.69 0.63 0.70 0.57 0.55 0.70 0.89 0.55 0.68 0.67 0.43 0.47 0.56 
Number of Obs. 453 686 458 299 461 338 75 73 64 173 158 164 152 
Note: The heteroskedasticity consistent t-value with significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted with *, ** and ***, respectively. 
The observations of some years in panel A are less than those in panel B because of the lack of trading information for some completed offerings (e.g., those listed on the 
OTC).
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Table 3.2 provides examples of regressions of the first-day excess returns and the 
IPO spreads on offering characteristics with the year noted for the period from 1995 to 
2007. Panel A reports the regressions on the first-day excess returns with R-squares of 
most periods above 0.2. Both offering size and price adjustment level have some 
explanatory power, although the significance of their coefficients varies from time to 
time. Offerings priced at or above the high boundary of the preliminary price range are 
significantly underpriced in almost all sample periods, consistent with Hanley (1993). For 
regressions in panel B, the SB2 form dummy is significantly and positively related to the 
percentage spread, and the proceeds variable is negatively related to the spread. It appears 
that larger offerings are charged for smaller percentages of spread, and firms registering 
in SB2 are, by definition, small businesses. 
We roll over the regressions for each completed offering for a one-year period 
ending on the date of that offering. The abnormal first-day return (or spread) of an 
offering is the actual return (or spread) minus the predicted first-day return (or spread), 
which is the estimated result from the regression. For each offering, we calculate the 
mean, maximum, and minimum of the abnormal first-day initial return of all completed 
offerings underwritten by the same book manager of the current offering for the year 
preceding and following the current offer date, as well as for the two-year period 
preceding and following the current offer date. We also calculate the mean, maximum, 
and minimum of the one-year excess return and abnormal spread of the same book 
manager for each offering. The one-year excess return of an offering is calculated as the 
market price one year after the initial offering divided by the offer price and then minus 
the NASDAQ composite index one year after the offering divided by the index on the 
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offering date. We then calculate the change in these variables as the difference between 
the statistics of one year before and of one year after the offering. For instance, the 
change of mean abnormal spread of the book runner underwriting the current offering is 
calculated as the mean abnormal spread of the book runner in one year before the current 
offering minus that in one year after the current offering.40 For each offering, we also 
calculate the percentage of withdrawals for the book runner during the two years around 
the current offering and the change of that one year before and one year after the current 
offering. Rolling over the calculation, we get these bank-level variables for each offering. 
In chapter 2, we estimate the withdrawal probability for each offering with a 
probit model. The dependent variable is assigned a value of one for withdrawals and zero 
for successful offerings, and the independent variables include the following: Logarithm 
of revenue, Logarithm of proceeds, Debt ratio multiplies equity ratio, Technology 
dummy, VC/PE-backing dummy, Debt retirement dummy, Market dummies (AMEX, 
NASDAQ, and NYSE), Carter-Manaster rank, Bank market share, Bank industry market 
share, Number of offerings in prior two months, Logarithm of proceeds of offerings in 
prior two months, Number of industry offerings in prior two months, Logarithm of 
proceeds of industry offerings in prior two months, BAA-AAA yield spread at 
issue/withdrawal, Change in BAA-AAA yield spread in prior two months, Ten-year 
Treasury yield at issue/withdrawal, Change in ten-year spread in prior two months, 
Industry average book-to-market ration of the year before the offering, Return on the 
NASDAQ composite index in prior thirty days, Positive return on the NASDAQ composite 
index in prior thirty days. In addition to the whole sample of 1996 to 2007, we also 
                                                 
40 The mean, maximum, and minimum of the one-year return are statistics calculated on samples one year 
earlier than those of spread or first-day return, since the one-year return is available after one year.  
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regress on the subsamples before and after the burst of the Internet bubble for the hot 
market of 1996 to 2000 and the cold market of 2001 to 2007.  Our regression results of 
the probit model are presented in table 2.5. We include all the variables at first and then 
“dismiss” variables of which the coefficients in any one of these three sample regressions 
are insignificant, while other similar but competitive variables maintain significant results 
across the regressions. For example, Bank industry market share and Bank market share 
beat Carter-Manaster rank. Number of all offerings in the prior two month and Logarithm 
of proceeds of industry offerings in prior two months beat Number of industry offerings 
and Logarithm of proceeds of all offerings. As a result, we dismiss three variables with 
insignificant coefficients. We also report the marginal effects of each variable.  
Our probit regression results are largely consistent with Busaba et al. (2001) and 
Dunbar and Foerster (2008), considering the sample difference and the adjustment of 
variable measurements. The probability of withdrawal is significantly and negatively 
related to firm revenue, VC/PE-backing dummy, bank industry market share, number of 
offerings in prior two months, industry average B/M ratio before issue/withdrawal, and 
NASDAQ composite index return in the prior thirty days, but positively related to filing 
size and firm debt ratio. 
Table 2.5 presents our estimation results of the probit model. We use the 
withdrawal probability to capture the effect of withdrawal screening, while the prediction 
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error, defined as the estimation minus the withdrawal dummy, proxies the effort of 
withdrawal averting.41  
3.3.3.  Empirical Model and Summary Statistics 
Our key research question is how the tactic of averting potential withdrawals of 
individual offerings affects the corresponding underwriter’s future IPO market share. 
Whereas earlier studies on underwriter market share focused on the group level of a bank 
by pooling the offerings underwritten by that bank, we directly study the IPOs at the 
individual level of individual transactions and offerings, while, at the same time, 
controlling the group effect of the corresponding bank. There are several advantages with 
this method. First, it helps in revealing the relationship between the change in underwriter 
market share and the performance of individual offerings that might be obscured if it is 
pooled with the performance of other offerings run by the same bank. For example, if a 
tactic is adopted by most banks but, case by case, for only a limited portion of offerings 
underwritten by one bank, the effect of adopting this tactic on market share change might 
be smoothed out if we pool the performance of all offerings by that bank. Second, while 
controlling the group effect of each bank, we roll over and calculate the pooled IPO 
performance of all offerings conducted by the corresponding book runner. This dynamic 
pooling reflects the evolving pattern of a bank from time to time (for example, due to 
mergers and acquisitions). Finally, the least square optimized in the regression is 
weighted by offerings but not by banks, and hence is better in reflecting the mix-up of the 
whole market.  
                                                 
41 Although our probit model estimating the withdrawal probability contains some public information after 
the mutual selection, the effect of withdrawal screening, if it exists, should still be observed using our 
measure.  
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Assuming a bank’s IPO market share is mainly determined by the aggregated IPO 
performance of past offerings underwritten by the bank, we argue that the market share 
change of the corresponding book manager around an issue/withdrawal is a function of 
the performance of the current issue/withdrawal and the bank’s aggregated performance 
before and after the issue/withdrawal. The aggregate performance around the period 
before and after the issue/withdrawal can be presented by the aggregated performance 
over the whole period and the performance difference between periods before and after 
the current issue/withdrawal. Our regression model takes the general form  
𝑀𝑘𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑓�𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖,𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑗 ,Δ𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑗�  (9)  
where 𝑀𝑘𝑠𝐶ℎ𝑖,𝑗 is the bank 𝑗 ’s IPO market share change before and after an 
issue/withdrawal  𝑖 , 𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑗  is a variable matrix of the aggregated performance on IPOs 
underwritten by bank  𝑗  during the two years before and after the current 
issue/withdrawal, Δ𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑗 is the matrix of the changes of the corresponding variables from 
the year preceding to the year following the date of the current offer. The 𝐾𝑃𝐼 variables 
include the mean, maximum, and minimum of the abnormal first-day initial returns, the 
abnormal spreads, the one-year excess returns of all offerings underwritten by the same 
bank during the period, its percentage of withdrawals, and the industry concentration of 
the same underwriter during that period.42  
In table 3.3, we report the summary statistics on 3,661 IPOs (including 560 
withdrawals) from 1996 to 2007 for the underwriter market share change and the 
corresponding book runner’s IPO performance. The estimated probability of withdrawal 
                                                 
42 These variables contain all IPO performance-related factors discussed in Dunbar (2000) except analyst 
reputation, a factor that is difficult to measure, especially for the less-established banks.  
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is the estimation from the probit model reported in table 2.5, while the prediction error is 
the residual of this probit model, calculated as the withdrawal dummy minus the 
estimation. For a bank’s overall IPO performance in two years, observations are missing 
for some withdrawals and successful offerings that were underwritten by banks 
completing no other successful offerings during the two-year period. For a bank’s 
performance change over two years, observations are missing if the bank performance 
variables of the past year or the next year are unavailable. These banks are occasional 
underwriters in the two-year period examined, so we exclude them from our analysis.  
As a result, our sample includes 3,492 offerings, of which the corresponding 
underwriters have at least one successful offering (that has trading information) in the 
year preceding and the year following that offering (including itself) underwritten by the 
same book runner.  
Our study focuses on how the outcome of an offering affects its corresponding 
book runners’ ability to compete for future offerings. The dependent variable is the 
underwriter market share change between the periods one year preceding and one year 
following the current offering. The underwriter’s market share of a period is defined as 
the sum of the gross proceeds raised in successful offerings, plus the sum of expected 
gross proceeds in withdrawn offerings, for which the bank acts as book manager, divided 
by the sum of the gross proceeds raised and expected gross proceeds in all successful and 
withdrawn offerings in the period. We predict that the withdrawal-averting effort is 
positively correlated to the corresponding underwriter market share change. We also 
predict that overpriced offerings, in comparison to the withdrawals, are positively 
associated with the corresponding underwriter market share change, even if the 
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overpriced offerings were followed with less first-day aftermarket price support. We use 
two sets of performance measures on individual offerings in our study and report the 
empirical results in the next section. 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics on the 3,661 initial public offerings, including 560 
withdrawals, for the underwriter IPO market share change and 
performance from 1996 to 2007 
A book manager’s market share is defined as the sum of the gross proceeds raised in offerings (or 
to be raised in withdrawals) where the bank acts as book manager, divided by the sum of the 
gross proceeds raised in all offerings (or to be raised in withdrawals) during that period. All 
proceeds are measured in 1984-constant dollars. The estimated probability of withdrawal is the 
estimation of the probit model reported in table 3. The statistics of a bank’s IPO performances are 
based on the corresponding results of all the offerings underwritten by the bank during the period. 
The abnormal first-day initial return and the abnormal spread of an individual offering are the 
actual measures minus the predictions from the rolling-over regressions for each completed 
offering for the one-year period ending on the date of that offering.  
 Obs. Mean SD Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Book manager’s market share 
Market share last year  3661 6.71 8.30 0.01 0.46 3.35 10.65 70.99 
Market share next year  3661 6.69 8.55 0.01 0.41 3.03 10.61 66.25 
Change of market share  3661 -0.02 3.83 -24.42 -1.06 -0.01 0.69 21.82 
WR prediction/WR-averting 
Estimated probability of withdrawal 3661 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.18 1.00 
Prediction error 3661 0.00 0.29 -1.00 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.80 
Bank’s overall IPO performance in two years 
Mean abnormal first-day initial return 3586 0.00 0.13 -0.91 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 1.12 
Min. abnormal first-day initial return 3586 -0.48 0.43 -1.41 -0.78 -0.30 -0.19 2.21 
Max. abnormal first-day initial return 3586 1.09 1.57 -1.11 0.16 0.44 1.27 6.49 
Mean abnormal spread 3609 0.00 0.35 -3.03 -0.05 0.02 0.08 2.40 
Min. abnormal spread 3609 -0.84 0.73 -4.73 -1.35 -0.91 -0.33 2.40 
Max. abnormal spread 3609 0.61 0.56 -3.12 0.38 0.58 0.84 2.60 
Mean one-year excess return 3589 0.21 0.46 -1.27 -0.03 0.18 0.36 3.51 
Min. one-year excess return 3589 -0.95 0.46 -1.76 -1.16 -1.00 -0.73 3.51 
Max. one-year excess return 3589 4.85 6.25 -1.32 1.19 2.57 5.80 24.73 
Percentage of withdrawals  3661 15.47 16.85 0.00 5.30 11.11 20.72 100.0 
Business industry concentration 3661 0.28 0.23 0.05 0.14 0.20 0.35 1.00 
Bank’s performance changes over two years 
Change of mean abnormal first-day return 3493 -0.02 0.15 -1.10 -0.06 0.00 0.04 0.74 
Change of min. abnormal first-day return 3493 -0.01 0.31 -1.28 -0.09 0.00 0.11 1.40 
Change of max. abnormal first-day return 3493 -0.17 1.45 -6.21 -0.27 0.00 0.17 5.88 
Change of mean abnormal spread 3531 0.00 0.21 -1.56 -0.08 0.00 0.06 1.92 
Change of min. abnormal spread 3531 0.02 0.59 -3.81 -0.28 0.00 0.26 3.16 
Change of max. abnormal spread 3531 -0.05 0.43 -2.45 -0.22 0.00 0.13 3.36 
Change of withdrawn percentage 3661 5.43 19.76 -66.67 -2.08 1.29 14.14 90.00 
Change of industry concentration 3661 0.01 0.22 -0.83 -0.07 0.00 0.10 0.90 
Change of mean one-year excess return 3188 -0.04 0.76 -4.61 -0.36 -0.04 0.26 4.66 
Change of min. one-year excess return 3188 -0.10 0.56 -5.71 -0.35 -0.07 0.20 3.20 
Change of max. one-year excess return 3188 0.50 5.73 -23.82 -0.98 0.25 1.70 23.86 
 
 
98 
 
 
 
 
3.4.  Empirical Results 
3.4.1.  The Effect of Withdrawal-Averting Effort on 
Underwriter Market Share 
We first test the effect of withdrawal-averting effort on underwriter market share 
change. Regressions on market share change are reported in table 3.4. Independent 
variables include: Withdrawal dummy, the dummy variable that values one if the offering 
is withdrawn and zero otherwise; Estimated probability of withdrawal, the estimation of 
likelihood of withdrawal from the probit model; Withdrawal-averting effort, the 
prediction error of the probit model estimating the withdrawal probability, calculated as 
the estimated withdrawal probability minus the withdrawal dummy; Estimated 
probability of withdrawal for withdrawals only, which is the interaction of the estimated 
probability of withdrawal and the withdrawal dummy; and Estimated probability of 
withdrawal for completed offerings only, which is the interaction of the estimated 
probability of withdrawal and one minus the withdrawal dummy. The corresponding 
book runner’s group effect is controlled using the overall performance measure and the 
performance change measure.  
Model 1 reports the regression controlling the underwriter’s overall IPO 
performance in the two-year period, while Model 2 controls the underwriter performance 
change over the period. Model 3 controls both the overall performance and the change of 
performance. Model 4 provides an alternative regression, and Model 5 extends the 
regression by separating the effects of the successful from the withdrawn offerings.  
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Table 3.4: Regressions on underwriter IPO market share change for offerings from 1996 to 2007, controlling bank IPO 
performance and trends over the year preceding and following the offering. 
The dependent variable is defined as the change of market share of the bank underwriting the current offering, seen in the period 
beginning one year before and ending one year after the current offering date.  
Independent variable:  
Underwriter IPO Market Share Change 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat 
Intercept -0.968 -3.69 *** -0.132 -1.20  -1.187 -4.34 *** -1.187 -4.34 *** -1.080 -3.87 *** 
Estimated probability of withdrawal 0.555 1.33  0.417 0.97  0.486 1.14  1.166 2.39 ** -0.108 -0.16  
Estimated probability of withdrawal, withdrawals only              2.438 2.59 ** 
Withdrawal-averting effort (prediction error)  0.587 2.39 ** 0.799 3.03 ** 0.680 2.69 **       
Withdrawal dummy           -0.680 -2.69 ** -1.325 -3.86 *** 
Bank’s overall IPO performance in two years 
Mean abnormal first-day initial return -3.613 -4.63 ***    -3.716 -5.15 *** -3.716 -5.15 *** -3.812 -5.27 *** 
Min. abnormal first-day initial return 1.611 4.22 ***    1.560 4.18 *** 1.560 4.18 *** 1.588 4.25 *** 
Max. abnormal first-day initial return 0.626 7.93 ***    0.478 6.43 *** 0.478 6.43 *** 0.477 6.42 *** 
Mean abnormal spread -0.731 -1.93 *    -0.937 -2.30 ** -0.937 -2.30 ** -0.982 -2.41 ** 
Min. abnormal spread 0.009 0.05     0.020 0.12  0.020 0.12  0.028 0.17  
Max. abnormal spread 0.704 3.16 **    0.884 3.53 *** 0.884 3.53 *** 0.892 3.57 *** 
Mean one-year excess return 0.786 3.51 ***    0.857 3.70 *** 0.857 3.70 *** 0.861 3.75 *** 
Min. one-year excess return -0.171 -0.85     -0.194 -0.87  -0.194 -0.87  -0.193 -0.86  
Max. one-year excess return -0.010 -0.42     0.009 0.35  0.009 0.35  0.008 0.35  
Percentage of withdrawals  0.003 0.58     0.007 1.25  0.007 1.25  0.008 1.38  
Business industry concentration 0.743 2.61 **    0.996 3.26 ** 0.996 3.26 ** 1.110 3.67 *** 
Bank’s performance changes over two years 
Change of mean abnormal first-day return    3.167 4.26 *** 2.975 4.54 *** 2.975 4.54 *** 3.008 4.60 *** 
Change of min. abnormal first-day return    -1.047 -3.08 ** -0.789 -2.34 ** -0.789 -2.34 ** -0.821 -2.44 ** 
Change of max. abnormal first-day return    -0.297 -4.52 *** -0.161 -2.80 ** -0.161 -2.80 ** -0.169 -2.93 ** 
Change of mean abnormal spread    -1.627 -3.67 *** -1.113 -3.19 ** -1.113 -3.19 ** -1.136 -3.28 ** 
Change of min. abnormal spread    -0.320 -1.93 * -0.370 -2.48 ** -0.370 -2.48 ** -0.368 -2.46 ** 
Change of max. abnormal spread    1.885 7.36 *** 1.716 7.50 *** 1.716 7.50 *** 1.721 7.55 *** 
Change of withdrawn percentage    0.025 5.73 *** 0.016 3.87 *** 0.016 3.87 *** 0.016 3.96 *** 
Change of industry concentration    3.158 9.00 *** 2.600 8.94 *** 2.600 8.94 *** 2.592 8.93 *** 
Change of mean one-year excess return    0.663 4.22 ***          
Change of min. one-year excess return    -0.155 -1.20           
Change of max. one-year excess return    -0.061 -2.51 **          
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.070 0.086 0.086 0.088 
Number of observations 3568 3143 3492 3492 3492 
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Controlling the bank’s overall IPO performance and the bank’s performance 
change over the two-year period, Models 1, 2, and 3 show that the withdrawal-averting 
effort of an offering is significantly and positively correlated with the corresponding 
bank’s underwriter market share change before and after the offering. Banks showing 
their ability and willingness to avert offerings from potential withdrawals gain future 
market shares. When the measure of withdrawal-averting effort is introduced 
simultaneously, there is no significant evidence on the association of the estimated 
probability of withdrawal with the corresponding bank’s underwriter market share 
change. We interpret this result as the market-wide equilibrium of the matching between 
underwriters and issuers (Fernando et al. 2005). The implicit withdrawal probability and 
the explicit items stimulated in the underwriting contract (e.g., the spread charged) will 
lead to the optimized results of the matching. The equilibrium matching, therefore, 
contains no information to predict the underwriter’s future market share change. 
Taking a look at the alternative regression of the withdrawal dummy and the 
estimated probability of withdrawal in Model 4, we observe a significant and negative 
correlation between association with withdrawals and the underwriter market share 
change, consistent with the result of Dunbar (2000). However, we also observe a 
significant and positive correlation between the underwriter market share change and the 
ex ante estimation of probability of withdrawal. If a bank adopts a withdrawal-screening 
tactic, the positive effect on the underwriter’s market share change from the outcome of a 
successful offering is, partially if not completely, deducted by the negative effect from 
choosing in ex ante an issuer with lower withdrawal probability. 
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In the extended study in Model 5, we truncate the estimated probability of 
withdrawal by interacting it with the withdrawal dummy and then examine whether the 
effects of the estimated probability of withdrawal on underwriter market share are 
different retrospectively after observing the completion/withdrawal outcome of an 
offering. The negative, but insignificant, coefficient of the estimated probability of 
withdrawal, and the significantly positive coefficient of the variable interacting with the 
withdrawal dummy (truncated for successful offerings), indicate that underwriters 
completing offerings with higher probability of withdrawal are rewarded with future 
market share, and that underwriters failing to complete offerings with lower probability 
of withdrawal are punished in their future market shares. The negative incentive on 
withdrawals, shown as the later effect, is more prominent. Since most successful 
offerings are underpriced, it is no surprise that issuers attribute few successful offerings 
to the withdrawal-averting effort of underwriters but attribute most withdrawals to the 
bank’s incompetence in averting withdrawals.  
For all the regressions on individual offerings, we control the bank-level statistics 
of their overall IPO performance and/or the change in their periodic performance. Our 
results of the coefficients of the control variables are largely consistent with earlier 
studies. By introducing the extreme IPO performance together with the mean statistics, as 
well as the changes of these performance characteristics over time, our models generate 
many interpretations for the banks hoping to improve market share.  
We find that the mean abnormal first-day initial return of the corresponding bank 
is negatively correlated to its market share change, consistent with the findings by Beatty 
and Ritter (1986), Nanda and Yun (1997), and Dunbar (2000) that banks lose market 
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share if they leave too much money on the table. In contrast to the negative coefficient of 
the two-year period variable, the positive coefficient of the in-period change of the mean 
suggests that the bank converge its mean underpricing to a normal level if its past year’s 
mean underpricing was too high or too low, consistent with the argument that 
maintaining a certain underpricing level is essential to attract sufficient investors. The 
minimum abnormal first-day return of a bank has a positive effect on its subsequent 
market share, consistent with the results of Nanda and Yun (1997) and Dunbar (2000). To 
complement these papers that interpret the minimum abnormal first-day returns as 
substantially overpriced offerings, we emphasize that this variable represents an 
insufficient first-day aftermarket price support provided by the underwriter, and hence 
interpret this positive effect as a support to the argument that the bank will lose its market 
share if it fails to provide sufficient aftermarket price support. In addition, our regressions 
produce a significant and positive coefficient for the maximum abnormal first-day initial 
return variable, which is different than, but unnecessarily conflicting with, the results of 
Dunbar (2000), who finds that the maximum variable is negatively correlated to the 
market share change in regressions in which the corresponding mean was not an 
independent variable. We argue that, since the mean variable in our models is always 
controlled and it proxies the underpricing behavior, the maximum of abnormal first-day 
initial return catches only the cases of extreme underpricing. Thus, this positive 
coefficient represents the star effect of the “hottest” IPOs that generate information 
momentum (Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack 2002). On the other hand, the coefficients 
of the changes in minimum and maximum abnormal first-day return oppose the 
coefficients of the corresponding overall performance variables. This shows that the 
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extreme IPO performance occurring in the preceding year has more effect on market 
share change than those taking place in the next year. The insufficient aftermarket price 
support (or extreme overpricing) and the “hottest” IPO have a lag effect on the 
corresponding underwriter’s market share. 
We find a negative correlation between the mean abnormal spread of the 
corresponding bank and its market share change, and a positive correlation between the 
maximum abnormal spread and market share change. The change of minimum abnormal 
spread is negatively correlated to market share change. These results suggest that banks 
adopting the flexible and decreasing fee schedule gain market shares, consistent with the 
arguments of Dunbar (2000) and Hansen (2001) that banks compete on their fee schemes. 
The mean one-year excess return is positively correlated to the corresponding 
underwriter’s market share change, consistent with Dunbar’s (2000) findings that better 
long-term performance of the offerings represents higher quality of the banks. These 
banks are either superior in screening issuers (Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994) or 
capable of providing long-term after-market support (Dunbar 2000). We exclude the 
change variables of the one-year returns in our regressions other than Model 2 because 
this variable is missing for many observations. Including this variable, as shown in Model 
2, does not affect our key conclusions.  
Our definition of market share is based on all offerings, both successful and 
withdrawn, and we thus include the change of withdrawn percentage in the regressions to 
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relieve possible measurement bias.43 This positive coefficient by itself has little meaning 
for the banks willing to improve their market share. Finally, we observe a significantly 
positive correlation between underwriter market share change and the bank’s business 
industry concentration, a finding consistent with the argument that industry specialization 
improves the pricing of offerings due to information spillovers (Booth and Chua 1996; 
Benveniste et al. 2002).  
3.4.2.  Additional Tests 
Dunbar (2000) finds that the factors affecting underwriter market share are more 
significant for the established banks in low-volume IPO markets. Fernando et al. (2005) 
also argue that the matching between underwriters and issuers is affected by the level of 
activity in the equity issue market. To determine if the conclusions regarding our 
hypothesis on withdrawal-averting effort are robust to the regime change in the market 
environment, we rerun our regressions for subsamples of different periods. Since our 
study covers both the hot IPO market before the burst of the Internet bubble in 2001 and 
the cold IPO market afterward, we first examine the effect of withdrawal-averting effort 
on underwriter market share change for offerings before and after 2000 separately, using 
the withdrawal probabilities estimated from the probit models within each sample period. 
We then examine that effect for different IPO market segments – by offering size and by 
the corresponding underwriter’s market share separately. For each regression, we provide 
an alternative set of explanatory variables as a supplement to decomposing withdrawal 
screening from withdrawal averting. These alternative variables, similar to those in 
                                                 
43 For example, an increase of market share for a bank might be due to the increased withdrawals 
underwritten by the bank and thus does not represent an increase in its competitiveness.  
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Model 5 in section 3.4.1, include the withdrawal dummy and the probability of 
withdrawal multiplying the withdrawal dummy. The results of these alternative models 
are also reported at the bottom of each regression in Table 3.5. 
As reported in Table 3.5 (Panel A), we find that withdrawal-averting effort is still 
significantly and positively related to underwriter market share change for both the cold 
and the hot market periods, and we find no evidence on such effect of withdrawal 
screening. Our conclusion regarding the hypothesis on withdrawal-averting effort, 
therefore, does not change. A detailed examination of the alternative models shows a 
pattern for the post-2000 period similar to that of the whole sample period. Whereas 
market share decrease is significantly associated with observed withdrawals, the ex ante 
estimated withdrawal probability of these withdrawals is also an important concern. 
However, this is not the case for the period between 1996 and 2000, since none of the 
variable coefficients is significant. The withdrawal-averting effect on the market share 
change should thus be attributed to a mixed effect of withdrawal probability and realized 
withdrawal or completion. 
We report in panel B the regression results for offerings grouped by underwriter 
market share larger than 4%, less than 4%, 3%, 2%, and 1% separately. Withdrawal-
averting effort is significantly and positively correlated to the underwriter market share 
change for large banks, and the correlation is insignificant for small banks with market 
share less than 2%. We interpret that the small banks have less market power and thus are 
less likely to adopt withdrawal averting as a competitive strategy. Panel C reports the 
results for offerings grouped by offering size measured in 1984-constant dollars. 
Offerings with proceeds larger than $100 million are extremely large deals, and those 
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smaller than $10 million are extremely small ones. Each of these two groups occupies 
about 11.9% of the total samples. We then separate the offerings in-between into large 
offerings or small offerings by setting a threshold of $32 million. We see that underwriter 
market share maintains its positive correlation to withdrawal-averting effort for the 
majority of the offerings except for the extremely large or extremely small offerings.  
Our conclusion about the hypothesis on withdrawal-averting effort is fairly robust 
to both sample periods before and after the year 2000. The results are more pronounced 
in the subsample of offerings underwritten by banks with market share in excess of 2% 
(63% of the entire sample) and those between $10 million and $100 million (76% of the 
sample).  
We also observe some significant changes in the coefficients of some bank-level 
performance variables. First of all, the banks’ IPO performance of one-year excess 
returns affects their underwriter market share changes differently before and after 2000. 
Before 2000, banks with better long-term IPO performance gain market share, consistent 
with the argument that investment banks screen out firms with bad evaluations 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1994). After 2000, banks associated with overpriced IPOs 
gain future business, consistent with our argument in chapter 2 that banks compete on 
“saving” potential withdrawals in the cold market.44 Second, the coefficient of business 
industry concentration is significantly negatively related to the underwriter market share 
change for the period of 2001 to 2007, opposite to the result for the period of 1996 to 
2000. It implies an optimal strategy for banks to increase their industry specialization 
                                                 
44 Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest that long-running underperformance of IPOs can 
result from improper price in the early aftermarket.  
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when the IPO market is hot, since the pricing can be improved due to information 
spillovers (Booth and Chua 1996; Benveniste et al. 2002). The same strategy, however, 
can be very risky, as Dunbar (2000) argue, when the industry makeup changes 
dramatically in the cold IPO market. Finally, we observe that the effects of first-day 
initial returns on the underwriter market shares for some small banks (for example, those 
with average market share between 1% and 2%) are in opposition to those for the larger 
banks. This suggests that, for these smaller banks to grow their market shares, substantial 
underpricing is essential to attract sufficient investor biddings for the offerings 
underwritten by these banks.  
Table 3.5: Additional tests. 
Panel A: Robust test for different sample periods 
Independent variable:  
Underwriter IPO Market Share Change 
1996 – 2007 1996 – 2000 2001 – 2007 
Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat 
Intercept -1.187 -4.34 *** -1.341 -4.77 *** 1.127 1.53  
Estimated probability of withdrawal 0.486 1.14  0.463 0.91  -0.014 -0.02  
Withdrawal-averting effort (prediction error) 0.680 2.69 ** 0.446 1.85 * 1.191 1.74 * 
Bank’s overall IPO performance in two years 
Mean abnormal first-day initial return -3.716 -5.15 *** -4.010 -5.56 *** -0.221 -0.07  
Min. abnormal first-day initial return 1.560 4.18 *** 2.270 6.00 *** -0.863 -0.58  
Max. abnormal first-day initial return 0.478 6.43 *** 0.487 6.59 *** -1.224 -1.69 * 
Mean abnormal spread -0.937 -2.30 ** 0.566 1.29  -2.104 -2.69 ** 
Min. abnormal spread 0.020 0.12  -0.443 -2.25 ** 0.193 0.66  
Max. abnormal spread 0.884 3.53 *** -0.146 -0.59  1.857 3.93 *** 
Mean one-year excess return 0.857 3.70 *** 1.719 7.49 *** -2.076 -2.70 ** 
Min one-year excess return -0.194 -0.87  -0.919 -4.03 *** 2.136 3.38 *** 
Max one-year excess return 0.009 0.35  -0.031 -1.40  0.094 1.15  
Percentage of withdrawals 0.007 1.25  0.003 0.70  -0.005 -0.41  
Business industry concentration 0.996 3.26 ** 1.409 4.77 *** -1.536 -1.74 * 
Bank’s performance changes over two years 
Change of mean abnormal first-day return 2.975 4.54 *** 3.109 4.70 *** 2.869 0.75  
Change of min. abnormal first-day return -0.789 -2.34 ** -1.118 -3.48 *** -1.031 -0.68  
Change of max. abnormal first- day return -0.161 -2.80 ** -0.195 -3.40 *** -1.802 -2.94 ** 
Change of mean abnormal spread -1.113 -3.19 ** -1.381 -3.92 *** -1.096 -1.09  
Change of min. abnormal spread -0.370 -2.48 ** -0.386 -2.40 ** -0.260 -0.96  
Change of max. abnormal spread 1.716 7.50 *** 1.961 8.74 *** 1.828 4.18 *** 
Change of withdrawn percentage 0.016 3.87 *** 0.019 6.57 *** 0.014 1.26  
Change of industry concentration 2.600 8.94 *** 2.583 9.29 *** 3.113 3.73 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.145 0.051 
Number of observations 3492 2474 1018 
Alternative models: 
Withdrawn probability, withdrawals only 2.331 3.42 *** 1.155 1.34  3.645 2.93 ** 
Withdrawn probability, completed offerings -0.108 -0.16  0.684 1.03  -1.469 -1.11  
Withdrawal dummy -1.325 -3.86 *** -0.558 -1.64  -2.991 -3.30 *** 
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Panel B: Market segments based on IPO market share of the corresponding investment banks 
 Samples grouped by underwriter market share (the average of lag and lead market share) 
Independent variable:  
Underwriter IPO Market Share Change 
> 4% ≤ 𝟒% ≤ 𝟑% ≤ 𝟐% ≤ 𝟏% 
Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat 
Intercept -3.102 -3.62 *** 0.215 2.40 ** -0.013 -0.17  -0.015 -0.24  0.016 0.44  
Estimated probability of withdrawal 1.560 1.83 * -0.074 -0.54  -0.299 -2.34 ** 0.071 0.70  -0.132 -2.81 ** 
Withdrawal-averting effort(prediction error) 1.154 2.21 ** 0.204 2.52 ** 0.147 2.03 ** -0.033 -0.64  0.053 1.59  
Bank’s overall IPO performance in two years 
Mean abnormal first-day initial return -11.288 -4.90 *** 0.770 3.82 *** 0.835 4.47 *** 0.696 3.89 *** -0.176 -1.73 * 
Min abnormal first-day initial return 2.840 3.27 ** -0.634 -5.41 *** -0.579 -5.46 *** -0.435 -5.09 *** -0.033 -0.57  
Max abnormal first-day initial return 0.761 5.83 *** -0.333 -9.71 *** -0.355 -8.27 *** -0.301 -4.36 *** 0.106 3.22 ** 
Mean abnormal spread 0.586 0.24  0.098 0.75  -0.055 -0.45  -0.214 -2.64 ** -0.009 -0.21  
Min abnormal spread -0.392 -1.00  -0.080 -1.35  -0.053 -0.90  0.049 1.25  0.005 0.23  
Max abnormal spread 1.359 2.86 ** -0.030 -0.43  0.085 1.41  0.150 3.38 *** 0.014 0.59  
Mean one-year excess return 4.032 5.02 *** 0.089 1.24  0.280 4.08 *** 0.261 4.71 *** 0.059 1.41  
Min one-year excess return -0.720 -0.93  0.179 2.71 ** -0.016 -0.26  -0.059 -1.21  0.023 0.70  
Max one-year excess return -0.024 -0.47  -0.028 -3.02 ** -0.064 -6.19 *** -0.067 -6.73 *** -0.026 -1.75 * 
Percentage of withdrawals -0.004 -0.19  -0.001 -0.84  0.001 1.15  -0.001 -1.23  0.000 0.67  
Business industry concentration -0.803 -0.26  -0.248 -2.45 ** 0.071 0.79  0.056 0.81  0.016 0.41  
Bank’s performance changes over two years 
Change of mean abnormal first-day return 8.609 6.63 *** -0.589 -2.70 ** -0.340 -1.51  -0.036 -0.20  -0.056 -0.62  
Change of min. abnormal first-day return -1.476 -2.11 ** -0.535 -5.10 *** -0.399 -4.07 *** -0.372 -3.85 *** -0.120 -2.44 ** 
Change of max. abnormal first-day return -0.364 -3.56 *** 0.029 0.83  0.073 1.69 * 0.187 2.86 ** 0.085 2.95 ** 
Change of mean abnormal spread -4.966 -2.00 ** 0.122 1.07  0.200 1.92 * 0.028 0.41  0.065 1.44  
Change of min. abnormal spread -0.611 -2.08 ** -0.267 -4.64 *** -0.344 -5.74 *** -0.101 -2.75 ** -0.059 -2.58 ** 
Change of max. abnormal spread 1.894 4.94 *** 0.564 7.91 *** 0.426 6.90 *** 0.280 6.15 *** 0.151 5.98 *** 
Change of withdrawn percentage 0.002 0.19  0.002 2.14 ** 0.004 3.87 *** 0.002 2.46 ** 0.001 2.68 ** 
Change of industry concentration 10.900 7.98 *** -0.136 -1.81 * -0.065 -0.95  -0.096 -1.79 * -0.188 -5.72 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.185 0.272 0.313 0.250 
Number of observations 1587 1905 1606 1316 1009 
Alternative models: 
Withdrawn probability, withdrawals only 4.198 3.32 *** -0.142 -0.60  -0.565 -2.50 ** -0.029 -0.15  -0.151 -1.37  
Withdrawn probability, completed offerings 0.455 0.28  0.367 2.19 ** 0.169 1.26  0.079 0.79  -0.051 -0.99  
Withdrawal dummy -2.036 -3.03 ** -0.060 -0.53  0.076 0.75  0.067 0.90  -0.021 -0.39  
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Panel C: Market segments based on IPO size 
 Samples grouped by offering size (proceeds in millions of 1984-constant dollars) 
Independent variable:  
Underwriter IPO Market Share Change 
𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 > 100 𝟏𝟎𝟎 ≥ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 > 32 𝟑𝟐 ≥ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 > 10 𝟏𝟎 ≥ 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒆𝒅𝒔 
Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat 
Intercept -5.034 -2.93 ** -1.312 -2.17 ** -0.520 -1.63  0.120 1.64  
Estimated probability of withdrawal 3.398 1.94 * 0.579 0.82  0.322 0.54  0.037 0.31  
Withdrawal-averting effort (prediction error) -0.953 -0.63  1.051 2.13 ** 0.543 1.90 * -0.051 -0.76  
Bank’s overall IPO performance in two years 
Mean abnormal first-day initial return -14.165 -3.50 *** -6.931 -4.60 *** -1.337 -1.03  1.503 2.39 ** 
Min. abnormal first-day initial return 3.508 2.25 ** 1.391 2.35 ** 0.911 1.78 * -0.901 -2.30 ** 
Max. abnormal first-day initial return 0.829 2.82 ** 0.507 4.62 *** 0.270 2.49 ** -0.569 -2.22 ** 
Mean abnormal spread 0.740 0.18  -2.322 -1.80 * -0.682 -0.91  0.259 1.58  
Min. abnormal spread 0.348 0.53  -0.063 -0.18  0.045 0.20  -0.153 -1.63  
Max. abnormal spread 2.166 2.86 ** 1.138 2.27 ** 0.112 0.24  -0.102 -1.38  
Mean one-year excess return 5.481 3.81 *** 1.567 2.79 ** 1.220 4.21 *** 0.357 2.91 ** 
Min. one-year excess return -2.027 -1.33  0.176 0.37  -0.469 -1.59  -0.142 -1.86 * 
Max. one-year excess return -0.038 -0.51  0.007 0.16  -0.060 -1.87 * -0.163 -3.18 ** 
Percentage of withdrawals 0.040 0.90  0.007 0.55  -0.001 -0.23  -0.002 -1.28  
Business industry concentration 3.759 1.14  0.052 0.05  0.168 0.45  -0.126 -1.32  
Bank’s performance changes over two years 
Change of mean abnormal first- day return 10.208 4.49 *** 3.789 3.67 *** 1.565 1.57  -0.813 -1.93 * 
Change of min. abnormal first-day return -1.500 -1.34  -0.713 -1.31  -1.329 -3.16 ** 0.432 1.92 * 
Change of max. abnormal first-day return -0.490 -2.25 ** -0.130 -1.59  -0.172 -1.84 * 0.323 1.48  
Change of mean abnormal spread -4.909 -1.16  -0.434 -0.44  -1.359 -2.09 ** 0.126 0.83  
Change of min. abnormal spread -1.060 -1.82 * -0.596 -2.36 ** -0.053 -0.25  0.007 0.09  
Change of max. abnormal spread 2.185 2.98 ** 2.080 5.06 *** 1.523 3.52 *** 0.081 1.84 * 
Change of withdrawn percentage -0.040 -1.74 * 0.027 3.19 ** 0.012 2.90 ** 0.002 1.47  
Change of industry concentration 6.575 2.61 ** 4.861 6.25 *** 1.043 3.57 *** -0.168 -2.15 ** 
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.132 0.071 0.103 
Number of observations 416 1324 1340 412 
Alternative models: 
Withdrawn probability, withdrawals only 5.829 2.61 ** 2.897 2.65 ** 1.212 1.32  -0.024 -0.14  
Withdrawn probability, completed offerings -2.502 -0.44  -0.390 -0.28  0.441 0.57  -0.013 -0.11  
Withdrawal dummy -0.968 -0.73  -1.873 -2.95 ** -0.731 -1.93 * 0.054 0.73  
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3.4.3.  Withdrawal, Overpricing, and Aftermarket Price 
Support 
To measure the relative effects of withdrawal and overpricing on underwriter 
market share change, with or without successful aftermarket price support, we define a 
set of dummy variables to identify the offerings. Differing from earlier researchers, we 
argue that a negative first-day initial return represents the extent of aftermarket price 
support instead of overpricing. The huge trading volume on the first day and the 
corresponding flipping volume show that the first day trading is crucial in reflecting an 
underwriter’s aftermarket price support.45 In addition, Barry and Jennings (1993) and 
Schultz and Zaman (1994) documented that the first-trade price captures most of the 
initial returns (robust for their cold IPO subsample), which suggests that aftermarket 
price support intention of the bank is consistent during the first trading day and that the 
aftermarket price support, like underpricing, benefits mainly the subscriber investors.46 
Specifically, we define a first-day initial return higher than -1% as a proxy for successful 
aftermarket price support, allowing room for the bid-ask spread because the underwriter 
can stabilize the stock only at or below the offer price.47 Assuming that the effect of 
aftermarket price support fades out in the days after the first trading day, we measure the 
overpricing of offerings with excess returns three days prior to the end of the quiet period 
                                                 
45 Aggarwal (2000; 2003) and Ellis et al. (2000; 2002) document the enormous trading volume on the first 
day or two following an IPO, which equalled over 70% of the shares sold in the offering. Aggarwal (2003) 
shows that the flipping volume accounts for only 15% of the shares sold in the offering. Krigman, Shaw 
and Womack (1999) find that flipping accounts for 45% of the trading volume for cold IPOs, and Ellis 
(2006) find that the trading volume in cold IPOs comprises mostly flipping trades and interdealer trades. 
46Aggarwal and Conroy (2000) find that the first trade and the first bid quote during preopening for weak 
IPOs occur at the offer price, and Corwin, Harris and Lipson (2004) document an average bid-ask spread of 
4.3% for 5,000-share trades and 9.1% for 10,000-share trades on day 1. 
47 Changing the -1% room for the bid-ask spread to -2% or -0.5% does not affect our main results. 
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(PEQ), which is calculated as the closing price divided by the offer price and then minus 
the NASDAQ composite index of the day divided by the same index on the offering date.  
We define a set of dummy variables: Overpricing dummy, which equals one for 
offerings with negative excess return three days PEQ, and zero otherwise; Successful 
first-day aftermarket price support dummy, equalling one for offerings with first-day 
initial return no less than -1%, and zero otherwise; Overpricing with successful price 
support dummy, which is the interaction of the overpricing dummy and the successful 
first-day aftermarket price support dummy; Overpricing without successful price support 
dummy, which is the interaction of the overpricing dummy and one minus the successful 
first-day aftermarket price support dummy; and Dummy of withdrawal or overpricing 
without successful first-day support, which is the sum of the withdrawal dummy and the 
dummy for overpricing without successful price support. 
Table 3.6 reports our regressive results comparing the different effects of 
withdrawal, overpricing, and aftermarket price support on the corresponding 
underwriter’s future market share change. The number in parentheses after the name of 
the dummy variable is the number of observations where that dummy equal to one. 
Among the 3,492 offerings in our sample, there are 430 withdrawals. Holding stocks of 
the 3,062 successful IPOs at the offer price to three days prior to the end of the quiet 
period, the investors gain negative excess returns from 900 of them. Among these 900 
overpriced offerings, the first-day prices of 556 were successfully supported as defined, 
while the remaining 334 were not. Overall, the first-day initial returns of 2,621 successful 
offerings were above -1% and these offerings are either underpriced or overpriced with 
successful aftermarket price support. 
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We compare the effects on the underwriter market share change for withdrawals, 
overpriced offerings, and underpriced offerings in Model 1 by introducing the 
Withdrawal dummy and the Overpricing dummy. The coefficient of the withdrawal 
dummy is significantly negative (t-stat -3.79) and that of the overpricing dummy is 
insignificantly positive (t-stat 0.24). While the withdrawal of an offering significantly 
weakens the corresponding underwriter’s ability to compete for future business, the 
overpriced result does not generate a significantly weakening effect on the banks’ market 
share change, in comparison to the effect of the underpriced offerings. Overpricing beats 
withdrawal in its effect on the corresponding underwriter future market share. 
Models 2, 3, and 4 divide the overpriced offerings into groups with or without 
successful first-day aftermarket price support by introducing the Successful price support 
dummy. In model 2, the effect (on underwriter market share) of the overpriced offerings 
with successful price support is significantly positive (t-stat 1.91), compared to that of the 
overpriced offerings without successful price support, while the latter is insignificantly 
weaker (t-stat -1.17) than that of the underpriced offerings. Model 3 provides a direct 
comparison between the overpriced offerings with successful price support and all other 
successful offerings. The effect of the former is insignificantly better, with t-stat 1.56, 
than that of the latter. Model 4 focuses on the offerings with successful price support and 
compares the effects (on underwriter market share) of overpriced and underpriced 
offerings, both with successful price support. The result shows that, while offerings with 
successful aftermarket price support in the first day generate a significantly more positive 
effect (t-stat 2.24) on the market share change than the other successful offerings, the 
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effect of overpriced offerings is even slightly more positive (t-stat 0.98) than the 
underpriced offerings within the same group. 
Finally, we compare the effect on underwriter market share of the overpriced 
offerings without successful price support to that of the withdrawals in Model 5 by 
grouping all these offerings together with the Withdrawal or overpricing w/o successful 
support dummy and examining the coefficient for Overpricing without successful price 
support dummy. The overpriced offerings, even without successful first-day aftermarket 
price support, show a significantly positive effect (t-stat 2.66) on the corresponding 
underwriter market share change when compared to the withdrawals. 
In summary, when comparing the effects on underwriter market share of different 
offering groups, we find that withdrawals have the worst effect, while overpriced 
offerings, accompanied by even a low level of price support during the first-day trading, 
generate a significant improvement on the corresponding banks’ future IPO market share. 
Overpriced offerings with successful first-day aftermarket price support are significantly 
better than those without such support. Although finding no significant difference 
between the effect of overpriced offerings and that of underpriced offerings, we observe a 
weak improvement on the underwriter market share for overpriced offerings with 
successful price support over the effect for other successful offerings. These results are 
consistent with the argument that, due to the cost related to aftermarket price support and 
the necessary investor resources to temporarily pump up premarket demand, overpricing 
can be only used as a withdrawal-averting tactic to improve the bank’s future market 
share.   
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Table 3.6: Withdrawal, overpricing, and aftermarket price support. 
The overpricing dummy equals one if the NASDAQ-adjusted PEQ excess return is negative, and zero otherwise. The successful aftermarket price 
support dummy equals one if the NASDAQ-adjusted first-day initial return is larger than -1%, and zero otherwise. The overpricing with or without 
successful price support dummy is the interaction of the overpricing dummy and one minus the successful price support dummy.  
Independent variable:  
Underwriter IPO Market Share Change 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat Coefficient - t-stat 
Intercept -1.089 -3.89 *** -1.103 -3.95 *** -1.128 -4.04 *** -1.514 -4.57 *** -1.059 -3.80 *** 
Estimated probability of withdrawal -0.117 -0.18  -0.087 -0.13  -0.132 -0.20  -0.036 -0.06  -0.058 -0.09  
Estimated probability of withdrawal, withdrawals only  2.447 2.60 ** 2.422 2.58 ** 2.463 2.62 ** 2.375 2.53 ** 2.394 2.55 ** 
Withdrawal dummy (430) -1.314 -3.79 *** -1.312 -3.78 *** -1.278 -3.70 *** -0.905 -2.36 **    
Overpricing dummy (900) 0.035 0.24  -0.258 -1.17           
Successful aftermarket price support dummy (2621)          0.447 2.24 **    
Overpricing with successful price support dummy (556)    0.469 1.91 * 0.251 1.56  0.164 0.98     
Overpricing without successful price support dummy (344)             1.049 2.66 ** 
Withdrawal or overpricing w/o successful support (774)             -1.356 -3.95 *** 
Bank’s overall IPO performance in two years 
Mean abnormal first-day initial return -3.797 -5.20 *** -3.843 -5.25 *** -3.768 -5.20 *** -3.920 -5.35 *** -3.893 -5.34 *** 
Min. abnormal first-day initial return 1.588 4.25 *** 1.566 4.20 *** 1.577 4.23 *** 1.558 4.19 *** 1.574 4.22 *** 
Max. abnormal first-day initial return 0.477 6.42 *** 0.476 6.41 *** 0.477 6.41 *** 0.476 6.41 *** 0.476 6.41 *** 
Mean abnormal spread -0.981 -2.40 ** -0.959 -2.35 ** -0.965 -2.37 ** -0.954 -2.34 ** -0.972 -2.39 ** 
Min. abnormal spread 0.029 0.17  0.018 0.10  0.024 0.14  0.011 0.07  0.020 0.12  
Max. abnormal spread 0.891 3.56 *** 0.891 3.56 *** 0.887 3.55 *** 0.895 3.59 *** 0.896 3.59 *** 
Mean one-year excess return 0.866 3.77 *** 0.864 3.76 *** 0.882 3.85 *** 0.847 3.69 *** 0.843 3.67 *** 
Min. one-year excess return -0.194 -0.87  -0.190 -0.85  -0.194 -0.87  -0.180 -0.81  -0.188 -0.84  
Max. one-year excess return 0.008 0.34  0.008 0.32  0.008 0.32  0.008 0.32  0.008 0.34  
Percentage of withdrawals 0.007 1.38  0.007 1.30  0.007 1.34  0.007 1.30  0.007 1.33  
Business industry concentration 1.109 3.67 *** 1.131 3.74 *** 1.117 3.70 *** 1.141 3.77 *** 1.128 3.73 *** 
Bank’s performance changes over two years 
Change of mean abnormal first-day return 3.008 4.59 *** 3.007 4.59 *** 3.006 4.58 *** 2.993 4.57 *** 3.009 4.60 *** 
Change of min. abnormal first-day return -0.820 -2.43 ** -0.823 -2.44 ** -0.816 -2.42 ** -0.828 -2.46 ** -0.828 -2.46 ** 
Change of max. abnormal first-day return -0.169 -2.93 ** -0.171 -2.95 ** -0.171 -2.96 ** -0.169 -2.92 ** -0.169 -2.93 ** 
Change of mean abnormal spread -1.131 -3.28 ** -1.153 -3.36 *** -1.127 -3.27 ** -1.152 -3.35 *** -1.165 -3.39 *** 
Change of min. abnormal spread -0.368 -2.47 ** -0.368 -2.47 ** -0.370 -2.48 ** -0.366 -2.46 ** -0.366 -2.45 ** 
Change of max. abnormal spread 1.720 7.55 *** 1.724 7.57 *** 1.720 7.55 *** 1.722 7.57 *** 1.725 7.58 *** 
Change of withdrawn percentage 0.016 3.97 *** 0.016 3.97 *** 0.016 3.93 *** 0.016 3.99 *** 0.016 4.00 *** 
Change of industry concentration 2.591 8.93 *** 2.586 8.90 *** 2.585 8.91 *** 2.583 8.89 *** 2.591 8.91 *** 
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.089 0.088 
Number of observations 3492 3492 3492 3492 3492 
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3.5.  Summary 
This chapter examines the impact of individual offering performances on the 
corresponding underwriter’s future market share change. If the withdrawal or completion 
of an offering is the result of the equilibrium matching (Fernando et al. 2005) between the 
banks and the issuers before the bookbuilding procedure plus a random effect during the 
offering, and if the market reacts efficiently to the revealed information in the offering, 
there should be no predictable shift in the underwriter’s IPO market share based on the 
withdrawal/completion outcome. The extant literature, such as Dunbar (2000), however, 
documents a strong correlation between underwriter market share and association with 
earlier withdrawals. We estimate the withdrawal probability for all offerings using a 
probit model and use this estimation to represent the ex ante matching result which can 
be interpreted as the bank’s withdrawal-screening effect. We then measure the bank’s 
withdrawal-averting effort by the prediction error in the above-mentioned estimation. We 
test whether withdrawal-averting effort contributes to a larger future market share. This 
would be in line with the underwriter’s selective overpricing strategy to avert potential 
withdrawals, which is a tactic unpredicted in the probit model. A predictable 
improvement in subsequent IPO market share reflects the market’s realization of the 
bank’s withdrawal-averting effort as implicated in the observed offering result. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, we determine that market reaction to the 
withdrawal-averting effort should be significant, whereas no evidence should be found 
for the effect of withdrawal screening on underwriter market share change. Consequently, 
future market share increases more for banks that manage to avert offerings from highly 
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probable withdrawals. We control for the overall performances of IPOs underwritten by 
the same bank before and after the current offering as well as the changes in these 
performances, such as the short-term and long-term returns of successful offerings, the 
spread charged, the business industry concentrations, and so on. The result is robust in 
our additional tests separating the sample periods into 1996-2000 and 2001-2007. It is 
also robust to IPOs underwritten by the large banks and the majority of IPOs except for 
those extremely large or small ones.  
The direct comparisons of the market share changes among offerings that were 
withdrawn, overpriced, and with or without successful first-day aftermarket price support 
show that withdrawal is the worst outcome for underwriters willing to improve their 
future market shares. Overpriced offerings, even with less price support in the first day of 
trading, significantly relieve the corresponding underwriters from the potential of a 
severe dip in market shares, which is commonly associated with withdrawals. 
The implication of our evidence is that withdrawal-averting effort is a plausible 
explanation for underwriter market share changes. Also, banks would be better off by 
employing a selective overpricing tactic with issuers of high withdrawal possibility, and 
would benefit from the increase in future market share when the market eventually 
recognizes the bank’s capability to avert withdrawals.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4   Strategic Overpricing: an Extension of IPO 
Bookbuilding Theory 
In this chapter, we extend the IPO bookbuilding theory by developing a model 
which encompasses the potential for IPO withdrawal, overpricing and aftermarket price 
support altogether, and solving for the equilibrium offer-price-maximizing 
price/allocation schedule.  
4.1.  Notations 
We employ an information structure laid out in Welch (1992), adapt it to the 
model of bookbuilding mechanism presented in Benveniste and Spindt (1989), and 
introduce the reservation price constraint postulated in Brisley and Busaba (2007) and the 
price stabilization as a bonding mechanism demonstrated in Benveniste et al. (1996). The 
issuing firm wishes to sell a certain fraction of ownership in the form of 𝑄 shares. There 
are 𝐻  risk neutral investors, each willing to buy at most one share. Technically, we 
set 𝐻 > 𝑄 , so that there are enough investors to soak up the offering. 
It is common knowledge that the per-share aftermarket value ,𝑉,  is uniformly 
distributed on a normalized interval, 𝑉~𝑈[0,1], and the issuer’s reservation value is 𝑉𝑅.48 
Each investor observes a private signal that is independently drawn from a Bernoulli 
variable, {𝐿,𝑈}, on the value, 𝑉, where 𝐿 and 𝑈  represent the lower and upper signals 
respectively. Thus the investors’ information and the actual aftermarket value per share 
                                                 
48 The issuer has no preference on issue/withdrawal when the offering is priced at 𝑉𝑅. We define the 
reservation price as the maximum price at which the issuer is committed to withdrawal. The bank needs to 
price an offering above the reservation price to guarantee the success of the offering. The price difference is 
required to incentive the issuer’s truth-telling in our model. We will discuss it later.  
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are correlated in a natural style: the probability that any one investor observes 𝑈 is 𝑉. 
Given the number, ℎ ∈ {0,1, … ,𝐻}, of 𝑈 signal in 𝐻 investors, the expected value of 𝑉, 
by Bayes’ rule, is 
𝑉ℎ ≡ 𝐸(𝑉|ℎ,𝐻) = ℎ + 1𝐻 + 2, (10)  
Proof: See Welch (1992), Lemma 1, page 699. 
The ex ante probability of realizing any particular demand state, ℎ, is 𝜋ℎ = 1𝐻+1, 
and, conditional on observing 𝑈 signal, an investor believes that the probability of ℎ of 
other 𝐻 − 1  investors have received a 𝑈  signal is 𝜋ℎ′ = 2(ℎ+1)𝐻(𝐻+1)  (see Benveniste and 
Busaba (1997) page 388). 
4.2.  A Review of IPO Pricing and Allocation without 
Overpricing 
4.2.1.  Unbinding Reservation Price – a Standard Solution 
without Withdrawal 
We first review the classic problem of IPO pricing and allocation (Benveniste and 
Spindt 1989) where the possibility of withdrawal is not considered and the reservation 
price is presumably unbinding. That is, 𝑉𝑅 < 𝑉0, as the reservation price is less than the 
lower boundary of the per-share value interval. The underwriter, in this case, does not 
need to worry about the potential withdrawal by the issuer. A standard solution is 
provided by Benveniste and Busaba (1997). 
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The banker’s objective is to  
max
�𝑃ℎ,𝑞𝑈,ℎ,𝑞𝐿,ℎ� 𝑠𝑄�𝜋ℎ𝑃ℎ
𝐻
ℎ=0
, (11)  
subject to the investors’ incentive-compatibility constraint 
�𝜋ℎ
′ (𝑉ℎ+1 − 𝑃ℎ+1)𝑞𝑈,ℎ+1 ≥𝐻−1
ℎ=0
� 𝜋ℎ
′ (𝑉ℎ+1 − 𝑃ℎ)𝑞𝐿,ℎ𝐻−1
ℎ=0
,  (12)  
the investor-rationality condition 
0 ≤ 𝑃ℎ ≤ 𝑉ℎ , ∀ℎ ∈ {0,1, … ,𝐻},  (13)  
and the full-subscription constraints 
�
0 ≤ 𝑞𝐿,ℎ ≤ 10 ≤ 𝑞𝑈,ℎ ≤ 1
ℎ𝑞𝑈,ℎ + (𝐻 − ℎ)𝑞𝐿,ℎ = 𝑄  , ∀ℎ ∈ {0,1, … ,𝐻}, (14)  
Lemma 1: (Benveniste and Busaba, 1997, Theorem 2, page 392) A price/allocation 
schedule that solves the banker’s optimization problem without withdrawal concern 
is:  
�𝑷𝒉
∗ ,𝒒𝑼,𝒉∗ ,𝒒𝑳,𝒉∗ � = ��𝑽𝒉 − 𝒖𝒉,𝑸𝒉 ,𝟎� , 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉 > 𝑸
�𝑽𝒉,𝟏,𝑸 − 𝒉𝑯− 𝒉� , 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉 ≤ 𝑸 , (15)  
where 𝒖𝒉  is an underpricing pattern across strong demand states, 𝒉 ≥ 𝑸,  which 
ensures that the investors’ incentive compatibility is satisfied with equality.  
From the firm’s point of view, the total ex ante expected underpricing cost is 
𝑸 � 𝝅𝒉𝒖𝒉
𝑯
𝒉=𝑸+𝟏
= 𝜶𝑯
𝟐
�𝝅𝒉
′ (𝑸 − 𝒉)
𝑯− 𝒉
𝑸
𝒉=𝟎
, (16)  
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where 𝜶 ≡ 𝑽𝒉 − 𝑽𝒉−𝟏 = 𝟏𝑯+𝟐 is the marginal value of investor signal. 
Proof: See Benveniste and Busaba (1997), Theorem 2, page 392. 
4.2.2.  Binding Reservation Price – a Solution Truncated by 
Withdrawal 
We now consider the cases where the reservation price is higher than the lower 
boundary of the per-share value interval,𝑉0 ≤ 𝑉𝑅. Here, the issuer reservation price is 
binding. It is well known that the issuer will withdraw the offering if the proposed offer 
price is no more than the reservation price,𝑃ℎ ≤ 𝑉𝑅. Brisley and Busaba (2007) provide 
an amended solution consolidating the issuer reservation price constraint. We duplicate 
their solution first and then extend the model by introducing underwriter aftermarket 
price support commitment as a price subsidy.  
The banker’s objective is to  
max
�𝑃ℎ,𝑞𝑈,ℎ,𝑞𝐿,ℎ� 𝑠𝑄 � 𝜋ℎ𝑃ℎ
𝐻
ℎ=𝑅+1
, (17)  
subject to the investors’ incentive compatibility constraint 
�𝜋ℎ
′ (𝑉ℎ+1 − 𝑃ℎ+1)𝑞𝑈,ℎ+1 ≥𝐻−1
ℎ=𝑅
� 𝜋ℎ
′ (𝑉ℎ+1 − 𝑃ℎ)𝑞𝐿,ℎ𝐻−1
ℎ=𝑅+1
,  (18)  
the investor-rationality condition 
𝑉𝑅 ≤ 𝑃ℎ ≤ 𝑉ℎ, ∀ℎ ∈ {0,1, … ,𝐻},  (19)  
and the full-subscription constraints, showed as equations (14). 
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Lemma 2: (Brisley and Busaba, 2007, Lemmar2, page 702) A price/allocation 
schedule that solves the banker’s optimization problem truncated by withdrawal is:  
�𝑷𝒉
∗ ,𝒒𝑼,𝒉∗ ,𝒒𝑳,𝒉∗ � = ��𝑽𝒉 − 𝒖𝒉,𝑸𝒉 ,𝟎� , 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑸 < 𝒉 ≤ 𝑯
�𝑽𝒉,𝟏,𝑸 − 𝒉𝑯− 𝒉� ,            𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹 < 𝒉 ≤ 𝑸, (20)  
where 𝒖𝒉 is such that (21) is satisfied with equality.  
From the firm’s point of view, total ex ante expected underpricing is 
𝑸 � 𝝅𝒉𝒖𝒉
𝑯
𝒉=𝑸+𝟏
= 𝜶𝑯
𝟐
� 𝝅𝒉
′ (𝑸 − 𝒉)
𝑯− 𝒉
𝑸
𝒉=𝑹+𝟏
, (21)  
where 𝜶 ≡ 𝑽𝒉 − 𝑽𝒉−𝟏 = 𝟏𝑯+𝟐 is the marginal value of investor signal. 
Proof: See Brisley and Busaba (2007), Lemma 2, page 702. 
4.2.3.  Price Stabilization as a Bonding Mechanism 
The classic theories of IPO bookbuilding assume that an underwriter will credibly 
convey the outcome of the roadshows to interested investors prior to the pricing and 
allocation of the issue, ignoring the underwriter’s incentive to overstate the premarket 
interest. Benveniste et al. (1996) provided a theoretical model as a complement, 
ascertaining that the underwriter has the incentive to overstate premarket interest, but 
such incentive is eliminated by the implicit commitment of price support, which acts as a 
bonding mechanism. The economic rationale behind the bonding mechanism is that the 
implicit commitment of stabilization “ensures that the underwriter captures only a small 
fraction of any proposed increase in the offer price, but bears the full marginal cost of 
providing price supporting in the secondary market.” Furthermore, the penalty bid 
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provisions make sure that the underwriter price stabilization commitment is distributed 
discriminatorily to the informed investor only, so that such commitment will not weaken 
the investors’ truth-telling incentive in the bookbuilding.  
However, the model does not consider the possibility of issuer withdrawal and, 
thus, is not applicable in examining an underwriter’s pricing behavior when faced with 
likely withdrawal. We extend the extant theory by taking into account of the potential 
withdrawal factor and provide an optimal solution in the next section. 
4.3.  An Extension of IPO Pricing and Allocation with 
Deliberate Overpricing 
4.3.1.  Binding Reservation Price, with Underwriter Price 
Subsidy 
As the underwriter commits to support the stock price in the aftermarket, the 
investors believe that the reputable bank will buy back the stocks of the offering, even if 
overpriced, at the offer price, as long as the corresponding cost does not exceed the 
bank’s expected limitation, e.g., underwriting commissions received by the bank. This 
can be interpreted as a price subsidy policy to the investors who bid for an overpriced 
offering. 
Let 𝜔ℎ denote the price subsidy at state ℎ and 𝜔� denote the maximum amount of 
subsidy binding the bank in all demand states.  
𝜔ℎ ≤ 𝜔�, ∀ℎ ∈ {0,1, … ,𝐻}, (22)  
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The issuer will withdraw an offering if the offer price is no higher than the 
reservation price, and the investors refuse to bid an offer with negative payoff in 
equilibrium. When premarket demand is insufficient to support the reservation price, 
overpricing (to an offer price no less than the reservation price) is necessary to complete 
the offering. Simultaneously, the subsidy scheme to cover the overpricing is fulfilled so 
that the investor-rationality condition is satisfied as following,  
𝑉𝑅+1 ≤ 𝑃ℎ ≤ 𝑉ℎ + 𝜔ℎ, ∀ℎ ∈ {0,1, … ,𝐻}, (23)  
Define  ℎ ≡ {ℎ|𝑉𝑅+1 = 𝑃ℎ = 𝑉ℎ + 𝜔�}  as the specific demand state that the 
investor-rationality condition is satisfied with equality at the maximum price subsidy. ℎ is 
thus the minimum demand state that an offering can be completed, and the objective 
function of the underwriter and the corresponding constraints are amended as following. 
The banker’s objective is to  
max
�𝑃ℎ,𝑞𝑈,ℎ,𝑞𝐿,ℎ,𝜔ℎ� 𝑠𝑄�𝜋ℎ𝑃ℎ
𝐻
ℎ=ℎ
− 𝑄�𝜋ℎ𝜔ℎ
𝐻
ℎ=ℎ
, (24)  
subject to the investors’ incentive compatibility constraint 
� 𝜋ℎ
′ (𝑉ℎ+1 + 𝜔ℎ+1 − 𝑃ℎ+1)𝑞𝑈,ℎ+1 ≥𝐻−1
ℎ=ℎ−1
� 𝜋ℎ
′ (𝑉ℎ+1 + 𝜔ℎ − 𝑃ℎ)𝑞𝐿,ℎ𝐻−1
ℎ=ℎ
,  (25)  
and the allocation constraints, shown as equation (14), the underwriter subsidization 
constraint of equation (22) as well as the investor-rationality condition of equation (19)  
Lemma 3: A price/allocation/subsidy schedule that solves the banker’s optimization 
problem is:  
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�𝑷𝒉
∗ ,𝒒𝑼,𝒉∗ ,𝒒𝑳,𝒉∗ ,𝝎𝒉∗ � =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ �𝑽𝒉 − 𝒖𝒉, 𝑸𝒉 ,𝟎,𝟎� ,         𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑸 < 𝒉 ≤ 𝑯
�𝑽𝒉,𝟏, 𝑸−𝒉𝑯−𝒉 ,𝟎� ,               𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹 < 𝒉 ≤ 𝑸
�𝑽𝑹+𝟏,𝟏, 𝑸−𝒉𝑯−𝒉 ,𝑽𝑹+𝟏 − 𝑽𝒉� ,   𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉 ≤ 𝒉 ≤ 𝑹 , (26)  
where 𝒉 ≡ {𝒉|𝑽𝒉 = 𝑽𝑹+𝟏 − 𝝎�}  and 𝒖𝒉 is such that (27) is satisfied with equality.  
From the firm’s point of view, total ex ante expected underpricing is 
𝑸 � 𝝅𝒉𝒖𝒉
𝑯
𝒉=𝑸+𝟏
= 𝜶𝑯
𝟐
�𝝅𝒉
′ (𝑸 − 𝒉)
𝑯− 𝒉
𝑸
𝒉=𝒉
, (27)  
where 𝜶 ≡ 𝑽𝒉 − 𝑽𝒉−𝟏 = 𝟏𝑯+𝟐 is the marginal value of investor signal. 
[Proof] By definition  ℎ ≡ {ℎ|𝑉𝑅+1 = 𝑃ℎ = 𝑉ℎ + 𝜔�} , we have  𝑉ℎ = 𝑉𝑅+1 + 𝜔� . 
Defining 𝑃ℎ′ ≡ 𝑃ℎ − 𝜔ℎ, we transfer the current question to the same question in 4.2.2 by 
mapping {𝑃ℎ′ ,𝑉ℎ,ℎ} to {𝑃ℎ,𝑉𝑅′+1,𝑅′ + 1} of 4.2.2, given 𝜔ℎ∗ . An equivalent solution from 
4.2.2 is: 
�𝑃ℎ
∗ − 𝜔ℎ
∗ , 𝑞𝑈,ℎ∗ , 𝑞𝐿,ℎ∗ � = ��𝑉ℎ − 𝑢ℎ,𝑄ℎ , 0� , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑄 ≤ ℎ ≤ 𝐻
�𝑉ℎ, 1,𝑄 − ℎ𝐻 − ℎ� ,            𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ ≤ ℎ < 𝑄 , (28)  
There is no need to provide subsidies in states that satisfy ℎ ≥ 𝑅 + 1. When ℎ ≤ 𝑅, the 
bank prices the offering at 𝑉𝑅+1  to satisfy the issuer reservation price constraint, and 
provide subsidy to the investors. An optimal subsidy plan is 
𝜔ℎ
∗ = �𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝑉ℎ, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ℎ ≤ ℎ ≤ 𝑅0,              𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 . (29)  
We get the result by combining (28) and (29).    Q.E.D. 
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As we discussed in section 2.2.1, an underwriter is willing to use at most all the 
underwriting commission fees and the expected indirect profit from the offering 
completion to subsidize the investors. Let 𝑠  denote the underwriting spread and 𝐸[𝛿] 
denote the expected indirect profit from the success of the offering, for example, the 
profit from the market making of the offering and the expected future business such as 
the SEO of the same issuer and/or a subsequent stream of IPOs in the same industry, we 
have: 
𝜔� = 𝑠𝑉𝑅+1 + 𝐸[𝛿]. (30)  
Equivalently, the minimum demand state under which the bank is willing to 
overprice and complete the offering is  
ℎ ≡ {ℎ|𝑉ℎ = (1 − 𝑠)𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝐸[𝛿] }. (31)  
4.3.2.  Binding Reservation Price, with Aftermarket Price 
Support Commitment in the Form of a Put Option 
In the last section, we apply a general format of subsidy that an underwriter can 
provide to the investors, which is, in practice, the commitment of aftermarket price 
support. We now specify the commitment in the form of a put option and solve the 
solution of IPO pricing and allocation with a proportion of put option allocated to each 
share offered.   
The total amount of put option is a proportion, 𝑟ℎ ∈ (0,1], of the amount, 𝑄, of the 
shares to be offered. The put option is discriminatorily distributed per share to the 
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uninformed investors with 𝑟𝐿,ℎ and informed investors with 𝑟𝑈,ℎ. Thus, 𝑟ℎ is the average 
of 𝑟𝐿,ℎ and 𝑟𝑈,ℎ weighted by offer allocations.  
First, we claim that, by overpricing weakly demanded offerings at 𝑃ℎ = 𝑉𝑅+1, an 
underwriter can extend the completion of offerings to certain demand states,  𝑉ℎ ∈[𝑉ℎ∗ ,𝑉𝑅], without changing the mechanism that works in the strong demand states. 
We use 𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ) to denote the value of the put option with strike price 𝑃ℎ and 
stock price  𝑉ℎ , thus, we have  𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑃ℎ > 0, 𝜕2𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑃ℎ2 > 0,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑉ℎ ∈ [−1,0). The underwriter 
payoff is: 
Π𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 = �𝑠𝑃ℎ − 𝑟ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ) , 𝑃ℎ ≥ 𝑉𝑅+10                                   ,         𝑃ℎ < 𝑉𝑅+1  (32)  
Based on Benveniste et al. (1996), the marginal payoff constraint to bond the 
underwriter against overstating premarket demand can be written as: 
𝜕Π𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
𝜕𝑃ℎ
|𝑃ℎ=𝑉ℎ = 𝑠 − 𝑟ℎ 𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑃ℎ |𝑃ℎ=𝑉ℎ ≤ 0 (33)  
The amount of put options required can be written as, 
𝑟ℎ ≥
𝑠
𝑃𝑢𝑡
′ ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑢𝑡′ ≡ 𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑃ℎ |𝑃ℎ=𝑉ℎ (34)  
The negative marginal payoff shows that an increase in the offer price will 
decrease the underwriter payoff. Since 𝜕2Π𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
𝜕𝑃ℎ
2 = −𝑟ℎ 𝜕2𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑃ℎ2 < 0, 𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ)𝜕𝑃ℎ  is maximized 
at 𝑃ℎ = 𝑉ℎ  for all 𝑃ℎ ≥ 𝑉ℎ , given 𝑉ℎ . The constraint of equation (33) shows that it is 
never optimal for an underwriter to set the offer price above the true price, if the offering 
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can be priced at its true price, since the marginal payoff will be negative for all 
overpriced offerings.49 
However, it is not always the case that the offering can be priced at its true price. 
In a lukewarmly received offering where the true price is lower than the issuer’s 
reservation price, 𝑉ℎ < 𝑉𝑅+1, overpricing is required to complete the offering. Under this 
circumstance, the marginal payoff constraint of equation (34) binds the underwriter to 
overprice the offering above 𝑉𝑅+1, the lowest required price, since the marginal payoff 
at 𝑃ℎ = 𝑉𝑅+1 > 𝑉ℎ is negative. 
We now turn to the participation constraints (PCs), a.k.a. the rationality constraints, 
for all parties, 
𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟:                                                   𝑃ℎ ≥ 𝑉𝑅+1 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠:                       𝛱𝑈 ≡ 𝑉ℎ − 𝑃ℎ + 𝑟𝑈,ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ) ≥ 0 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠:                 𝛱𝐿 ≡ 𝑉ℎ − 𝑃ℎ + 𝑟𝐿,ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ) ≥ 0 
𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟:                             Π𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 ≡ 𝑠𝑃ℎ − 𝑟ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑃ℎ,𝑉ℎ) + 𝐸[𝛿] > 0 (35)  
The issuer’s PC in equation (35) is always satisfied as long as the offering is 
priced at or above 𝑉𝑅+1. The investors’ and the underwriter’s PCs are satisfied for non-
overpriced offerings by default. If we consider the overpricing cases where 𝑃ℎ = 𝑉𝑅+1 >
𝑉ℎ, the participation constraints of equation (34) can be satisfied with 𝑟ℎ if it satisfies 
𝑉ℎ − 𝑉𝑅+1 + 𝑟ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ) ≥ 0 
𝑠𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝑟ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ) + 𝐸[𝛿] ≥ 0 (36)  
From equation (34), we have 𝑉ℎ ≥ 𝑉ℎ  ≡ (1 − 𝑠)𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝐸[𝛿], and the combined 
form of equation 34 and 36 is: 
                                                 
49 On the other side, the marginal payoff can be positive for some underpriced offerings. In that case, the 
underwriter has the incentive to increase the offer price (decrease the underpricing), which is bound by the 
information revealing mechanism (i.e. the investors’ incentive compatibility of truth-telling) that requires 
underpricing. 
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𝑠𝑉𝑅+1 + 𝐸[𝛿]
𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ) ≥ 𝑟ℎ ≥ 𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝑉ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ) 
𝑟ℎ ≥
𝑠
𝑃𝑢𝑡
′ ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑢𝑡′ ≡ 𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑃ℎ |𝑃ℎ=𝑉ℎ  (37)  
Setting  ?̅?ℎ∗ = max � 𝑠𝑃𝑢𝑡′ , 𝑉𝑅+1−𝑉ℎ𝑃𝑢𝑡�𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ��  satisfies the equation (37) for all  𝑉ℎ ∈[𝑉ℎ,𝑉𝑅+1), as we always have  𝑓(𝑉ℎ) ≡ 𝑠𝑉𝑅+1+𝐸[𝛿]𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ) > ?̅?ℎ∗ on 𝑉ℎ ∈ [𝑉ℎ,𝑉𝑅+1).50 
To conclude, we have: 
𝒓�𝒉
∗ = 𝐦𝐚𝐱� 𝒔
𝑷𝒖𝒕
′ , 𝑽𝑹+𝟏 − 𝑽𝒉𝑷𝒖𝒕�𝑽𝑹+𝟏,𝑽𝒉�� ,∀𝑽𝒉 ∈ [𝑽𝒉∗ ,𝑽𝑹+𝟏) 
𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝑽𝒉∗ = (𝟏 − 𝒔)𝑽𝑹+𝟏 − 𝑬[𝜹] 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑷𝒖𝒕′ ≡ 𝝏𝑷𝒖𝒕𝝏𝑷𝒉 |𝑷𝒉=𝑽𝒉 . (38)  
Proposition 1: Given the issuer’s reservation price, the underwriting spread, the 
expected stock price and its volatility, (𝑽𝑹, 𝒔,𝑽𝒉,𝝈),  assuming that underwriter 
aftermarket price support commitment has the value form of a put option, 
𝑷𝒖𝒕(𝑷𝒉,𝑽𝒉,𝝈), there exist a proper amount of put options and a certain the premarket 
demand states, (𝒓�𝒉∗ ,𝑽𝒉∗ ), as shown in equation (38), such that the underwriter can 
extend the completion of offerings in the weak demand states where 𝑽𝒉 ∈ [𝑽𝒉∗ ,𝑽𝑹] by 
overpricing the offering at 𝑷𝒉 = 𝑽𝑹+𝟏and providing investors with 𝒓�𝒉∗  put option per 
share in the form of aftermarket price support commitment. Such an arrangement is 
an equilibrium solution that satisfies the participation constraints for all parties and 
the underwriter marginal payoff constraint that bonds the underwriter against 
overstating the premarket interest in strong demand states. 
                                                 
50 𝑠𝑉𝑅+1+𝐸[𝛿]
𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ) > 𝑠𝑉𝑅+1𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ) > 𝑠𝑉𝑅+1𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉𝑅+1) > 𝑠𝑃𝑢𝑡′ . 
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When an issue is overpriced, the underwriter will provide the put option to 
compensate all allocated investors for participating the weakly demanded offering with 
𝑉𝑅+1−𝑉ℎ
𝑃𝑢𝑡�𝑉𝑅+1,𝑉ℎ� unit of option per share. The value of these options is equal to the overpricing 
in total. In addition, as we know that the minimum proportion of put option in total to 
prevent the underwriter from overpricing the strong demanded offerings is  𝑠
𝑃𝑢𝑡
′ , 
where 𝑃𝑢𝑡′ ≡ 𝜕𝑃𝑢𝑡𝜕𝑃ℎ |𝑃ℎ=𝑉ℎ. These two criteria jointly set the minimum bound of put options 
required. In practice, the penalty bid provisions provide the underwriter the 
discriminatory power to distribute the put options—in other words, to fulfill the price 
stabilization commitment—differently to informed and uninformed investors. The 
underwriter allocates the put options to all participating investors to compensate the 
deliberate but necessary overpricing and then allocates the rest, if the total value of these 
put options is insufficient to eliminate the underwriter incentive to unnecessarily 
overprice the offering (e.g. overprice strong demanded offerings), to the informed 
investors. As a result, the uninformed investors are compensated fully but only for the 
deliberate overpricing. The informed investors are allocated with more put options, if 
any, so that the total amount of put options will be sufficient as bonding mechanism 
against the underwriter overstating premarket demand unnecessarily. In this way, the 
distribution of the option will not weaken the truth-telling incentive of the investors—the 
informed investors cannot better-off from hiding their information. Thus, we can easily 
revise the solution in 4.3.1 accordingly.   
Lemma 4: A price/allocation/proportion-of-put-option schedule that solves the 
banker’s optimization problem is:  
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�𝑷𝒉
∗ ,𝒒𝑼,𝒉∗ ,𝒒𝑳,𝒉∗ , 𝒓𝑼,𝒉∗ , 𝒓𝑳,𝒉∗ � =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ �𝑽𝒉 − 𝒖𝒉, 𝑸𝒉 ,𝟎,𝟎,𝟎� ,         𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑸 < 𝒉 ≤ 𝑯
�𝑽𝒉,𝟏, 𝑸−𝒉𝑯−𝒉 , 𝒔𝑸𝒉𝑷𝒖𝒕′ ,𝟎� ,               𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝑹 < 𝒉 ≤ 𝑸
�𝑽𝑹+𝟏,𝟏, 𝑸−𝒉𝑯−𝒉 , 𝒓, 𝑽𝑹+𝟏−𝑽𝒉𝑷𝒖𝒕�𝑽𝑹+𝟏,𝑽𝒉�� ,   𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒉 ≤ 𝒉 ≤ 𝑹 , 
(39)  
𝒘𝒉𝒆𝒓𝒆 𝑷𝒖𝒕′ ≡ 𝝏𝑷𝒖𝒕𝝏𝑷𝒉 |𝑷𝒉=𝑽𝒉 , 𝒉 ≡ {𝒉|𝑽𝒉 = (𝟏 − 𝒔)𝑽𝑹+𝟏 − 𝑬[𝜹] }, 𝒓 ≡ 𝐦𝐚𝐱 � 𝒔𝑸𝒉𝑷𝒖𝒕′ −
(𝑸−𝒉)
𝒉
𝑽𝑹+𝟏−𝑽𝒉
𝑷𝒖𝒕�𝑽𝑹+𝟏,𝑽𝒉� , 𝑽𝑹+𝟏−𝑽𝒉𝑷𝒖𝒕�𝑽𝑹+𝟏,𝑽𝒉�� and 𝒖𝒉 is such that (40) is satisfied.  
From the firm’s point of view, total ex ante expected underpricing is 
𝑸 � 𝝅𝒉𝒖𝒉
𝑯
𝒉=𝑸+𝟏
= 𝜶𝑯
𝟐
�𝝅𝒉
′ (𝑸 − 𝒉)
𝑯− 𝒉
𝑸
𝒉=𝒉
− � 𝝅𝒉
𝒔𝑸
𝑷𝒖𝒕
′ 𝑷𝒖𝒕(𝑽𝒉,𝑽𝒉)𝑸
𝒉=𝑹+𝟏
−�𝝅𝒉𝑸𝑷𝒖𝒕(𝑽𝑹+𝟏,𝑽𝒉)𝒎𝒂𝒙�� 𝒔𝑷𝒑𝒖𝒕′ − (𝑽𝑹+𝟏 − 𝑽𝒉)𝑷𝒖𝒕(𝑽𝑹+𝟏,𝑽𝒉)� ,𝟎�𝑹𝒉=𝒉 , 
(40)  
where 𝜶 ≡ 𝑽𝒉 − 𝑽𝒉−𝟏 = 𝟏𝑯+𝟐 is the marginal value of investor signal. 
As stated by Benveniste et al. (1996), the penalty bid provision can limit the 
access to the stabilizing bid to informed investors. This discriminatory power warrants 
the efficient distribution of the put option among investors. An informed investor can not 
improve his/her payoff by hiding private information while still enjoying the put option 
value, since the put option provided to the uninformed investors can, but only, covers the 
deliberate overpricing. The put option, therefore, does not weaken the investors’ truth-
telling incentive.  
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The second part of the RHS of equation (39) is the expected value of put options 
the underwriter provides to the informed investors in net of the compensation for their 
participation in the weak demand states. With a minimum proportion of put option at 𝑠
𝑃𝑢𝑡
′  
committed for demand states ℎ ≤ 𝑄, this part prohibits the underwriter from overpricing 
the offering in the strong demand states, as stated by Benveniste et al. (1996), and 
reduces the expected underpricing required by the investors for their information 
revealing. The uninformed investors receive no gain or loss from the offering, no matter 
what premarket demand is.  
4.4.  Discussion and Prediction 
So far, we extend the theory model assuming that the issuer tells or signals the 
reservation price truthfully. We show now that the issuer has no incentive to overstate the 
reservation price to 𝑉𝑅′ > 𝑉𝑅.  
If the issuer overstates the reservation price to 𝑉𝑅′ , the corresponding minimum 
demand state will be ℎ′ ≡ {ℎ|𝑉ℎ = (1 − 𝑠)𝑉𝑅′+1 − 𝐸[𝛿]}. Given 𝐸[𝛿], we have 𝑅′ − 𝑅 =
ℎ′ − ℎ. The minimum demand state increases as the issuer overstating the reservation 
price. The overstatement can result withdrawals in states {ℎ|ℎ ≤ ℎ < ℎ′}, but reduce the 
expected underpricing (form equation 40) for the corresponding states with 
approximately �𝛼𝐻
2
∑ 𝜋ℎ
′ (𝑄−ℎ)
𝐻−ℎ
ℎ′−1
ℎ=ℎ − ∑ 𝜋ℎ
𝑠𝑄
𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑡
′ 𝑃𝑢𝑡(𝑉ℎ,𝑉ℎ)𝑅′ℎ=𝑅+1 �, and increase the offer 
price to 𝑉𝑅′+1 in states{ℎ|ℎ′ ≤ ℎ ≤ 𝑅′}. Hence, we make two comparisons: the additional 
proceeds in states where the offer price increases versus the loss of overpricing in states 
where the issuer withdraws; and the reduction of expected underpricing versus the forgo 
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surplus due to withdrawal. We consider the case  ℎ′ ≤ 𝑅 in the following discussion for 
simplicity. Overall, overstating the reservation price to a higher state makes the issuer 
worse-off.  
Claim 1: The issuer does not gain from increasing the offer price in states{ℎ|ℎ′ ≤ ℎ ≤
𝑅′}. 
It is intuitive that the shift of ℎ, the minimum demand state that an offering can be 
completed, does not change the expected price subsidy in aggregation since the price 
subsidy sticks to the overpricing required but not the states. The extra proceeds from the 
increase of the offer price in states {ℎ|ℎ′ ≤ ℎ ≤ 𝑅′} is no more than the loss of the 
overpriced portion of proceeds in the withdrawn states {ℎ|ℎ ≤ ℎ < ℎ′}. 
The expected increase of proceeds in states  {ℎ|ℎ′ ≤ ℎ ≤ 𝑅}  is  𝑄∑ 𝜋ℎ(𝑉𝑅′+1 −𝑅ℎ=ℎ′
𝑉𝑅+1) = 𝛼𝑄𝐻+1∑ (𝑅′ − 𝑅)𝑅ℎ=ℎ′ = 𝛼𝑄𝐻+1∑ (ℎ′ − ℎ)𝑅ℎ=ℎ′ = 𝛼𝑄𝐻+1∑ �𝑅 + 1 − ℎ′�ℎ′−1ℎ=ℎ , and the 
expected increase of proceeds in states  {ℎ|𝑅 + 1 ≤ ℎ ≤ 𝑅′}  is 𝑄∑ 𝜋ℎ(𝑉𝑅′+1 −𝑅′ℎ=𝑅+1
𝑉ℎ) = 𝛼𝑄𝐻+1∑ (𝑅′ + 1 − ℎ)𝑅′ℎ=𝑅+1 = 𝛼𝑄𝐻+1∑ �𝑅′ + 1 − (ℎ + �𝑅′ − ℎ′ + 1��ℎ′−1ℎ=ℎ =
𝛼𝑄
𝐻+1
∑ �ℎ′ − ℎ�
ℎ′−1
ℎ=ℎ , and the loss of overpricing in the withdrawn  states {ℎ|ℎ ≤ ℎ < ℎ′}  
is 𝑄∑ 𝜋ℎ(𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝑉ℎ)ℎ′−1ℎ=ℎ = 𝛼𝑄𝐻+1∑ (𝑅 + 1 − ℎ)ℎ′−1ℎ=ℎ . The sum up is zero. 
Claim 2: The reduction of expected underpricing does not compensate the issuer’s 
welfare loss in the withdrawn states.   
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To attract the issuer and guarantee the success of an offering, the bank prices the offering 
above the issuer reservation price with a value (𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝑉𝑅). In other words, withdrawal 
from any state that otherwise should have been successful generates a welfare loss 
equivalent to this value. (Overstating the reservation price to a higher state generates 
more welfare loss.) 
𝑄∑ 𝜋ℎ(𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝑉𝑅)ℎ′−1ℎ=ℎ = 𝛼𝐻+1∑ 𝑄ℎ′−1ℎ=ℎ > 𝛼𝐻+1∑ (ℎ + 1) (𝑄−ℎ)𝐻−ℎℎ′−1ℎ=ℎ = 𝛼𝐻2 ∑ 𝜋ℎ′ (𝑄−ℎ)𝐻−ℎℎ′−1ℎ=ℎ .  
The welfare loss (LHS) is larger than the deduction of expected underpricing (RHS). 
As a conclusion, the issuer will not overstate its reservation price as long as the 
offer price is attractive enough. In our model, when overpricing is required, the 
underwriter prices the offering above the issuer’s reservation price with an added-value 
equal to the marginal value of investor signal, 𝛼 ≡ 𝑉𝑅+1 − 𝑉𝑅 = 1𝐻+2, which is sufficient 
to incentive the issuer truthfully telling its reservation price, since the deduction of 
expected underpricing by overstating the reservation price is always less than the 
otherwise forgone surplus in the withdrawn states.  
Lemma 4 shows the solution of IPO pricing and allocation where the underwriter 
underprices the offering in the strong market demand states to incentive the investors 
information revealing and overprices the offering above the reservation price in the 
lukewarmly weak premarket demand. The underwriter provides aftermarket price support 
discriminately to the informed investors in states where the offering is truly priced, but 
indiscriminately to all investors participating in the weak demand states where the 
offering is deliberately overpriced. The price stabilization commitment bonds the 
134 
 
 
 
 
underwriter from overstating premarket demand when it is strong, for the very reason as 
in Benveniste et al. (1996), and compensates the investors for accepting overpricing in a 
lukewarmly weak premarket.  
The selective overpricing solution is an extension of and hence compatible with 
the bookbuilding mechanism that Benveniste and Spindt (1989) have described. It reveals 
a unique but underspecified advantage of the bookbuilding mechanism where, by 
selective overpricing, the underwriter can improve the odds of offering success, which is 
also in line with the evidence provided by Dunbar (1998) that firm commitment produces 
a higher probability of success than the best-efforts offering method could. Meanwhile, 
our argument of deliberate overpricing accompanied by aftermarket price support adds to 
the extant literature and evidence regarding the price support activities of underwriters. 
The commitment of price support resolves the underwriter’s incentive problem by 
deterring deliberate overpricing when premarket demand is strong (Benveniste et al. 
1996), and, in the case of insufficient demand, compensating the uninformed investors 
for taking part in a deliberately overpriced offering (Chowdhry and Nanda 1996). The 
argument predicts that price support should be observed more in the later scenario as it is 
expected to accompany the selective overpricing strategy. Indeed, Lewellen (2006) 
observed that banks with retail brokerage operations stabilize to a greater degree than 
other banks, and suggested that price support allows the underwriter to discriminate 
among investors. Our solution in lemma 4 presents a clear incentive and application of 
this discrimination. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5   Conclusions 
Complementary to the earlier IPO literature demonstrates that the underwriter’s 
incentive to overstate premarket interest is constrained by the costly commitment to 
support the aftermarket price, this thesis finds that it is still optimal for underwriters to 
selectively overprice—so as to save—offerings that would otherwise have been 
withdrawn. We find empirical evidence consistent with our predictions. The negative 
price drift is more pronounced in offerings priced at the lower boundary of the 
preliminary price range, especially when the ex ante withdrawal probability is high or 
when the price adjustment to the lower boundary represents a smaller percent of the 
preliminary range’s midpoint. A further study on aftermarket price support shows a 
similar pattern on the underpriced offerings, suggesting that deliberate overpricing is 
accompanied by aftermarket price support. 
The thesis then examines the effect of selective overpricing on the underwriter’s 
future IPO market share change. We find a pronounced market share increase for banks 
after they underwrite offerings with a higher degree of withdrawal-averting effort and 
find no such effect associated with withdrawal screening. A direct comparison among 
different groups of offerings shows that withdrawals are the worst possible outcome for 
underwriters willing to improve their future market shares. Overpriced offerings, even 
with less price support in the first day of trading, significantly relieve the corresponding 
underwriters from the potential of a severe market-share dip commonly associated with 
withdrawals. For overpriced offerings, the underwriters that provide sufficient first-day 
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price support improve their market shares significantly in comparison with those who 
failed to do so. Overall, our results imply that a bank’s withdrawal-averting effort is a 
plausible explanation for its underwriter market share change, and suggest that banks 
willing to improve their future market shares should strategically overprice offerings that 
would otherwise be withdrawals and fulfill the commitment of aftermarket price support 
accordingly. 
In summary, the thesis reveals how underwriters selectively overprice offerings to 
avert potential withdrawals, a phenomenon neglected by past studies. Not only might this 
withdrawal-averting strategy be profitable for individual IPO cases, it might also improve 
investment banks’ capability to compete for future IPOs. As such, our findings shed new 
light on IPO studies and extend implications for practices in the industry.   
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